286 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA HON. OLIVER W. WANGER J. DOE, ) No. CIV-F-03-6249 OWW ) Plaintiff, ) Plaintiff's Application for ) Judgment by Default, Day 3 vs. ) ) ALVARO RAFAEL SARAVIA; and ) DOES 1-10, inclusive, ) ) Defendants. ) ) Fresno, California Thursday, August 26, 2004 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Vol. 3, pgs. 285 to 453, inclusive REPORTED BY: PEGGY J. CRAWFORD, RMR-CRR, Official Reporter 287 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff: HELLER EHRMAN WHITE & MCAULIFFE LLP 333 Bush Street San Francisco, CA 94104-2878 BY: NICHOLAS W. van AELSTYN RUSSELL P. COHEN CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY 870 Market Street, Ste. 684 San Francisco, CA 94102 BY: MATTHEW J. EISENBRANDT CAROLYN PATTY BLUM Also Present: ALMUNDENA BERNABEU 288 INDEX PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES: TERRY LYNN KARL 289 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. van AELSTYN 289 JON CORTINA 372 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. EISENBRANDT 372 MARÍA JULIA HERNÁNDEZ CHAVARRÍA 409 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. van AELSTYN 409 ***** EXHIBITS ***** PLAINTIFF'S Received 64 406 222 410 136 to 138, 140, 141, 145 through 147, 149 430 through 152 and 194 through 215 90, 92 and 93 433 91 and 94 434 22, 26, 35, 36, 38 and 40 443 22, 26, 35, 36, 38 and 40 443 30 444 67 to 72 449 KARL - D 289 1 Thursday, August 26, 2004 Fresno, California 2 9:30 a.m. 3 (Discussion was had in chambers off the record.) 4 THE COURT: Good morning. We are going back on the 5 record in Doe versus Saravia. 6 I believe we have Professor Karl on the witness 7 stand. 8 MR. Van AELSTYN: We would like to continue with 9 Professor Terry Lynn Karl. 10 TERRY LYNN KARL, 11 having been previously sworn, resumed the stand and testified 12 as follows: 13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 14 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 15 Q. Professor Karl, when we finished yesterday, we had gone 16 through your qualifications and the bases of your opinions in 17 this matter. 18 Where I would like to begin now is we turn to the 19 substance of your opinions. First, if you could, I think it 20 would be helpful to an understanding of the events of 1980 to 21 appreciate the historical context in which we find ourselves 22 at that time in El Salvador. 23 So could you please give us a little bit of 24 background about El Salvador at that time and the roots of the 25 conflict that were present at that time. KARL - D 290 1 A. Yes, I think the most important thing is that this is a 2 military authoritarian regime. I have actually prepared a few 3 slides to make this go more quickly so that it's not a class 4 of mine. And I think this is Exhibit 129, if we could put 5 that up. 6 The most important thing, I think, to understand 7 about the roots of the conflict in El Salvador are really two 8 issues: The issue of the concentration of land, which I'm 9 going to talk about in one moment, and the fact that this was 10 a country under military authoritarian rule since 1932. 11 The reason I started in 1932 is that there is a major 12 massacre in that time which is referred to as "The Massacre," 13 that's what it's called, in which it's estimated about 30,000 14 peasants died, killed by militias and people who eventually 15 consolidated into what is at the time of the Romero 16 assassination, the Salvadoran army. 17 And you can see there, I think that's important in 18 that list, is how long it lasted. This is the longest 19 military government in the history of Latin America. 20 Q. The longest continuous military? 21 A. Continuous military government in the history of Latin 22 America. And they occasionally had a practice of inviting 23 civilians into the junta. If they invited enough civilians, 24 we referred to it as a "military civilian junta." 25 So you can see that there are one or two years in '48 KARL - D 291 1 to '50. But instead of thinking of this as an army that 2 defends the borders, this was an army that is like a 3 government. It has factions, it has groups and cliques 4 inside, it has all kind of conflicts within it because it in 5 fact operates as government. 6 Q. You mentioned the traditional role of military, that of 7 defending borders. Has the military of El Salvador ever 8 engaged in war with any of its neighbors? 9 A. It engaged in a very brief war with Honduras. That war 10 was called the "Soccer War." It broke out after a soccer 11 match. It was very, very brief, and that's the only time that 12 I know of that El Salvador has actually defended -- the El 13 Salvadoran military has defended its borders rather than act 14 as a government whose key role was to keep order inside El 15 Salvador. 16 Q. How did they keep order and what kind of order did it 17 maintain within El Salvador? 18 A. If I can see slide 130 or Exhibit 130? The most important 19 thing, to summarize very quickly, about this is, that in El 20 Salvador, the military ruled with a group of landowners that 21 were often referred to as the "14 families." 22 Q. Were they in fact 14 families? 23 A. No, there were not 14, but they are called "los 24 quatorce" -- I will spell that for you later -- "The 14." And 25 they ruled in conjunction with each other as a kind of KARL - D 292 1 bargain. 2 And the bargain was that the military would keep 3 order. It would protect the land of the landowners. It would 4 actually locate National Guard barracks on large property. So 5 there would actually be National Guard, not barracks, but 6 housing in groups inside the property of large landowners, and 7 they would patrol property. And the reason for that -- 8 Q. They would patrol the private -- the military would patrol 9 the private property of the landowners? 10 A. That's right. 11 Q. In the barracks? 12 A. That's right. They would make sure that peasants were 13 working, that they were behaving themselves, that they were 14 not organizing. There was no right to organize or freedom of 15 expression or any of the things that we might have in our Bill 16 of Rights. 17 And the purpose was to maintain order on the property 18 of large landowners and make sure that the peasantry did not 19 organize at all or that there were no farm workers unions, et 20 cetera. 21 And if you can see, it was a bargain in the sense 22 that military officers who retired often worked for 23 landowners. And officers who were in the military, 24 particularly low level officers at lower ranks, would, on the 25 side, would for -- excuse me, work for landowners. KARL - D 293 1 And that meant that this practice of having, in a 2 sense, two jobs, one in the military, and then one for the 3 landowners, is a practice that is a fairly old one. So they 4 would actually be on the payroll of landowners and on the 5 payroll of the military. 6 Q. And was most of the land in El Salvador then owned by 7 these "14 Family" landowners? 8 A. Yes. El Salvador had at this time one of the highest 9 concentrations of land ownership worldwide, not just in Latin 10 America, but also worldwide. And that meant that there was a 11 situation in which there were some very wealthy Salvadorans, 12 and the great majority of Salvadorans were extremely poor. 13 It was still, at the time of the outbreak of the war, 14 and the assassination of Archbishop Romero, it was still 15 primarily a rural country. And that meant that about -- it's 16 our estimate that about 70 percent of the people -- it's not 17 my estimate, this is the estimate of economists, about 70 18 percent of the people lived far below what we call a 19 poverty -- at absolute poverty line. 20 Q. And most of them lived in the countryside? 21 A. And most of them lived in the countryside, that's right. 22 Q. And the concentration of land ownership, you said at this 23 time, how long did that concentration of land ownership 24 continue? 25 A. The concentration of land ownership continued until a land KARL - D 294 1 reform that was actually carried out during the process of the 2 civil war. So land is less concentrated, although wealth and 3 assets in El Salvador, meaning other forms of property, remain 4 as concentrated as before. 5 So there is an important land reform that happens in 6 this story, but not until later, and it is the issue of the 7 concentration of land that is one of the major issues that 8 provokes the kind of violence that we see in El Salvador 9 during this period. 10 Q. You say "later." Let's try to be specific here. Do we 11 mean before or after Monseñor Romero's killing? 12 A. Well, there is a debate inside the military between what I 13 refer to as "hardliners and reformists." 14 The reformists are people who believe that some type 15 of land reform has to occur, even if it's very, very small. 16 And even if it's a very, very small one, of at least massive 17 properties that are unoccupied and are not being worked, that 18 at least those should be broken up. 19 Hardliners do not believe in any form of land reform 20 and they are absolutely violently opposed to it, as are, 21 really, all of the leading landowners. 22 Q. You are talking about 1979-1980? 23 A. This is a long-standing issue. So this is an issue in the 24 60s. It's an issue in the 70s. It's an issue that becomes 25 more and more intense, because after the war with Honduras, KARL - D 295 1 the border between Honduras and El Salvador is closed. And -- 2 Q. When was that war? 3 A. That's in 1969. The closing of that border is very 4 important, because in the past, Salvadorans, who didn't have 5 land and had no access to land used to cross the border into 6 Honduras, where there is a lot more land, and work there. So 7 it was kind of an escape valve for pressure. 8 As soon as that was closed, the pressure for land 9 reform built up greater and greater and greater inside the 10 country and the tensions within the military over the issue of 11 land reform became greater and greater. The demands for land 12 reform outside became much greater. 13 Q. Professor Karl, before we can understand the nature of the 14 conflict that these tensions that you are describing with 15 regard to the demands for land reform, perhaps you could 16 describe in a little more detail just how it was that the 17 military implemented this model that you have described in 18 terms of its tacit agreement with the landowners? 19 A. Right. As pressure and tensions for land reform grew, the 20 military found itself having to become -- when I say -- let me 21 be clear. 22 When I say "the military," it is shorthand for 23 military and security forces. And that means, unlike our 24 system, military or armed forces means all of the forces of 25 the Salvadoran -- all armed groups in El Salvador. So it KARL - D 296 1 includes -- just so I don't have to repeat every group -- it 2 includes the National Guard, the Army, the Air Force, the 3 Treasury Police, the National Police. 4 So armed forces in El Salvador are under one 5 officer -- one group of officers, a very small group. At the 6 time of the outbreak -- at the time of the Romero 7 assassination, there were approximately 450 officers in the 8 country. Those officers ruled over the military. 9 Q. I'm sorry to back up. Just so I'm clear, you have 10 identified, if I understand you correctly, five different 11 branches of the military? 12 A. That's right. 13 Q. The Army, Air Force, National Guard, Treasury Police and 14 National Police? 15 A. That's right. 16 Q. And each one of these branches of the military was a 17 national entity? 18 A. That's right. 19 Q. There were no local police forces? 20 A. No. 21 Q. Okay. And there was no Navy? 22 A. No. And unlike our system, where the police and armed 23 forces are separate, and unlike our system, where there are 24 separate branches of the armed forces, this is all united 25 under one set of officers who have a High Command that rules KARL - D 297 1 over all of these groups. 2 Q. So a major in the Army can equally well order troops that 3 are in the National Police; is that what you are saying? 4 A. No, that's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that the High 5 Command, as a group, may decide that the National Guard goes 6 here, and then that will go under the structure of the 7 National Guard. 8 But it also means that they are very used to 9 cooperating. And they graduate in classes together. So you 10 don't go to an Army college, you don't go to a Navy school. 11 You go to a school of the armed forces. You graduate as 12 officers. And your graduating class, one might go to the 13 police, another might go to the Army, another might go to the 14 National Guard. 15 And then that group is your reference group. It's 16 called a "tanda," it's your group of loyalty. It's your 17 clique, if I could put it that way. And yet that group 18 extends throughout the entire armed and security forces and 19 police. 20 So it's very, very different than our own system, and 21 they cooperate together to keep order in El Salvador. And 22 when I say a "military authoritarian government," I mean all 23 of these groups, then. 24 The Minister of Defense would be the Minister of 25 Defense over the Army, the security forces and the police. So KARL - D 298 1 it's very different than our system. 2 THE COURT: By 1980, was there a concentration of 3 political authority in one command leader or was there a group 4 that held the power? 5 THE WITNESS: This is what is so interesting to me in 6 this organization, because it actually works more like a 7 government than it does an armed forces, in that it rules by 8 consensus and compromise. 9 So there is a group, which is the High Command, and 10 yet it is -- the decision of who becomes the Minister of 11 Defense is a decision made by the entire High Command in their 12 bargaining. And while that person may then have command 13 responsibility over the group, they could also remove him. So 14 it's more complicated than the system that we have, because 15 they are government, they rule together, make agreements 16 together. 17 It is clear at the time of Romero's assassination 18 that there are some people in the Army High Command, which is 19 a very small group, and in fact, the -- so if you can think of 20 an officer corps that's 450 people, there is a High Command, 21 which is a relatively small group, I don't actually know the 22 exact number, but it's probably something like 30 or so. 23 And then within that group, there is another group, 24 which is the most important in the High Command. And they are 25 often referred to as "compadres." And that actually means KARL - D 299 1 godfathers. 2 And the reason for that language inside the military 3 is that these people are so close and so deeply intertwined 4 that they become the godparents for each other's children, and 5 that's how that language came about. 6 So it's an extremely tight-knit group that goes to 7 school together, that rises through the ranks together, that 8 goes to different services together, but their loyalty is 9 never to the service, it is to each other. 10 THE COURT: Was there a central place of government 11 where the High Command, in effect, convened to do the business 12 of the nation? 13 THE WITNESS: Well, there is two places. One is the 14 estado mayor. And that is the -- if you go into San Salvador, 15 there is a huge area of San Salvador that is the headquarters 16 of the armed forces. And inside, that is where their meetings 17 take place; that's where their club is. That's where the high 18 officers live, many of them, et cetera. 19 But there is also the official government, which is 20 the Presidential Palace, and the Minister of Defense, the 21 president, who would be a Colonel, would be inside the 22 Presidency, but there is also the Army Headquarters. 23 So between those two places, that is power, in other 24 words. If you were trying to -- if you were going as the U.S. 25 Ambassador to present your credentials, you would present them KARL - D 300 1 to the Colonel, who was President at the time, in the 2 Presidential Palace, but he may very well live and have his 3 permanent residence in the headquarters in San Salvador of the 4 armed forces. 5 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 6 Q. A small question. Why wouldn't the President be a General 7 instead of a Colonel? 8 A. There were no Generals until after the civil war started. 9 So the High Command were Colonels. 10 And if you look at this slide of mine, what is 11 important in it, what -- the first time I ever did interviews 12 in El Salvador, the first army or military man I ever talked 13 to, I was asking him to explain, since it was not an army that 14 I was familiar with, it was clearly very different, to explain 15 the ranks. 16 And this is what he said to me. He went up through 17 the ranks starting at the bottom and he said, "Captain, Major, 18 Colonel, millionaire." That's the way he explained it to me. 19 And that meant that as you -- the army was a mechanism to 20 become rich. 21 This is very important, because as you pass through 22 in the high officer corps, you also, because of your bargain 23 with the landowners, found ways to move into wealthier 24 occupations and to work for private landowners. That's why 25 this bargain also relates, also develops strong relationships KARL - D 301 1 between retired Colonels and landowners. 2 Q. Did there come a time when there were security forces that 3 were of a more irregular nature? 4 THE COURT: Before we get to this, if I may, I would 5 like to ask one more question. That is, was there, in 1980, a 6 legislative body within El Salvador that was separate from 7 this military command you've described? 8 THE WITNESS: There was a legislative body. But the 9 parties that were permitted to operate until October 1979 were 10 military parties. In other words, if you think of the 11 military as government, again, the military actually had a 12 political party which was called the "Party of National 13 Reconciliation" and that party was a military party. 14 There were also smaller military parties. And that's 15 one of the ways the military, as government, also starts to 16 have the problems of any government. It has different groups 17 that want their own party. It has Colonels that, when they 18 retire, want to form an organization. So there is that 19 tension. 20 Until -- well, I will tell more of this history in a 21 little bit, but until, really, 1984, no civilian, nonmilitary 22 party was really permitted to actually enter elections -- 23 well, to enter elections, yes, but not to win. 24 THE COURT: Was the legislature, whatever it was 25 called, subordinate to or was it independent or coequal with KARL - D 302 1 the ruling command? 2 THE WITNESS: There was nothing independent. There 3 was no independent judiciary. There was no Parliament. The 4 Parliament was run by the military party. 5 The judiciary was usually -- particularly the Supreme 6 Court, was usually a place that landowners felt very strongly 7 about controlling, and one of the things that, in these 8 factions that happened inside the military, you see that there 9 are key positions that hardliners and reformers jockey for. 10 They try to get certain positions because they are more 11 powerful. For example, the Minister of Defense, it's a 12 powerful position. So the hardliners would want that. 13 The hardliners always wanted the investigative units 14 of every operation. For example, the investigative units of 15 the National Police, the agency that actually investigated, 16 was always controlled by hardliners. 17 When I get to the death squad discussion, it became 18 the center of one of the major death squads in the country. 19 The legislature was never independent. And later on, 20 one of the main death squads was run out of the office of the 21 President of the Legislature. 22 So even though there were lots of government 23 institutions, there was one power in the country. And that 24 actually -- well, actually, let me step back from that. 25 What is important, and is very important, I think, to KARL - D 303 1 understanding the moment in which the Archbishop is murdered, 2 is that this bargain that I have there (referring to diagram) 3 between the landowners and the military actually changes over 4 time in power. 5 The way it changes is that, as conflict rises, the 6 military, particularly the hardliners and the landowners, 7 believe that you need more and more force and more and more 8 violence to control the country and to make sure that the 9 military stays in power. 10 The more you rely on violence, the more the military 11 becomes powerful. And the landowners begin in this bargain 12 not to be the top -- certainly, they are the top socially, but 13 not politically, I'm speaking, not to be the top. Eventually 14 to be coequal with the military. 15 And later, it is the military that calls the shots 16 and not the landowners. So we are actually living in a time 17 where the more you need to rely on violence to govern 18 El Salvador, the more the people with guns have power. 19 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 20 Q. And this time that you are talking about, this 21 transitional period, is the 1970s, roughly? 22 A. It is the 1970s. Now, when that happens -- well, it 23 actually starts in the 60s, but through the 70s. When that 24 happens, the military, meaning all of these armed services 25 that I'm talking about, begin to find that the National Guard, KARL - D 304 1 as it's constituted, or the police -- and those are the ones 2 that do the most work in maintaining order, because the 3 National Guard, as I said, are often on properties -- the 4 police, those are the ones that maintain order the most in 5 rural areas, internal order. 6 So it's the security forces, the National Guard, that 7 are key -- that are the keys to maintaining order. The First 8 Brigade in the Army is located in San Salvador, but it isn't 9 patrolling in the same way that the police are, for example, 10 to keep order inside. 11 Now, as -- 12 Q. If I may understand. The National Police and the National 13 Guard, then, would they be a little bit more closely allied 14 with the rural landowners? 15 A. They would be much more closely allied with the 16 landowners, particularly the Treasury Police. Treasury Police 17 are originally formed in Latin America to collect taxes, but 18 there are no taxes in these countries. There is no collection 19 of taxes. 20 So rather than collecting taxes, the Treasury Police 21 make sure that it helps control labor. This is a system that, 22 as political scientists, we call a "labor repressive system." 23 It means you squeeze as much labor out of workers, farmers, 24 peasants, as you can through the use of force. And rather 25 than paying them a salary or wage or having unions or KARL - D 305 1 whatever, you don't allow any of that. 2 And the way you do it is you force people to work 3 certain hours at extremely low pay. And that's what we call a 4 "labor repressive system." This is a classic labor repressive 5 system. 6 What happens is that as the problems in El Salvador 7 intensify, as land becomes more and more scarce, as people -- 8 very low standards of living begin to fall, as peasants cannot 9 eke out any kind of livelihood whatsoever, the tension inside 10 this country grows more and more and more as an opposition 11 starts to form. 12 The military begins to feel that it cannot govern 13 with the numbers that it has and that it needs more help. And 14 this is actually a very important decision, because I believe 15 the roots of the Romero murder are actually in this process. 16 What they do, then, is they set up a paramilitary 17 apparatus, which is called "ORDEN" and it means literally 18 "order." It's an acronym, O-R-D-E-N. 19 Now, when I say "they," I need to say a name, who is 20 very important in this story. His name is Colonel Medrano. 21 And Colonel Medrano is the architect. He is, at this point, 22 the primary leader within the High Command. And there are a 23 series of -- 24 Your Honor you asked me about whether there was a 25 primary leader. In different moments, there is somebody who KARL - D 306 1 rises up because of some kind of skills, and at this moment, 2 in the 60s, it was Colonel Medrano. 3 THE COURT: Would he be the equivalent of a head of 4 state? 5 THE WITNESS: Well, he was not the head of state, 6 because there was a president, there was a different 7 president. 8 But the key to El Salvador is the formal institutions 9 aren't the way it's governed. It's not where real power lies. 10 Real power doesn't lie because you are the president. It lies 11 in who are the key members of the High Command of the 12 military. That's real power in El Salvador. 13 So you can be the president and look like you have 14 formal power, but you will not be able to do anything against 15 what the High Command wants you to do, and you may very well 16 be removed as president of the country by the High Command. 17 So in this case, Colonel Medrano, this is in the late 18 1960s -- 19 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 20 Q. Professor Karl, if I could, I know I may be jumping ahead 21 a little bit, but I think this might be helpful, because you 22 mentioned Colonel Medrano, if we could see slide, Exhibit 164. 23 A. Oh, okay. Do I have a copy of that? 24 THE COURT: Is the monitor on there, Professor Karl? 25 It's too small. All right. KARL - D 307 1 THE WITNESS: Okay. 2 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 3 Q. First, perhaps, if you could quickly identify what 4 Exhibit 164 is? 5 A. Yeah. This is a declassified document from the Central 6 Intelligence Agency. 7 Q. For whom was it prepared? 8 A. This is a memorandum that was prepared for then 9 Vice-president George Bush, the father of the current 10 President. And he was then Vice-president in the Reagan 11 Administration. 12 In 1983, he makes a very important trip to 13 El Salvador, basically, to tell the military High Command that 14 if they do not cut the level of repression and if they do not 15 remove certain officers from the military, that the United 16 States will cut aid. And he says he is bringing -- this is a 17 secret meeting. 18 He says he is bringing this message directly from 19 President Reagan, and I will actually talk about this visit a 20 little later. But in preparation for this visit -- 21 Q. Preparation or what's the date of the document? 22 A. No excuse me, this is after. I'm sorry. Well, actually, 23 let me step back, because both in preparation for this visit 24 and after the visit, there were a series of documents prepared 25 so that Vice-president Bush in his meetings would understand KARL - D 308 1 exactly who he was meeting with. 2 There had been a sense among some members of the 3 Republican party that the problem in El Salvador, conservative 4 versus liberal versus Communist insurgency, could be 5 understood somehow like us, that somebody like D'Aubuisson was 6 kind of like a conservative Republican or an especially 7 conservative Republican. 8 And I think they were quickly disabused of that the 9 more people came in contact with the kinds of -- with somebody 10 like Roberto D'Aubuisson and the people around him. 11 So there were constant preparation of documents for 12 each new Ambassador and for anybody who was coming to 13 El Salvador at the first time. 14 Q. That's the importance of this document, by way of 15 preparation, though, because you mentioned Colonel Medrano 16 before, and I wanted to draw your attention to the first 17 paragraph on page 2 at the top. 18 A. I want to say that the importance of this particular memo 19 is after Vice-president Bush read them the riot act, this is a 20 memo prepared afterwards. So they can try to track what 21 actually happened as a result of the Vice-president's visit. 22 The first paragraph of this, as you can see, it's -- 23 actually, my copy is more redacted -- I'm sorry. 24 It says D'Aubuisson's military contacts, right. And 25 on this page, it has a history of Roberto D'Aubuisson prepared KARL - D 309 1 for the Vice-president. 2 "Before leaving the Armed Forces in the wake of the 3 October 1979 military coup, Major D'Aubuisson had 4 served much of his career as an intelligence officer 5 with the National Guard. He and several other 6 colleagues, graduates from the academy classes of 7 1963, 1964 and 1966, worked directly under or in 8 cooperation with National Guard Director Medrano, a 9 notorious and powerful figure in military and right 10 wing civilian circles. Medrano had his proteges 11 focus on counter-intelligence and rural security; 12 during the 1960s and 1970s, D'Aubuisson and his 13 colleagues helped develop civilian intelligence 14 networks and vigilante organizations controlled by 15 the National Guard. 16 "They also engaged in illegal detentions, torture, and 17 the killing of prisoners, habits which," and this 18 is -- the name is redacted, "suggests stayed with 19 some of them after the 1979 reformist coup." 20 Q. And I bring this up by way of reference back to Medrano, 21 and the origins of the tensions that became more prominent in 22 the 1970s. 23 A. Right. 24 Q. Who was Medrano? And that would then lead us to our 25 discussion of Roberto D'Aubuisson. KARL - D 310 1 A. Medrano was a very important figure in the military. He 2 was formally the head of the National Guard, but again, the 3 formal positions are not what's key here, although it meant, 4 as head of the National Guard, that he had more interaction 5 with rural landowners than others. 6 What Medrano did was realize that -- and this is one 7 of the reasons he's considered such a hero inside the 8 Salvadoran military, he believed that the military itself and 9 the security forces, as they were constituted, were not going 10 to be able to control a situation in El Salvador that was 11 arising, and they were not going to be able to stay in power 12 as a military regime unless they developed a more 13 sophisticated repressive apparatus. 14 Q. In this document that you just read, it refers to 15 developing civilian intelligence networks and vigilante 16 organizations? 17 A. That's right. That is ORDEN. And what Medrano did is he 18 established ORDEN, which was a paramilitary organization of 19 about 80,000 civilians that were not in the military, had not 20 been through the military schools. They were not officers, 21 but they were collaborators with the military, and there were 22 about 80,000 of them. So it means they were in every single 23 village. 24 Q. It does say here in the CIA documents that these 25 organizations were controlled by the National Guard? KARL - D 311 1 A. That's right. And they had a very close relationship with 2 the National Guard. 3 I want to talk about ORDEN for just a moment, but 4 before I do, let me say one other agency that I think we 5 should also talk about, and that is the other piece that 6 Medrano -- this is again why he is considered such a hero 7 inside the military. 8 The other piece, the other idea was to develop a very 9 sophisticated intelligence apparatus that was -- that united 10 intelligence throughout the country. And meant that if you 11 lived in one part of El Salvador, you could have an 12 intelligence that would let you know what was going on in the 13 other part of El Salvador. 14 And he set up an organization called ANSESAL, which 15 is the National Security Intelligence Agency of El Salvador. 16 And his idea was that you would have the armed 17 forces, meaning the armed forces, the security forces; you 18 would have a major paramilitary organization, ORDEN; and you 19 would have ANSESAL, which is the big intelligence agency. 20 His other idea, which became very important for 21 Roberto D'Aubuisson, is that ORDEN would eventually become a 22 political party that would have two sides to it. 23 The first side was a kind of normal political party, 24 if I could put it that way, in which it would be in the 25 legislature, do whatever the legislature does. It would be a KARL - D 312 1 political party affiliated with the military and loyal to the 2 military. 3 But the second part of it was always considered to be 4 a paramilitary apparatus that belonged to the party and that 5 would in fact carry out the kinds of activities that are 6 listed in the document for the preparation of Vice-president 7 Bush. 8 So it would be a party that would have a military 9 apparatus as part of the party. 10 Q. So Colonel Medrano's assessment of the increasing tensions 11 within El Salvador led him to develop the strategy of 12 developing ORDEN and ANSESAL, paramilitary groups and 13 intelligence. 14 What were the problems that Medrano and his 15 colleagues were focused upon for which ORDEN and ANSESAL were 16 their solutions? 17 A. Well, the main problem came from the nature of military 18 rule and the nature of the bargain I talked about, which is -- 19 I think -- I'm simplifying a lot. 20 But it comes down to two questions: The right to 21 land or to in some way to earn a livelihood in, particularly, 22 rural areas, but eventually urban areas as well. 23 And the second issue is really democracy. It's the 24 right to form political parties, the right to have unions, the 25 right to have freedom of expression, the right to have KARL - D 313 1 newspapers that can print whatever they want, et cetera, et 2 cetera. 3 And that was what the opposition was about. It was 4 an opposition to military authoritarian rule that had governed 5 since 1932. 6 Q. So opposition was starting to develop and increase during 7 this period? 8 A. Absolutely. The Christian Democratic Party, which is a 9 party that was headed by Jose Napoleon Duarte, was founded in 10 the 1960s. It was the first major political party in 11 El Salvador that was not a military party. 12 There were other -- when I say "major," I mean in 13 terms of size and reach. There was a very small Communist 14 party. There were other little parties. Many other little 15 parties, but in terms of the important political party, it was 16 the Christian Democratic Party. It was affiliated with 17 Christian Democratic Parties all over the world, including one 18 in Germany, including one in Spain, et cetera. 19 So -- and it was the primary push at this time for 20 democracy. 21 Now, I should also say that the Christian Democratic 22 party was in its roots, not just in El Salvador, but all over 23 the world, is a party that was formed by religious Catholics. 24 So it's always had, in every country, a strong link with 25 religious authorities and with churches. KARL - D 314 1 Q. And was there a role of the Church in the growing 2 opposition at this period in the early 70s? 3 A. Yes. May I have Exhibit 218? I want to be clear that I'm 4 an expert in the Church as a political force and not as a 5 religious organization. 6 So what happens in the Church all over the world at 7 this time is the appearance of something that is called 8 "liberation theology." And liberation theology, this is 9 very -- we date this primarily to changes in the Church in 10 1968, just to put a date on it. 11 Liberation theology -- 12 Q. I'm sorry, was there a place as well? 13 A. Medellin. 14 Q. Was there a conference there? 15 A. Yes, and the Pope. 16 Q. The Pope met at this conference in Medellin? 17 A. As I said, I think others are more able to talk about the 18 religious origins of this and how liberation theology -- but 19 it is a major shift in Catholic doctrine. 20 Q. Okay. 21 A. I think that's the important thing. And the reason it's a 22 shift is that what it says is that the Church has a duty for 23 what is called a "preferential option for the poor." In other 24 words, it needs to prefer and put ahead of others the needs of 25 the poor. KARL - D 315 1 And that means that in the case of El Salvador, the 2 way this translates, is that instead of teaching that your 3 life might be miserable today, but you will have a better 4 after life, after you die, the Church -- and this is all over 5 Latin America -- begins to say that hunger, disease, infant 6 mortality, these things are not the will of God, these are 7 man-made problems. This is not God's order. And that since 8 they are man-made problems, people need to do something about 9 them. 10 So it encourages, actually, the organization of 11 unions, really, of peasant federations, of joining political 12 parties, because it says this order is not a natural order, it 13 is not God's will. These are problems made by human beings 14 and they can be changed by human beings. 15 And this is a very major change. Because the Church 16 initially, Archbishop Romero initially, these are conservative 17 bishops whose job in El Salvador, really, is to baptize and 18 educate the children of the wealthier. The UCA, the Catholic 19 University, was considered the best university in Central 20 America, all over Central America, by the way, for people 21 to -- for wealthy people to send their children. 22 So unlike a -- unlike other Latin American countries 23 that may want to send their child to Stanford or Harvard, that 24 wasn't what you wanted to do in El Salvador. Your kids went 25 to the UCA, because it was a very powerful and prestigious KARL - D 316 1 university that educated primarily the children of the wealthy 2 and the middle class -- well, it was a very little middle 3 class -- and professionals, let me put it that way. 4 So this is a big shift. Because as the Church then 5 begins to move from that traditional role, it doesn't leave 6 that role, but it starts to talk about farm workers having 7 rights to organize, and it starts to preach this preferential 8 option for the poor to the wealthy. 9 This is an enormous betrayal. It's just -- I can't 10 even explain how visceral this is to them. 11 Q. What percentage of the population El Salvador was Catholic 12 at this time? 13 A. Probably about 93 percent. 14 Q. 93 percent? 15 A. Uh-huh, somewhere between 93 and 95. 16 Q. It may be a little hard for us to appreciate in a more 17 secular society here, at least at this time. How practicing 18 were people at that time? 19 A. Very practicing. 20 Q. So this -- 21 A. Priests were -- even prior to the role that Archbishop 22 Romero played, in every community in El Salvador, the priest 23 was the only other major authority besides the military 24 commander of the area where you lived. 25 So if you were a peasant, you didn't travel, you KARL - D 317 1 stayed -- you worked the land and stayed where you were. And 2 you worked for somebody. And the people in your life that 3 mattered were the landowner you worked for, the military 4 officer that patrolled your area, and the priest or religious 5 worker that ministered to your soul. 6 Q. So this change in theology of the Church, then, this was a 7 voice that could be heard in El Salvador? 8 A. Oh, absolutely. And it also then joins with the building 9 up of a Christian Democratic Party. 10 Now, it also joins with other civilian political 11 parties that form. So there is the formation of a small 12 Social Democratic Party. There is a small Communist Party. 13 There is a bigger and growing Christian Democratic Party, 14 which I want to stress, that both the Social Democratic Party 15 and the Christian Democratic Party are very anti-Communist. 16 Deeply anti-Communist. 17 And the liberation theologists are theologists, so 18 they are not atheists, they are not members of a Communist 19 party. They are people who change because of this religious 20 doctrine of the preferential option for the poor. 21 So there is a deep religiosity in most of the 22 opposition of El Salvador. There is a very deep religiosity, 23 whether you are in a political party, whether you are a 24 religious worker, whether you are a union organizer, there is 25 a very deep religiosity in all of this. KARL - D 318 1 Q. Was there an election in 1972? 2 A. Yes, there was. In 1972, was the first time that a 3 civilian party had been able to both form and participate in 4 elections. 5 Q. This is the first time that civilian parties were allowed 6 to participate? 7 A. Were allowed to participate in an election. It just turns 8 out they weren't allowed to win one. 9 Q. Could you explain that? 10 A. Yeah. In 1972, Jose Napoleon Duarte and this new 11 Christian Democratic Party ran in the elections against the 12 military party. And by every single account, not only our 13 intelligence agencies and our Embassy, but every single 14 account in El Salvador, including the Right, by the way, and 15 including the military, Jose Napoleon Duarte won those 16 elections by what looked like a landslide. 17 As it was clear that he was winning, and, therefore, 18 would occupy the Presidency, and there would be a civilian 19 Christian Democrat who actually was in the opposition and 20 wanted a democracy and wanted to end military rule and had a 21 platform for land reform, when it became clear that he had won 22 this election, a group of military officers intervened from 23 the High Command to overturn the elections and to install a 24 new Colonel as president. 25 So Duarte was captured. He was caught and beaten. KARL - D 319 1 He probably would have been killed, most of us believe, except 2 he was very close to the President of the University of Notre 3 Dame in the United States, Father Theodore Hesberg, who is a 4 leading, both academic and theologian, in this country. And 5 Father Hesberg was called immediately, contacted somebody in 6 the CIA. And the CIA actually intervened to save Duarte. 7 Duarte then went to Venezuela in exile, which is how 8 I met him and how I actually became interested in El Salvador. 9 So that's what happens to him. He's actually forced 10 out of the country. The elections are shut down. And the 11 fraud is carried out by a group that installs Colonel Molina 12 as president. He becomes president from 1972 to 1977. 13 Q. Could we have Exhibit 77, please. Who are these people? 14 A. Well, the man on the right is Archbishop Romero, and the 15 other man is President and Colonel Molina. 16 Q. So this is before Archbishop Romero was elevated to the 17 Archbishop? 18 A. No, this is when he's a Bishop, I believe. I don't know 19 the date of this photo. But if he is meeting with Molina, he 20 is a Bishop. 21 He was working in the eastern part of the country, 22 and he probably met fairly regularly. Remember, Archbishop 23 Romero was actually considered a conservative cleric. 24 Q. When he was Bishop of San Miguel? 25 A. When he was Bishop of San Miguel, that's right. And so he KARL - D 320 1 participated, as did the bishops and the Archbishop, in the 2 ceremonies. When a president would be elected, they would 3 meet with the presidents, et cetera. 4 But Molina who is there, is a Colonel in the High 5 Command. And his -- the decision to make him president wasn't 6 just his decision. It was the decision of a group of people 7 in the High Command and their allies. 8 And that group is called the "Molina Group." That 9 group is very important. Because in the Molina Group are a 10 number of people that all figure very prominently in the 11 assassination of Archbishop Romero. Should I name them? 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. Okay. The names that are important, there are other 14 names, but the key names are a Colonel Gutierrez, a Colonel 15 Garcia, and the man who became part of the Presidential Guard 16 of Colonel Molina, Roberto D'Aubuisson. 17 Q. Could we have Exhibit 45, please. Is that Roberto 18 D'Aubuisson? 19 A. Yes, it is. 20 Q. Could we have -- 21 A. I should add that D'Aubuisson at this time is a relatively 22 low level military officer. And the way that these cliques 23 would work is there would be a powerful group. So the 24 powerful group in this case is Medrano, Gutierrez, Garcia, 25 another one named Carranza, Santivañez, and then D'Aubuisson KARL - D 321 1 works for them. He is very low level at this time in history. 2 The reason some of those names are important -- 3 Q. If I could interrupt for one moment. Did D'Aubuisson have 4 anybody below him even at this early level in Molina's 5 Presidential Guard? 6 A. Yes, he did. He had -- in the Presidential Guard, he met 7 Alvaro Saravia. So he worked with Saravia in the Presidential 8 Guard of Colonel Molina after the electoral fraud of 1972. 9 Q. Thank you. Go on. 10 A. Just to be clear, the reason that this is important is 11 that there is a kind of hierarchy here. There is Medrano at 12 the top. Medrano has two chief lieutenants, which he calls -- 13 which he calls his two chief lieutenants. 14 One of them is the person who was given the job of 15 forming ORDEN, of forming this paramilitary apparatus of these 16 80,000 civilians. And his name was Colonel Carranza. 17 The other person was given the job of setting up the 18 intelligence agency. The other two -- and that was Colonel 19 Gutierrez and Colonel Santivañez. 20 The reason that's important is Santivañez is 21 D'Aubuisson's direct boss, because D'Aubuisson ends up -- his 22 base of operation is the intelligence agency, ANSESAL. 23 So that's why I'm telling all this, is his base of 24 operation is in ANSESAL, after he leaves the Presidential 25 Guard. So I know we will talk about that a little bit, but KARL - D 322 1 just to understand the hierarchy, and also the institutions 2 that they occupy. 3 Q. So how long did Colonel Molina govern El Salvador? 4 A. Colonel Molina governed El Salvador from 1972 till 1977. 5 And when he governed, the Grupo Molina, the Molina Group, was 6 within the High Command what we call the "compadres," the 7 godfathers. They were the "High Command of the High Command," 8 if I can put it that way. 9 And this is, again, very important to understand, 10 because since the military is also the government, there are 11 always people who are in or out. 12 And at this point, during the Molina period, from '72 13 to '73, the Molina Group -- 14 Q. '72 to '77? 15 A. Excuse me, '72 to '77, the Molina Group are the ins. They 16 are the ones who are the godfathers. 17 When the next president comes in, who is another 18 Colonel, in 1977, they become "outs," because they are 19 associated with the last president. 20 Q. And the one who came in in 1977 was Humberto Romero? 21 A. That's right. He has the same name as the Archbishop. He 22 was Colonel Romero. 23 Q. And they are not related? 24 A. They are not related. 25 Q. So in 1977, the Grupo Molina goes on the outs after having KARL - D 323 1 been the ins on the High Command? 2 A. When I say "outs," they are still enormously powerful. 3 They are in the High Command. But in the High Command, there 4 are people who control the High Command, or who are more 5 powerful within the High Command. And they have moved from 6 the most powerful group back to the High Command. They are 7 still the governing apparatus of the country, and I mean that 8 in terms of power. 9 Q. Do I understand correctly then that within the High 10 Command there may be factions that are gaining power over each 11 other, occupying the position of the compadres you described? 12 A. That's right. 13 Q. So for any given period, one faction might be the 14 compadres within the High Command? 15 A. Right. So, for example, when Molina is in power, he wants 16 around him the people who made the decision to make him 17 president. So the people who were most powerful in the 18 decision in the High Command to choose Colonel Molina as 19 president of the country are the people that become the 20 godfathers. 21 When Romero, after -- these are five-year terms. And 22 I guess I should clarify something. El Salvador, during the 23 entire time it was a military authoritarian rule, always had 24 elections. Always. It's always had more elections under 25 authoritarian rule than almost any other country that was KARL - D 324 1 under authoritarian rule, but these were elections in which a 2 military party participated. 3 So the decision of who was going to be president 4 changed every five years. It's one of the reasons the 5 authoritarian regime lasted so long, because there was 6 actually a rotation of power within it. 7 This is one of the reasons why it was so durable, 8 because you actually shared power. You got to be in for a 9 while, and that's why the ranks of the military were described 10 in the way they were. You got to get into power. You got to 11 circulate, you got to get to the top of power, if you were an 12 officer. I'm not talking about a normal soldier or national 13 guardsman or a person like Garay, for example, which would 14 never have had these opportunities. 15 But if you were a member of the officer corps, if you 16 were one of these 450, you would always have the chance to 17 move up. You would always have the chance to be a member of 18 the High Command, if you were a good enough officer. 19 And if you were a member of the High Command, you 20 were going to be, at some point, if, again, you were a good 21 enough officer in the terms of what "good" meant in the 22 system, you would eventually get to be part of the godfathers. 23 You would get your turn. 24 And then once you got your turn, you would use that 25 to cement your relationship with the landowners and your KARL - D 325 1 ability to live well after you left the Army or the armed 2 forces. 3 So once Molina has his five years, there is an 4 election. He's out. He is no longer in the military. The 5 Molina Group is back into the High Command, but there is a new 6 group that are the godfathers. 7 Q. And that's the Romero Group? 8 A. That's Colonel Romero's group. Now, this is a system 9 which operated well when there was no opposition. But as 10 opposition grows, who becomes the high group in the High 11 Command becomes a much more controversial and political 12 question, because if it was once just a problem of whether you 13 had gone to school with this guy or not or were in the same 14 clique as him, it is now a problem of whether you are a 15 hardliner or a reformer within the military. 16 So the decision of who becomes president, of who is 17 in the High Command and then who in the High Command are the 18 godfathers of the High Command, becomes an extremely political 19 and politicized question within the military. 20 Q. When the Molina Group was out of power, what did they do, 21 including Roberto D'Aubuisson? Within 1977, now we are 22 talking about, no longer compadres, but still within the High 23 Command, but out of the most powerful position. Did they 24 begin to exercise power in some other way? 25 A. Well, speaking of Roberto D'Aubuisson, in particular, he KARL - D 326 1 was -- is -- was, excuse me, he's dead, but he was an 2 extraordinarily ambitious, very intelligent and clever person. 3 And he always wanted to rise high in the ranks. 4 So one of the things he did in this period of time 5 which actually sets him apart from all the others, is he had 6 some extensive training outside El Salvador. 7 Q. Where did he get this training? 8 A. He got training both inside the United States, but I think 9 actually more important, as his ideology, which becomes very 10 important, he went to the War College in Taiwan and 11 specialized in their courses on Political Warfare. That's the 12 name of the course. It was on political warfare. These were 13 taught by the Kuomintang, who was the Chinese party that had 14 lost in the Chinese revolution to Mao, and was extremely 15 anti-Communist. 16 The reason that this matters is that the political 17 war classes in Taiwan emphasize the model of -- what was then 18 Taiwan's authoritarian government, and that is a military, a 19 military party, which is a single party. It's not a 20 competitive -- it's not a competitive authoritarian system. 21 You can't have two military parties, you are just going to 22 have one. So there is a military, a military-based party, a 23 paramilitary organization. And that's the way that they would 24 teach how you control a country. That's how Taiwan was 25 governed at the time. KARL - D 327 1 And this was extremely important for Roberto 2 D'Aubuisson. He is the only one who had this kind of 3 training. So no one else went. He was the only one who was 4 really interested in ideology and in models of how to rule. 5 And he was already extremely worried about -- he was 6 a deeply, deeply, and I'm not using this word loosely, 7 fanatical anti-Communist. 8 And you will see how he's referred to in the cables. 9 They say, he's crazy, he's a radic, he's reckless. 10 He actually was very smart. He was very fanatic. He 11 blamed his own family situation on the 1932 massacre on the 12 uprising of peasants. He said if they hadn't risen up, he 13 would have been a wealthier person. He blamed family 14 misfortunes on that. 15 And so he was absolutely, in his own way of being, 16 committed to making sure that El Salvador was governed by a 17 military party, and that -- and he was very worried that the 18 current way the country was reigned as a traditional military 19 authoritarian rule wasn't going to be able to keep control of 20 this. 21 So the first thing that's important is he starts 22 developing international contacts. The second thing that's 23 important is that he forms what I have found in my research, 24 unless I'm missing something, was probably the first major 25 death squad in this period of time. KARL - D 328 1 Q. "This period of time," being roughly the 1970s? 2 A. 1977. Yes, he is still in the military and he is rising 3 in the ranks of the military. 4 Q. And is he in ANSESAL? 5 A. He is not in ANSESAL at this moment, but he ends up there. 6 He does end up there. He is number three. Remember, he is 7 again a younger officer than the rest. He is a lower ranking 8 military officer at this time. And so he is number three in 9 ANSESAL, in the intelligence agency. He is the -- and this is 10 the national intelligence agency. He is working -- his direct 11 boss is Colonel Santivañez. 12 Q. So as he has obtained this training and developed a more 13 refined ideology around 1977, what form did that ideology 14 take? 15 A. He, through his -- actually, I don't know this for sure, 16 but I would -- I believe from the trajectory of his career, 17 through his experience in Taiwan, he became part of an 18 organization that is called the "World Anti-Communist League." 19 That is considered by academics the most important and far 20 reaching extreme Right world organization. It was founded in 21 South Korea and Taiwan and it eventually becomes a worldwide 22 organization. 23 It sets up something called the "Confederation of 24 Latin American Anti-Communists." I call that the "CAL," 25 C-A-L, the Confederation of Latin American Anti-Communists. KARL - D 329 1 And this confederation has representatives from different 2 countries. So you attend as a delegate from your country. 3 So again, if I'm clear, there is the World 4 Anti-Communist League. There is a Latin American branch of it 5 called the CAL, which is precisely founded in 1972, when world 6 anti-Communist extremists are very worried that Latin America 7 may become Communist. 8 They are very worried about events in Chile, where 9 Allende is the government and he is a socialist. They are 10 worried about events in Argentina. They are not worried about 11 Central America, by the way. Central America is off the map 12 at this time. 13 But they do form this Latin American organization, 14 and the delegates in 1977 to the CAL meetings, there are a 15 number of names from El Salvador, but the two that I think are 16 most important are Roberto D'Aubuisson and Francisco Guerrero. 17 I mention him, because he later is the President of 18 the Supreme Court. And that's -- becomes very important in 19 the -- and he becomes President of the -- of the Salvador 20 Supreme Court during various investigations of the Romero 21 assassination. 22 THE COURT: Was he a military officer? 23 THE WITNESS: No, he is not a military officer. He 24 is a wealthy Salvadoran. And there are important positions 25 that have always, as this extreme Right faction formed and KARL - D 330 1 articulated itself with an ideology, with positions and with 2 links between civilians and military, there were key positions 3 that they deliberately sought. 4 And there are certain positions in the military, for 5 example, the heads of every single intelligence group in the 6 military in the National Guard, in the National Police, in the 7 Treasury Police. The intelligence units and the investigative 8 units, they always wanted to control those. They always 9 wanted to control the Supreme Court. So every single 10 president of the Supreme Court from the late 70s on, is an 11 extreme rightist in this circle. 12 There are other positions they wanted as well, but 13 these are the ones that are most important. 14 THE COURT: Do the Supreme Court judges have, as a 15 condition to their position, the requirements of legal 16 training? They have to be lawyers? 17 THE WITNESS: Absolutely, they do need legal 18 training. And it's a question of, again, which group and 19 which faction controls which positions. 20 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 21 Q. You mentioned that there was concern amongst the far Right 22 in the early 70s in the Southern Cone. 23 Did concerns start to grow in Central America when 24 Nicaragua had its revolution? 25 A. Yes. What happens -- and just to follow the chronology a KARL - D 331 1 bit, in 1977, D'Aubuisson and other Salvadorans become part of 2 this world organization, and I will show you later some of 3 their positions and resolutions, et cetera, and particularly 4 their positions on priests. 5 But what becomes important is that even before the 6 Nicaraguan revolution, and before the coup of October '79, 7 there is an ideology that is extremely strong in this group, 8 and that is that they believe very, very strongly that the key 9 enemy is not, in fact, the Communists, but it's the moderates. 10 And the reason for that, and I will be able to show 11 this later and demonstrate this through certain things, the 12 reason for that is that it's moderates, meaning Christian 13 Democrats, that open the door for Communism. That's what they 14 believe. That if the door is slammed shut, you are safe. But 15 if somebody opens it a little bit, the people behind them can 16 push through. 17 And so D'Aubuisson believed, and he said this all the 18 time -- 19 Q. You testified yesterday that you met him several times? 20 A. Uh-huh. 21 Q. Did he tell this to you? 22 A. Yes, he did. I am really interested in these things, so 23 probably -- he was very proud of his political sophistication, 24 and I think not many people understood how sophisticated he 25 was in his thinking. I think not many people appreciated -- KARL - D 332 1 he was sort of seen as a thug with a right wing death squad. 2 And, in fact, he really did have a plan. That became 3 clear later as he became a presidential candidate and as he 4 ran for the president and as he became head of the 5 legislature, which he did, and as he grew in stature. 6 The things I'm saying later became clear to the 7 people, but in the early days, that wasn't clear. 8 One of the things I remember -- he has said this to 9 other people as well, but one of the things I most remember 10 about him saying to me, is that he was talking about moderates 11 being Communists, basically, and I said -- he would name 12 people. 13 He would say, "You know, Duarte is a Communist." 14 Q. Didn't you say the Christian Democrats were very 15 anti-Communists? 16 A. Yes, so that was strange to me. 17 And so I would say, "You know, they have this 18 platform, the Christian Democrats. They are anti-Communists. 19 The International Christian Democracy fought in World War II 20 against Communism. They have always been the opposition to 21 Communism. So how can you say they are Communists?" 22 And he would say, "You know, the thing is you can be 23 a Communist without knowing you are a Communist. You don't 24 have to know you are a Communist." 25 And he would -- he did this early, even before he was KARL - D 333 1 president. He would -- 2 Q. Before he was president? 3 A. Excuse me, before he ran for president. I'm sorry. 4 Even before he ran for president, he would pick up, 5 if you were with him and he had it next to him, he would pick 6 up a watermelon, because a watermelon is green and the color 7 of the Christian Democratic party is green. And he would cut 8 open the watermelon, and he said, "See? Green on the outside, 9 red on the inside." That's what he would say. 10 And he would say, "You can be a Communist and not 11 know you are a Communist." 12 And for him, the real danger, and I think this has 13 not been understood very well because of what happened 14 subsequently in the civil war, but at this time, the real 15 dangers are what he considered moderates, who, like Christian 16 Democrats and, eventually, I think you will see, the Church. 17 Now, what happens with the Nicaraguan revolution in 18 1979 -- 19 Q. One question before you go there. At this time in 1977, 20 '78, is there a guerilla army, the FMLN that conducted the 21 civil war in the mid-80s? 22 A. No. It does not exist. What they are is they are small 23 armed groups. They are quite small. They don't really gain 24 strength until the very late 70s. So when I say "gain 25 strength," even by the time Archbishop Romero is murdered, KARL - D 334 1 there are still relatively small armed groups. 2 They -- we don't know exact numbers, but very, very 3 small, maybe not even a thousand members, for example. Very 4 small armed groups. 5 They are fighting each other in factions, in five 6 factions. So there is -- and some of them are Communist and 7 some of them are not, or espouse a kind of Communist ideology 8 and some of them are not. 9 The FMLN guerilla army forms after the murder of 10 Archbishop Romero, and the actual war between the guerilla 11 army and the Salvadoran army -- they are not two armies until 12 after Archbishop Romero is assassinated. 13 Q. So in '77 and '78, when D'Aubuisson is developing his 14 ideology, he doesn't view those very small armed groups as the 15 problem, he views the moderates as the problem? 16 A. That's right. Absolutely. 17 Q. And then -- 18 A. Particularly the Christian Democrats. And particularly 19 the Church. So there are two groups that had his animus. 20 There was the Christian Democratic Party and the Church. 21 THE COURT: Let's take the morning recess at this 22 time. We will stand in recess until 11:00 a.m. 23 MR. Van AELSTYN: Thank you, your Honor. 24 (Recess) 25 MR. Van AELSTYN: We will continue with Professor KARL - D 335 1 Terry Lynn Karl. 2 THE COURT: We are back on the record in Doe versus 3 Saravia. 4 Mr. Van Aelstyn, you may proceed. 5 MR. Van AELSTYN: Thank you, your Honor. 6 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 7 Q. Professor Karl, I believe you were about to start going 8 into the impact of the revolution in Nicaragua on these 9 developments. 10 A. Yes. Just before I said that, you asked me the question 11 before that was: What D'Aubuisson was doing in 1977 after 12 Molina was replaced as president? 13 And I talked about his international links with 14 Taiwan and with the World Communist League and then later, the 15 Confederation of Latin American Anti-Communists. 16 I wanted to just say something else about that. The 17 Confederation of Latin American Anti-Communists is the place 18 where leaders of death squad activity actually met. 19 And when you look at who attended these meetings, 20 particularly the Chileans and the Argentinians, almost all of 21 them have subsequently been tried, by the way, in the 22 Democratic system that followed the military authoritarian 23 regimes -- 24 THE REPORTER: I'm sorry, "military authoritarian 25 regimes" -- KARL - D 336 1 THE WITNESS: In Latin American, when military 2 authoritarian regimes were replaced by democratic regimes in 3 both Argentine and Cotina (phonetic). And very recently, in 4 Chile, there have been efforts to try officers for human 5 rights abuses. The officers that have been tried and 6 convicted, a number of them, appear in the meetings of the 7 Confederation of Latin American Anti-Communists. 8 I have reviewed all their records and they keep 9 records of who actually attends different meetings or who 10 attends their annual meetings. 11 And they began to share among them how you -- the 12 techniques of how you organize paramilitaries, how you 13 organize death squad apparatuses, et cetera, and they began to 14 help each other out and they even visited each other's 15 countries and helped each other out. 16 D'Aubuisson was part of this from 1977 on. And as I 17 said, it seems like the death squad that he was a part of, 18 which is called the White Warriors Union, and in Spanish, it's 19 called the "Union Guerrero Blanca" and its initials are UGB. 20 I'm going to single that one out because it becomes important 21 again. 22 It's one of the first. It is founded during this 23 period. And the reason that it is founded in this period is 24 that the pressures for land reform are becoming so great that 25 landowners, the military, ORDEN, all of these groups, are KARL - D 337 1 organizing more and more, and the violence is growing to try 2 to stop, particularly, the organization of farm workers 3 unions. Also unions in the cities, but I think the chief 4 concern was in the rural area. 5 So D'Aubuisson, one of his activities at this time 6 was the beginning of an organization of a death squad 7 apparatus, and that's very important in the '77 period, 8 because that's when that first appears. 9 In 1979, there is a revolution in Nicaragua, which is 10 right next door to El Salvador. And what happens in that 11 revolution is the National Guard, under the Somoza family, the 12 Somoza dictatorship comes apart. It actually is defeated, and 13 it actually breaks up as an institution. 14 The National Guard was the brother institution of the 15 Salvadoran armed forces and military. So they see, in 1979, 16 that something that had ruled the country for a very long 17 period of time suddenly is gone. It just is no longer in 18 power. It is defeated, and it disappears. And it absolutely 19 panics them. This is very clear in all kinds of internal 20 writings and their discussions. They all mention, everybody 21 mentions it when you interview them among the military 22 officers. 23 So, first, is this sense that if reformers actually 24 take power that there may not be a military any more. They 25 may not just -- it won't just be your clique out of favor, it KARL - D 338 1 will be the whole thing will be gone. 2 And remember, when I talk about a clique in favor or 3 out of favor, there is still the government, there is still 4 the elite, there is still the High Command, and they are going 5 to lose a lot, not just in terms of power, but also in terms 6 of position and ability to make money and all kinds of things. 7 So this is a real fear. The Nicaraguan revolution 8 just strikes terror to the hardliners. 9 The second thing that happens is in October 1979, 10 there is actually a military coup in El Salvador. Now, this 11 is, again, not unusual. 12 There are both elections, and then every once in a 13 while, something goes wrong with the military president and 14 then a faction of the armed forces overthrows the president in 15 power. There is what we call "internal military coups," so 16 it's not a coup against a Democratic government, it's a coup 17 against the authoritarians already in power. 18 Q. So the different factions within the High Command that 19 take turns, you testified -- 20 A. Right. 21 Q. -- before with regard to elections sometimes don't wait to 22 take their turn? 23 A. That's right. And so there are some times they move more 24 quickly than they would in a normal electoral cycle. And, in 25 this case, in October 1979 -- and this is really the key event KARL - D 339 1 for, I think, understanding the Romero assassination. In 2 October 1979, for the very first time in history, there is a 3 coup of junior officers led by a Colonel Majano, who moves 4 against the military government of Colonel Romero. So it's 5 one Colonel against another Colonel. 6 It's what we refer to, even though it's led by a 7 Colonel, we actually refer to it as a "junior officers coup," 8 because most of the people in it were younger officers moving 9 under the orders of Colonel Majano. So he is the Colonel. 10 THE COURT: Is this accomplished by force, military 11 force? 12 THE WITNESS: Well, these are not usually done that 13 way. It really depends on who controls the First Brigade, 14 which is the brigade in San Salvador. And in this case, it's 15 who has the -- as in any country, it's the capital city that 16 really matters. 17 And in El Salvador, if you have the city of San 18 Salvador, you have El Salvador. There is no other place that 19 is as much of a center of power. So it isn't really 20 accomplished by force, and yet the force is right there. 21 You are leaving Colonel Romero -- 22 THE COURT: It's a bloodless coup. 23 THE WITNESS: It's a bloodless coup, exactly. So 24 Romero, who was extremely repressive, Colonel Romero, 25 extremely repressive, and who had jacked up the level of KARL - D 340 1 oppression very much, Romero is -- and there are -- it's the 2 beginning of death squad killings. You are starting to see 3 bodies. You are starting to see bodies around in rural areas 4 that are marked, either with a white hand, which means it's 5 the White Hand Death Squad that got you, or with a "UGB" that 6 means it's the White Warriors Union that killed you, or you 7 may just have an "EM" written on you, which stands for 8 "esquadron de muerte," which means "death squad." These 9 bodies are starting to appear in great numbers. 10 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 11 Q. You mentioned Colonel Romero's presidency being 12 particularly repressive. He came into power in 1977, you 13 testified, and I believe you had testimony earlier that 14 Archbishop Oscar Romero was elevated to become Archbishop 15 around the same time? 16 A. That's right. 17 Q. What was his relationship there in the same seat of power, 18 San Salvador, with President Romero? 19 A. Well, as these -- the number of bodies appear and grow and 20 as they become very visible and as very explicit threats 21 against priests begin, and as priests start being killed, he 22 is then -- the Archbishop Romero, begins to change how he 23 understands the country, and he, for the first time, does 24 something that is never done in the history of El Salvador. 25 As the Archbishop, the highest religious authority, he refuses KARL - D 341 1 to attend the inauguration of Colonel/President Romero. 2 So this is the very first visible thing that 3 Archbishop Romero has done that shows that he is not content 4 with the way events are moving in El Salvador. 5 And it is very, very controversial. Because the 6 Archbishop is -- there is the military, the landowners and 7 God. And it's -- to not attend is a tremendous insult, if I 8 can put it that way. Even though he was an extraordinarily 9 courteous man, it was a tremendous insult to Colonel Romero. 10 Q. Okay, thank you. I believe you were talking then about 11 the coup in 1975 -- '9 by the junior officers? 12 A. So in October 1979, there is a coup led by Colonel Majano. 13 What is important at this moment is that nobody is very sure 14 what Majano's own positions are. And when I say that, there 15 are -- the military at this point has, although most of the 16 military and the overwhelming number of the officer corps and 17 the High Command are hardliners, there are some reformers 18 inside the High Command and at the level of Colonel. 19 So that's -- and the other thing I want to say about 20 this, why this is so important at the level of Colonel, is in 21 all of my years working in El Salvador and asking every single 22 Colonel and then General I met, "Have you ever had orders 23 disobeyed?" I never had anybody say yes. 24 In other words, when a Colonel said, "We are going to 25 do this," you say, "Si, mi Colonel." And it wasn't just "Yes, KARL - D 342 1 sir." It was "Yes, my Colonel." You were "my Colonel." And 2 I have never encountered a case when a Colonel gave an order 3 and it was not obeyed. 4 So when Majano comes in as the top of this what we 5 now know as a reformist coup, we didn't know what kind of a 6 coup it was at that time, and that meant that nobody was quite 7 sure where Majano was going to come down in what, inside the 8 military, had become a growing fight over the issue of reform. 9 Now, when I say it's a "growing fight," the division 10 was -- and again, you have to think of the High Command as the 11 governing body of the country, the division was whether you 12 were going to have no land reform at all, never do anything to 13 change, or whether you would do a little reform so that you 14 could keep more stability in the country. 15 And there were those Generals -- or excuse me, they 16 weren't Generals, they were the Colonels at the time, who were 17 hardliners, but who thought not of a big land reform, just a 18 little bit of something might be a good idea. And there were 19 other hardliners who said absolutely nothing. And then there 20 were reformers who wanted more. And nobody quite knew -- they 21 knew that Majano wanted something, but they didn't know how 22 much. 23 Q. Did Majano then become president? 24 A. Majano sets up a governing junta. It's called a "junta," 25 J-U-N-T-A, and he is the head of that junta. The day he takes KARL - D 343 1 power -- 2 Q. I'm sorry. How many members of the junta are there? 3 A. Actually, I don't remember, but I think it's -- actually, 4 I don't remember. 5 Q. Okay. I'm sorry. Carry on. 6 A. The day that Majano takes over, Roberto D'Aubuisson comes 7 to see him. The very day of October 15th, the day of the 8 coup, he comes to see Majano and he offers his services to 9 Majano. He said, "I am here to serve you, sir." In other 10 words, he is saying my loyalties are going to go to you now. 11 And Majano knows, because by this point, Roberto 12 D'Aubuisson is a very well known ultra hardliner. Majano 13 says, "I don't need your services." 14 Q. To whom? 15 A. This is Colonel Majano speaking. He says, "I don't need 16 your services, go back to your position." D'Aubuisson's 17 position is in ANSESAL, he is number three, and ANSESAL is the 18 intelligence agency of El Salvador. 19 So this is a very important defining moment because 20 it is Majano saying, "You are not going to work with me." 21 The next thing that happens that is extremely 22 important in just these very first days after the October 1979 23 coup, several extremely important things happen. The first is 24 that Majano makes clear that they are going to kick out of the 25 military the most repressive hardliners linked to Colonel KARL - D 344 1 Romero. In other words, they don't just get to go back and be 2 in the military and be not the godfathers, but they are going 3 to have to get out of the military. They are going to be -- 4 the term is "cashiered." They are going to be pushed out of 5 the military. 6 Now, this only happens, you know, in a very rare 7 sense when some officer has done something to really displease 8 you and you might be cashiered. But there is never a 9 wholesale cashiering of, say, 80 officers out of the military. 10 So that's one of the very first things that Colonel Majano 11 does. 12 The other thing he does, which appears in 13 legislation, but the decision is made in the very first days 14 after the coup, is to disband two organizations. One is 15 ORDEN, which is the root of the Molina Group's death squads. 16 And the other is ANSESAL, which is the intelligence agency 17 controlled by the Molina Group. 18 So he makes, in this -- when I said there were these 19 three types of repressive apparatuses, the normal army, 20 military forces, et cetera, ORDEN and ANSESAL, he is saying, 21 we are kicking out ultra hardliners from the military and we 22 are going to dismantle this paramilitary and intelligence 23 apparatus. 24 Q. And this is shortly after Colonel Majano came into power 25 in 1979? KARL - D 345 1 A. That's right. 2 Q. And you base this information on what? 3 A. Well, this is actually quite public record, because there 4 are decrees eventually that you can see, the decrees show you 5 that these were actual orders given. They don't show you when 6 the decision was made necessarily to do it, but in the first 7 weeks after the coup, all of these things are decreed. 8 Q. And you spoke, as well, of the things that Colonel Majano 9 has said to you? 10 A. Oh, absolutely. The other thing is it becomes very clear 11 that Colonel Majano is going to favor a land reform and he 12 invites civilians into the government. The civilians he 13 invited into the government -- if a civilian was invited into 14 the government in the past, it's usually because he is the 15 banker of the military or the friend of the military, and it's 16 a point of honor that the military is giving to someone else. 17 Bankers were really often invited into the -- as a civilian, 18 as member of a military junta. 19 In this case, Majano invites Christian Democratic 20 Party members into the governing junta. So it is a military 21 civilian junta in which, for the first time, reformist 22 officers are in power and the civilians they invite is a 23 civilian political party that is on record for land reform and 24 democracy. 25 Q. And what is the reaction to that development by the Molina KARL - D 346 1 Group, including D'Aubuisson and others? 2 A. The Molina Group immediately organizes itself. And 3 Colonel Gutierrez, who is a Colonel at the time, so that means 4 he's in the highest levels of the officer corps, Colonel 5 Gutierrez calls up Roberto D'Aubuisson, and he says, "Go over 6 to ANSESAL, go over to the offices of the intelligence agency, 7 and take out all of the files and all of the dossiers." The 8 dossiers are the dossiers of people they think are suspect, 9 are subversive. They are anybody who has entered their files 10 as somebody against the military regime. 11 And Colonel Gutierrez orders D'Aubuisson on the day 12 of the coup to go over to ANSESAL to remove the files and take 13 them out of ANSESAL and put them in the estado mayor, in other 14 words, in the military High Command headquarters. So move 15 them out of the government, the military as government, and 16 put them into the military as military, where they are going 17 to be safe and where they cannot fall into the hands of the 18 civil -- the new civil military junta. 19 So that would mean that, for example, the new 20 government, the Christian Democrats, wouldn't be able to see 21 these files. He tells D'Aubuisson to do that. 22 Q. And is D'Aubuisson and Gutierrez cashiered? Are they 23 amongst those officers? 24 A. No. D'Aubuisson is in the Army. He is not a cashiered 25 officer. He is not an officer that is kicked out. This is KARL - D 347 1 the day of the coup. 2 So the officers that are kicked out are not yet 3 kicked out and he is not actually one of them. They kick out 4 the people who are close to Colonel Romero, and remember, 5 D'Aubuisson is in a different clique. He is part of the 6 Molina Group. So he is a military officer. His Colonel is 7 Colonel Gutierrez, "Mi Colonel" (saluting) for him. He is a 8 Major at the time. And -- 9 THE COURT: Who is the Major? 10 THE WITNESS: D'Aubuisson is a Major. He is a Major 11 at the time. And Colonel Gutierrez calls him up and orders 12 him to take out the files and to put them in the military High 13 Command. 14 He also later, with Colonel Garcia, who is another 15 member of the Molina Group, and who is Minister of Defense in 16 the new junta, he is later -- he is not cashiered. He remains 17 an active military officer on pay from the military. 18 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 19 Q. Who does? 20 A. D'Aubuisson, excuse me. D'Aubuisson -- actually, I'm 21 sorry. Let me step back. D'Aubuisson takes the files -- 22 before I get into his situation in the military. 23 D'Aubuisson takes the files under the orders of 24 Colonel Gutierrez. He moves the files, but before he moves 25 the files, he takes a large number of the files for himself KARL - D 348 1 and keeps them. 2 So one set of files goes to the military High 3 Command, where the new government cannot see them. 4 Another set of files remains in D'Aubuisson's 5 personal possession. 6 Q. What other steps do D'Aubuisson and the other members of 7 the Molina Group do in response to the development of the 8 coup, not necessarily that day, but -- 9 A. Well, this is the key decision they make. They are, if 10 you think of it from their point of view, they are very 11 scared. There has been a revolution in Nicaragua. There is 12 some civil military coup in their own country. That coup is 13 run by a Colonel who is showing up -- showing that he's a 14 reformer. He has invited the Christian Democrats in the 15 government, and they think the Christian Democrats are worse 16 than Communists. "You can be a Communist without knowing you 17 are a Communist." They think that they may be losing the 18 whole thing. 19 Q. You indicated earlier that in the previous phase, Colonel 20 Medrano's strategy is, you testified, includes the development 21 of ORDEN and ANSESAL. 22 With the Colonel Majano Group seeking to disband 23 ORDEN and ANSESAL, what kind of strategy did D'Aubuisson and 24 the others then develop in response? 25 A. D'Aubuisson, in some ways, modified the strategy that he KARL - D 349 1 already had. He had, as I said, he had been in Taiwan. He 2 had been deeply influenced by this model of -- it's a single 3 party system, but it's a military party, the military, et 4 cetera. 5 When this was all happening, he -- and it wasn't just 6 his strategy, it was a strategy by the whole Molina Group. 7 They are afraid of two things: They are afraid that they are 8 losing control of the military. When I say "they," the 9 hardliners, that in fact the reformers are going to be in 10 power in the military and the military is not going to be 11 reliable any more to fight land reform. The military won't be 12 reliable. It might decide to leave power and let there be 13 Democratic elections. They are very worried about the 14 reliability of the military as an institution if reformers 15 control the decisionmaking process. 16 So they are not sure whether -- and they know they 17 are going to fight this. These are people who are extremely 18 fanatically against any form of reform. And those who are not 19 fanatics in terms of their real ideology, and really -- those 20 who are not still want to stay in power. They want to keep 21 the military as an institution and they want to be in power. 22 So they develop a strategy that I call 23 "inside-outside." And what I mean by that is they decide to 24 fight inside the military to try to get the chief positions 25 within the military back from Colonel Majano, from the KARL - D 350 1 reformist faction of the military. 2 But at the same time, just in case that fails, they 3 set up an apparatus outside the military. And Gutierrez and 4 Carranza, who are the two Colonels at the time, order 5 D'Aubuisson to cashier himself. In other words, to leave the 6 military and to operate outside the military as a form of 7 security and to help set up an apparatus just in case the 8 military, as an institution, falls under the control of 9 reformers. 10 So D'Aubuisson leaves the military. He makes it 11 public that he has left the military. Now, in fact, and I 12 have seen the documents on this, in fact, he is still on the 13 payroll of the military. He still is on the list of active 14 duty military officers, where he remains through at least the 15 assassination of Archbishop Romero. 16 Q. Professor Karl, you mentioned earlier that D'Aubuisson was 17 a Major. 18 A. Yes. 19 Q. Were you here the other day when Amado Garay testified? 20 A. Yes, I was. 21 Q. He referred to -- what did he refer to D'Aubuisson as? 22 A. He kept calling him "Colonel" D'Aubuisson. I have noticed 23 this a number of times. I have no evidence of this except for 24 Mr. Garay's testimony and another incident that I have seen 25 like this. But you do not mix up ranks in El Salvador. You KARL - D 351 1 know when somebody is a Major. You know when somebody is a 2 Colonel. This is very important, because this is the 3 governing body. If you are a Colonel, you are the boss of 4 this country. 5 And I have seen two examples, Mr. Garay is one, where 6 D'Aubuisson is referred to as "Colonel" D'Aubuisson. I do not 7 know whether -- to finish, I know he stayed on the payroll of 8 the military. I know he stayed on the active list of military 9 officers. I know he also received money from a special 10 intelligence account in the military, a secret intelligence 11 account. 12 I do not know whether he was actually promoted or 13 not. But it is clear that some people were calling him 14 Colonel D'Aubuisson. 15 Q. And was -- 16 A. He, however, responds, just to be clear to Gutierrez, 17 Carranza, and others as his commanding officer. 18 Q. Okay. You mentioned earlier that Alvaro Saravia was 19 working with D'Aubuisson earlier. Is he involved at this 20 time? 21 A. Alvaro Saravia, as I said, they formed their relationship 22 as part of the team that guarded Colonel Molina when he was 23 President. So they were part of the Presidential Guard of 24 Colonel Molina. 25 D'Aubuisson, as soon as he takes the ANSESAL files, KARL - D 352 1 the intelligence files, and as soon as he at least appears to 2 leave the military, he asks Alvaro Saravia to be the head of 3 his personal security. So Alvaro Saravia, at this moment, 4 right after the October coup, becomes the chief security 5 person of D'Aubuisson. 6 Now, when I say "personal security," I don't mean his 7 bodyguard. D'Aubuisson had other bodyguards. I mean the head 8 of D'Aubuisson's -- his Chief of Security. That's a better 9 way to put it, his Chief of Security. And that is what 10 Captain Saravia does. 11 Remember, for Captain Saravia, D'Aubuisson is his 12 commanding officer. So Captain Saravia becomes the Chief of 13 Security of Roberto D'Aubuisson. 14 Q. And D'Aubuisson had a portion of the ANSESAL files? 15 A. Yes, he did. 16 Q. What did they then do? Who -- what names were in these 17 files? 18 A. They did several things. As the events -- this is an 19 extremely traumatic time in El Salvador. Things are changing 20 daily. You don't know exactly what's happening, whether the 21 reformists are going to take command of the armed forces, 22 whether a land reform is going to happen, whether the 23 civilians are going to be allowed to stay. It's a very fluid 24 moment, and it's very controversial moment. 25 Q. Who were their enemies, D'Aubuisson's? KARL - D 353 1 A. D'Aubuisson's enemies? 2 Q. Yes. Who did he perceive at that time to be the enemy of 3 his faction within El Salvador? 4 A. Well, I think the way D'Aubuisson thought is that anybody 5 who wasn't his very close friend was his enemy. And the 6 reason I put it that way is that his enemy was a broad 7 umbrella of anybody who wasn't a hardline military officer. 8 And that umbrella was focused primarily, in my view, on the 9 Christian Democratic Party, as a party, and on the Church. 10 Q. On the Church itself? 11 A. On the Church, absolutely. 12 Q. And did -- what did he do with regard to his views of the 13 Church, and then how do you know that? 14 A. Well, the first thing -- can I step back just a moment, 15 because what actually happens then is Roberto D'Aubuisson 16 becomes the point man for the military in setting up a 17 replacement for ORDEN. And a replacement for a -- an 18 intelligence apparatus. 19 So while there is a formal decree to disband the 20 ORDEN, and while there is a formal decree to disband ANSESAL, 21 the intelligence agency, the intelligence agency and its 22 files, that whole apparatus is not dismantled, is not 23 disbanded. 24 And the files belong in two places: In the High 25 Command and with D'Aubuisson. And the ORDEN apparatus becomes KARL - D 354 1 a network of death squads throughout El Salvador. 2 So it's very important that while they were formally 3 disbanded, they were not disbanded, but they transformed into 4 this other type of repressive apparatus with D'Aubuisson as 5 the point person who looks civilian, but is not, and who looks 6 like he isn't a part of the military, but is a part of the 7 military. 8 And this is very important, his specific job, and it 9 actually was his job for a while, was to do the kinds of 10 things that would have been too controversial for the military 11 to do. 12 So the whole practice of traveling and taking off 13 your uniform, being a military man, but carrying out acts 14 without your uniform, is a practice of what we call in 15 political science, it's a "deniability practice"; it means you 16 can say, "We are not doing that, somebody else is doing that." 17 And that is his job. 18 The other thing is he becomes the specialist under 19 the orders of the people -- under the -- in conjunction with 20 the people who are his network, the Molina Group, he becomes 21 the specialist in what are called the high profile 22 assassinations. He becomes the specialist. And his death 23 squad, the first one, the Union of White Warriors, 24 specializes, in particular, in the killing of priests. And I 25 can show you some, if you want to discuss the Church, I can KARL - D 355 1 maybe show you why that's the case. 2 But it's important that he is the point man that 3 Captain Saravia is his Chief of Security, which means he is 4 his most -- one of his most trusted colleagues. 5 Q. And were priests indeed being killed? 6 A. Yes, they were. Now, I have prepared some exhibits that I 7 would like to show to show how the Church -- how this 8 extremely right wing fanatic network began to target priests 9 and why they did. 10 And we have to go back to the 1977 period. And, 11 again, I don't quite know how to express the visceral 12 animosity to the changes that are going on in the Church. And 13 the best way I can do it, frankly, because I took a delegation 14 of -- when I was teaching in Harvard, I took a delegation of 15 Congressmen and senators from Massachusetts to El Salvador, 16 who were trying to learn about El Salvador. 17 And they asked the man who was the president of the 18 chamber of commerce at the time this question. They said, 19 "Sir, is it the Cubans, the Soviets and Nicaraguans that are 20 causing problems here in El Salvador?" 21 And the -- this was in Spanish, so they asked the 22 question in Spanish. And the landowner said, "No." 23 This was very early in the Salvador story, because 24 later they wouldn't say this. But the very early part of the 25 story, he said, "No, it is not the Cubans, it is not the KARL - D 356 1 Soviets, it is not the Nicaraguans." 2 And so a senator, who was Catholic, said, "So who is 3 it who is causing these problems here in El Salvador, sir?" 4 And the landowner said, "Es la Iglesia." "It's the 5 Church." 6 And our translator was sick so I actually did the 7 translation at this moment. When I turned to the delegation 8 and said, "It's the church," they started saying, "He didn't 9 say that. You must have misunderstood." 10 And I said, "No, he says the Catholic Church is 11 causing all the problems." 12 And they said, "No, you must have misunderstood." 13 So we were having this conversation in English on the 14 side and it turned out that the landowner spoke perfect 15 English, so he turned around and said to the senators and 16 delegation there, he said, "No, no, Congressmen. It's the 17 Church, it's the Catholic Church," in English. 18 So it was this visceral sense that -- and the 19 language that D'Aubuisson and others would use, you are going 20 to see some of it in a moment, but the language they would use 21 when they described it, is that a priest was no longer -- 22 somebody who has been a priest and was dressed like a priest 23 and looked like a priest wasn't really a priest anymore. 24 And they used language, like in Spanish, they said 25 "antes era cura" or "antes era sacerdote," and what it meant KARL - D 357 1 was before -- "he used to be a priest." It's two forms of 2 saying he used to be a priest. And it means that the person 3 standing before you who you and I might still think is a 4 priest is no longer a priest; he is something else. 5 Q. Were there any formal documents that reflect this 6 viewpoint? 7 A. Yeah. It's important that this is a huge change in 8 El Salvador because priests, and particularly archbishops and 9 bishops, were figures of great prestige and importance in the 10 country. 11 And what is surprising is to see this ideology in El 12 Salvador with no history or tradition of it. 13 I would like to go back to 1977, if I can for a 14 moment, to show you how this evolved, in terms of the 15 targeting of priests, why priests, in particular, become 16 targets. 17 And what you see in the period of time, actually, 18 from 1972 to 1977, is that this far Right network I talked 19 about, which is called the World -- the World League of 20 Anti-Communists -- excuse me, World Anti-Communist League and 21 its branch in Latin America, which was called the 22 Confederation of Latin American Anti-Communists, in their 23 conferences and records and documents and speeches, you can 24 actually track the beginning of targeting priests. You can 25 see the language how priests are becoming more and more KARL - D