628 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA HON. OLIVER W. WANGER J. DOE, ) No. CIV-F-03-6249 OWW ) Plaintiff, ) Plaintiff's Application for ) Judgment by Default vs. ) ) ALVARO RAFAEL SARAVIA; and ) DOES 1-10, inclusive, ) ) Defendants. ) ) Fresno, California Friday, September 3, 2004 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS Vol. 5, pgs. 628 to 850, inclusive REPORTED BY: PEGGY J. CRAWFORD, RMR-CRR, Official Reporter 629 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL: For the Plaintiff: HELLER EHRMAN WHITE & MCAULIFFE LLP 333 Bush Street San Francisco, CA 94104-2878 BY: NICHOLAS W. van AELSTYN RUSSELL P. COHEN CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY 870 Market Street, Ste. 684 San Francisco, CA 94102 BY: MATTHEW J. EISENBRANDT CAROLYN PATTY BLUM Also Present: ALMUNDENA BERNABEU 630 INDEX PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES: TERRY LYNN KARL 631 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. van AELSTYN 631 NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA 734 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. COHEN 734 ***** EXHIBITS PLAINTIFF'S Received 45 and 46 728 224 and 225 728 123, 126, 226 732 ***** KARL - D 631 1 Friday, September 3, 2004 Fresno, California 2 9:00 a.m. 3 THE CLERK: Returning to Civil-F 03-6249, J. Doe 4 versus Alvaro Saravia. 5 MR. Van AELSTYN: Good morning, your Honor. We would 6 like to continue with Professor Karl. 7 THE COURT: Good morning. 8 THE WITNESS: Good morning, your Honor. 9 TERRY LYNN KARL, 10 called as a witness on behalf of the Plaintiff, having been 11 previously duly sworn, testified as follows: 12 DIRECT EXAMINATION 13 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 14 Q. Good morning, Professor Karl. 15 A. Good morning. 16 Q. I would like to continue your testimony this morning. We 17 had some discussion of a raid that took place at the San Luis 18 Finca. I believe the date was May 7, 1980, and I believe 19 there was some testimony about some documents that were seized 20 during that raid. 21 What is the significance, in your view, of the raid 22 at San Luis Finca and the materials that were seized there? 23 A. I think they are extremely significant, because the 24 documents that are seized in San Luis Finca show that Monseñor 25 Romero's assassination was part of a broader conspiracy to KARL - D 632 1 ensure that ultra rightists remained in power, that the 2 hardliners that I talked about earlier remain in power. And 3 they show that this effort to remain in power depended on 4 sowing terror. 5 So what is important about this whole event and 6 during the arrest is that it shows, in my opinion, that 7 Archbishop Romero's assassination, which is a single act, is 8 actually a part and pattern of practice of state terror. 9 Q. And what are your sources for the information about the 10 raid? 11 A. The sources that I use for assessing the raid are, first 12 of all, that I have seen the documents, the ones that are -- 13 that are still in public existence, let me put it that way, 14 that were taken; that I am relying on the testimony of 15 Mr. Garay; the testimony of Ambassador White and a number of 16 conversations with him; the Truth Commission Report; the 17 Inter-American Commission decision, and a number of 18 declassified documents as well. 19 I'm also relying on a number of U.S. press 20 discussions of this raid and arrest that appeared in places 21 like the New York Times, the Christian Science Monitor and the 22 Washington Post, and most importantly for me, I'm relying on 23 my own interviews of people who were involved with the process 24 of both taking the documents, copying them and distributing 25 them. KARL - D 633 1 And those documents, the whole group of them, I 2 think, reveal, as a group, as part of the significance, first 3 of all, the very close working relationship that exists, and 4 that existed at the time, between members of the armed forces 5 and the death squads. 6 They also -- this body of information, I think, shows 7 very compelling evidence of the D'Aubuisson group's 8 involvement in a number of illegal activities, including 9 planning a coup, planning assassinations, the defamation of 10 Monseñor Romero's character. 11 And finally, I also think these documents shed new 12 light on the murder of Archbishop Romero. 13 Q. Well, let's turn to those documents. If we could have 14 Exhibit 125, please. Professor Karl, what is Exhibit 125? 15 A. Exhibit 125 is a document in Spanish that was given to the 16 military judge who was appointed to deal with the arrest at 17 San Luis Finca. That judge's name is Miguel Antonio Mendez. 18 And in the process of El Salvador, you make a list, 19 when you arrest people, of everyone who is arrested and 20 everything that's found in their possession. 21 So this is the instructions to the Judge by the 22 arresting officers, essentially, who are part of -- who are 23 under the command of Colonel Majano, the reformist that I 24 talked about earlier. 25 Q. And a member of the ruling junta? KARL - D 634 1 A. And a member of the ruling junta, that's right. So this 2 is a list of the kind of documents they found. And it is also 3 a list of the people there. And it is very revealing as a 4 list, in my view. 5 Q. Let's begin with the people that were there first. Who is 6 included on the list of those arrested? 7 A. I won't give all the names for reasons of time, and this 8 is in the public record, but I want to note that there are 24 9 people arrested. 10 12 of them are officers of the Salvadoran Armed 11 Forces. And that includes Roberto D'Aubuisson and Captain 12 Saravia. 13 12 of them are people that the Salvadorans would 14 refer to as "nonofficers," if I could put it that way. And 15 that is because the officer corps, as I explained, is so 16 important in the way Salvadorans understand rank and status. 17 And the other 12, which are a series of names listed 18 here, includes Amado Antonio Garay, the driver of the 19 assassination, and it also includes a number of names of 20 civilians and former nonofficers in various services. 21 Some of the names, for example, are a Fernando 22 Sagrera, who is a civilian, and a very important link between 23 Mr. D'Aubuisson and between wealthy land-owning families. He 24 was a person of a different status than the officers 25 themselves, different social status. He was Roberto KARL - D 635 1 D'Aubuisson's drinking partner and very close friend. And he 2 was the one, because he comes from a land-owning background, 3 was the most important link with a number of families that 4 were financially supporting D'Aubuisson's activities. 5 Q. Professor Karl, you have testified about a number of 6 documents that you have reviewed, declassified documents, et 7 cetera. Are there any generalities that you can draw from 8 this collection of names? Have you seen them before? 9 A. I have seen, particularly, the officers' names, the 12 10 officers that I list, including Roberto D'Aubuisson, and 11 Alvaro Saravia. Those officers' names appear over and over 12 and over and over again in the declassified documents; 13 identified every single one of them as members of death 14 squads. And most importantly, they are linked to a series of 15 murders, including murders of U.S. citizens at the Sheraton 16 Hotel. 17 So the names are quite revealing. It's a group of 18 people who all know each other in different ways, who are all 19 identified repeatedly as hardliners, some of whom, by the way, 20 I have interviewed. 21 Q. If -- 22 THE COURT: Which of this group are included in that 23 description? 24 THE WITNESS: In that description, I would include, 25 if you look from line 3 of this document, Roberto KARL - D 636 1 D'Aubuisson -- I'm going to say their last names. Cruz Reyes, 2 Staben, S-T-A-B-E-N, Saravia, Alfredo Jiménez, Víctor Hugo 3 Vega Valencia, Eduardo Ernesto Alfonso Avila, Frederico 4 Chacón, Miguel Francisco Bennet Escobar, Rodolfo López 5 Sibrián, Carlos Hernán Morales, Jaime René Alvarado y 6 Alvarado. 7 Those are the most important ones. There are others 8 included. 9 Let's see, did I give you 12 names? 10 THE COURT: I have 11. But there is 12. You gave us 11 12. 12 THE WITNESS: That's right. They were the ones that 13 all have military rankings above them, in front of them. And 14 they end at the name of Señor Antonio Cornejo Hijo, so they 15 stop, not including his name. So all of those names are given 16 in the classified documents given repeatedly. 17 And also, some of those names appear on a list that 18 Vice-president Bush takes to the High Command of the 19 Salvadoran military in 1983, insisting in the name of 20 President Ronald Reagan that they be sent out of the country 21 and removed from officer status inside the Salvadoran 22 military. 23 So this is a group that is repeatedly mentioned in 24 the declassified documents, repeatedly mentioned as a concern 25 of the United States. KARL - D 637 1 And again, much of this is because some of them are 2 directly involved and named in the declassified documents as 3 killers of U.S. citizens in the Sheraton hotel. 4 THE COURT: And how was the request received? 5 THE WITNESS: The Bush request? 6 THE COURT: Yes. 7 THE WITNESS: The Bush request, as soon as 8 Vice-president Bush went down and insisted and gave a list in 9 a highly confidential set of meetings with the High Command, 10 directly gave a list and basically also a deadline. Said if 11 these people are not out of the military by such and such a 12 day, which was a date prior to a discussion about renewal of 13 U.S. aid, he said that the United States would no longer be 14 able to guarantee assistance to the High Command. 15 What happened right afterwards is several individuals 16 were moved for a short period of time outside of the country, 17 including several of the individuals on this list. 18 And they were then subsequently brought back into the 19 country and renewed their activities inside the country. So 20 there was very little activity and there is actually a 21 classified document that is sent to the U.S. government 22 saying: Here are the results. Because Vice-president Bush 23 asked for followup, he wanted to see what happened. And the 24 followup document says: They are moving people around to 25 please us, but they are all coming back. KARL - D 638 1 And they actually -- there is a series of documents 2 tracing their return and their involvement again. 3 These are also, by the way, people who are listed in 4 the group of kidnappings, the kidnapping-for-profit ring and 5 the baby robbers ring. 6 So these names, not every one of them, but all of 7 these names are identified as death squads. And some come up 8 in the murder of U.S. citizens. Some come up in the baby 9 robbers and some come up in the kidnapping-for-profit ring. 10 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 11 Q. Is there anything of significance in Amado Garay's 12 testimony about the raid on San Luis Finca, in your view? 13 A. Well, I think that Garay is outside of the meeting. He is 14 not inside the meeting. He is outside, holding D'Aubuisson's 15 gun, according to his own testimony. But he is also outside 16 with Nelson Morales, who is one of the people he named in his 17 testimony as being involved in the assassination of Archbishop 18 Romero. 19 And he sees some of these people as his social 20 equals, if I could put it that way, but he also sees others as 21 wealthier civilians involved in this. 22 Q. So there are some inside and some outside? 23 A. There is some inside and there is some outside. 24 Q. What was done with the 24 men when they were arrested? 25 Where were they taken? KARL - D 639 1 A. Well, they are all taken to different areas, which you can 2 see on the document. The document identifies where they are 3 taken. I think the most significant, for me, reading this 4 document, they are broken up as groups. 5 But interestingly enough, if you look in the middle 6 of the page, it says, Major D'Aubuisson and Captain Saravia 7 are taken together to the Central Headquarters of the Treasury 8 Police. So they are actually separated from the other group 9 and are kept together. 10 And Mr. Garay goes, instead -- you see him down at 11 the bottom -- he actually goes with a larger group of people 12 which are the civilians. And if you remember, he testifies 13 that he's in a room with them and kept with them for some 14 time. 15 Now, what he says in his testimony is that they were 16 actually never interrogated at all. They were kept together 17 in a room and then eventually released. 18 We have no information, at least I have no 19 information, about whether Major D'Aubuisson and Captain 20 Saravia were interrogated or not. 21 Q. Do you draw any significance from the fact that they were 22 separated from the others and taken to a different location? 23 A. Well, I think that one of the things that is important in 24 this document is that they were repeatedly discussed together. 25 It is very clear they were linked in some way. In my reading, KARL - D 640 1 it is very clear that they are linked in some way. 2 Not only are they taken together, but if you look on 3 page 2 of the document, there is something that says, 4 "Evidence Number 7," "Prueba number 7," and that has a part A 5 and a part B. 6 Part A is what we call the "Saravia diary." It is 7 the book that says, "This book is the property of Saravia 8 Alvaro Rafael," and then it is linked to a series of pages 9 from the Hyatt Regency Hotel of Washington, and also a list of 10 names. 11 So these documents, because of the way they are cited 12 here, are -- and I have other evidence from this as well -- 13 are found together and are actually clipped together. 14 Q. The set B? 15 A. The set A and B. 16 Q. A was the diary - -- 17 A. Of Mr. Saravia. 18 Q. -- which has previously been described as Exhibit 123 for 19 identification purposes. 20 And then B is? 21 A. A series of pages on hotel stationery. And two lists of 22 names of officers and important people. So those are linked 23 together. That's another way that I can see that these two 24 are being treated together, Mr. D'Aubuisson and Mr. Saravia. 25 Q. How do you get Mr. D'Aubuisson in here? KARL - D 641 1 A. Well, when we discuss the documents, I can show you why I 2 think they are together. 3 Q. All right. Perhaps before we turn to that particular 4 document, can you tell us if there is anything significant 5 about any of the other documents that are listed on Exhibit 6 125? 7 A. Well, this is a list, and again, let me just highlight 8 parts of it without translating the entire document. And I 9 think that when you -- the titles of the documents actually 10 speak for themselves. 11 Document number 3 is: 51 copies of a document 12 entitled "How to Carry Out a Political Coup d'etat in 13 El Salvador." 14 THE COURT: Is there any author? 15 THE WITNESS: No, there are no authors in these, but 16 my interviews reveal that all of these documents were provided 17 by Roberto D'Aubuisson. And, by the way, the declassified 18 documents also repeat that. 19 The second document, which is Document number 4, is a 20 document called "The General Organization of the 21 Anti-communist Struggle in El Salvador." 22 This document, I have never seen, and I do not know 23 anybody who has been able to produce a copy of it. However, 24 in the interviews I did with the members of the governing 25 junta, and -- well, with the members of the governing junta, KARL - D 642 1 the document, according to all of their descriptions, is an 2 organizational chart of death squads. And it is an 3 organizational chart of death squads, according to their 4 description, to unify various death squad activities into one 5 set of activities. 6 Document number 8 is called "F.A.N.," F.A.N., "A 7 Political Alternative." 8 Q. What is the F.A.N.? 9 A. The F.A.N. is the party that Roberto D'Aubuisson is 10 forming. I hesitate to use "party." It means the "Frente 11 Amplio Nacional." I hesitate to use the word "party" because 12 it's very much conceived of as a party with a paramilitary 13 arm, so it's not a party in the way we might think of them 14 here. 15 So there is a document that is included that has been 16 prepared that talks about what the F.A.N. is and how it is the 17 new political alternative. 18 Q. Do you draw any significance from the fact that its title 19 is in English rather than Spanish? 20 A. I don't know why that is, unless for anything to be in 21 English, it means that they are showing it to English 22 speakers. And it is, in other work I have done, the F.A.N. is 23 trying to set up an organization that has support branches in 24 Miami, San Francisco, and Washington D.C. And so it's likely 25 that this is a document that will also go to supporters inside KARL - D 643 1 the United States. 2 Q. Were there any other documents of particular note on this 3 list? 4 A. Another document, which is Document number 18, is called, 5 "Knocking on the Door of the Barracks." There are 33 copies 6 of that. Excuse me, that's Document 17. 7 And then there are a number of documents of Document 8 18, which is called, "Classmates, Officers and Heads of the 9 Armed Forces." 10 And the language that's used there, it's not really 11 fully captured by my translation, but it is a way of 12 organizing and going into the barracks to make sure that they 13 are loyal to this group of people. That's what "knocking on 14 the door of the barracks" means. 15 And there is actually other information here, 16 including, in evidence, 1, of a videotape. And I know from a 17 number of sources, not only interviews, but declassified, that 18 Roberto D'Aubuisson had prepared a series of videos which were 19 being shown inside the barracks to soldiers as a way of 20 getting them on his side. 21 So as a group -- oh, there is one more document I 22 wanted to draw your attention to, and that's Document 23 number -- it's the document that links -- it's Evidence number 24 7A; that's the Saravia diary. 25 As a group -- and there are many other things that KARL - D 644 1 are of interest to me -- but as a group, it is a set of 2 documents that reveals and revealed, in the opinion of 3 virtually everybody who saw them, I actually don't know 4 anybody who didn't think this, and that includes both U.S. 5 government officials and others, that this was a meeting to 6 plan a coup. 7 Q. Professor Karl, you mentioned the Saravia diary. Are you 8 familiar with the declaration of Todd Greentree in this 9 matter? 10 A. Yes, I am. 11 MR. Van AELSTYN: Your Honor, if I may approach, we 12 have additional copies of that declaration, if you would like 13 to refer to them. 14 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 15 Is it your opinion, Professor Karl, that the 16 documents that are contained in the Exhibit 123 were all 17 D'Aubuisson articles and documents? 18 THE WITNESS: I think that one of the documents which 19 I will make reference to is actually written and produced by 20 someone else, and I will show you why I think that in a 21 moment. 22 But it is clear, in my view, not only from the 23 documents here, but from my interviews with Roberto 24 D'Aubuisson and my knowledge of how he actually envisioned 25 what he wanted to do, and in my first -- first or second day KARL - D 645 1 of testimony, I had talked about how he was very influenced by 2 the Taiwan model of organizing essentially what is a Fascist 3 party. And I say that in the traditional sense of Fascism, 4 not as an epithet. 5 But what we have here is his view, and there are 6 other things that are included, including names of people he 7 would like to be in governing positions. It's his view of how 8 he thinks El Salvador should be governed and ruled. 9 So it is a party, a paramilitary apparatus. It's 10 part of -- it's the actual operation of the ideology that I 11 talked about earlier. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 13 MR. Van AELSTYN: Could we have on the screen Exhibit 14 123. 15 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 16 Q. Professor Karl, Exhibit 123, we have had testimony about 17 before. I believe you identified also as one of the -- as the 18 declassified version of the Saravia diary. 19 A. That's right. 20 Q. What is contained in the declaration of Todd Greentree, 21 but perhaps before I turn to that, let me just read a portion 22 of the Todd Greentree declaration. 23 He states in paragraph 5 -- strike that -- it's 24 paragraph 4. 25 "In my first position with the State Department, I KARL - D 646 1 served as a Desk Officer in the Office of Central 2 American Affairs in Washington D.C. I took this 3 position shortly after the assassination of 4 Archbishop Romero in San Salvador on March 24, 1980." 5 And continue to paragraph 5: "I learned -- again 6 shortly after taking up my position on May 7, 1980 -- 7 a raid by some of the reformist members of the 8 governing junta in El Salvador, under the direction 9 of Colonel Adolfo Majano, was conducted at a rural 10 estate known as the San Luis Finca in San Santa 11 Tecla, El Salvador." 12 He goes on to say at line 15: "A number of documents 13 also were seized during the raid, and the originals 14 of a number of those documents were provided to the 15 U.S. Embassy in El Salvador. Included among those 16 documents was a diary that stated on the cover: 17 'This book is the property of Saravia Alvaro 18 Rafael.'" 19 He goes on to state at the end: "Shortly after 20 arriving at the Embassy, I personally located, 21 identified and copied those original documents seized 22 in the May 7, 1980 raid that had been maintained at 23 the Embassy." And he attaches copies of documents. 24 Have you had an opportunity to review these 25 documents? KARL - D 647 1 A. Yes, I have. 2 Q. Do they differ in any way from Exhibit 123, which was the 3 declassified version of the Saravia diary? 4 A. Yes, they do. 5 Q. How so? 6 A. So the diary itself, in what I consider very consistent 7 handwriting of Mr. Saravia, is the same. 8 What is different is that Mr. Greentree's collection 9 of documents is more complete than any one I have ever seen. 10 And I should back up a moment to explain why I say 11 that. I have seen this diary in the form exactly that it is 12 in both the declassified and in Mr. Greentree's copy over and 13 over. 14 Q. Professor Karl, you say both the form of the document is 15 different and the content? 16 A. No. The form is the same. I'm sorry if I misspoke. The 17 form and content of this diary is the same in every -- in both 18 the declassified documents and the Greentree document with one 19 exception. 20 And that exception is there is an extra piece of 21 paper that is in the declassified document which is this piece 22 right here, that is slipped in the diary as if it were a part 23 of the diary, and yet just looking at it, you can see that it 24 is not. It is not the same format. It does not have the 25 dates like the diary does, et cetera. KARL - D 648 1 In Mr. Greentree's version, it is not inside the 2 diary, but it is in a separate set of documents that accompany 3 Mr. Saravia's diary. 4 Mr. Greentree's version is more complete than any 5 version I have seen because it has the original Saravia -- 6 excuse me, not the original -- the Saravia diary. 7 And then it has a series of appendages which are 8 listed on Judge Mendez's list of evidence. Now, some of those 9 appendices or other pieces of evidence either have not been 10 declassified or -- have not been declassified or for some 11 reason they are not in the declassified -- in the pile of 12 declassified documents. 13 So to be clear, the Saravia diary is the same in 14 both, except for this page and several other pages that I 15 would like to talk about that come from Mr. Greentree's copy 16 that he Xeroxed in the basement of the U.S. Embassy. 17 Q. Okay. What is the significance of this page? 18 A. Well, this is an extremely important page. And the reason 19 it's important is that -- 20 Q. I'm sorry, Professor Karl, before we get there. I 21 apologize. 22 Looking at the Greentree declaration, tab 1 appears 23 to be the Saravia diary. 24 A. That's right. 25 Q. And tabs 2, 3, 4 and 5 are the other documents you have KARL - D 649 1 referred to? 2 A. Right. 3 Q. And where does this document appear in the Greentree 4 declaration? 5 A. It appears in tab 3. So that in the declassified 6 document, it's inside the Saravia diary. And in the Greentree 7 version, it is in tab 3, appended to the Saravia diary, to be 8 very clear. 9 These are three pieces of paper that are Xeroxed on 10 the same page. Colonel Majano told me that they were Xeroxed 11 on the same page because they were clipped together, so that 12 was a way of showing that they had all come together with a 13 clip. May I describe the document? 14 Q. Yes. 15 A. On the bottom right, it says, "Equipo Operacion Piña," and 16 that means the "Operation Pineapple Team." Underneath that, 17 it lists "Number 1, starlight; 1, 257"; and I actually cannot 18 tell if that's a "257" or "253 - Robert's; 4, automatic guns 19 and grenades." Then there is a line, and under that, it lists 20 "one driver, one shooter, and four security men." 21 The second document that was attached to this is on 22 the left-hand bottom. That is a list of names. And it 23 includes some of the most prominent land-owning families of 24 El Salvador. For example, the name Ricardo Sol Meza, the name 25 Alfonso Salaverria. These are very, very prominent, these are KARL - D 650 1 families that are considered among what we once called the "14 2 families," when I testified earlier. 3 Q. Now, Professor Karl -- 4 A. There are a series of other names, as well, listed here. 5 Q. If I may, are these the papers that were referred to in 7B 6 on Exhibit 125? 7 A. That's right. 8 Q. Separate from 7A, which was the diary? 9 A. The diary. In other words, on the way the evidence is 10 collected, and on -- in view of the way the evidence was 11 collected and the way it's described in the document to the 12 judge, and in view of Mr. Greentree's copy and the way that it 13 was stored in the U.S. Embassy, these -- this piece of paper 14 was not found slipped inside the Saravia diary, but in the 15 declassified documents. It is actually slipped inside the 16 Saravia diary. 17 Finally, there is a document at the top of the page, 18 which is in a different handwriting, and while I'm not a 19 handwriting expert, it is very recognizable to me as the 20 handwriting of Mr. Saravia. And it lists a series of 21 payments. 22 One of those, for example, line 3, is "Amado," which 23 is the way in -- the way Mr. Saravia would refer to Amado 24 Garay, by the way he would call him by his first name, because 25 there is a status difference there. KARL - D 651 1 Q. What is the name above Amado's? 2 A. Saravia. 3 Q. By the last name? 4 A. Right. So he refers to himself by the last name and the 5 driver by the first name. This is my reading of these 6 documents. But it is also, I might add, everyone else's 7 reading that I have interviewed about these documents. 8 So what's important is that these three pieces of 9 paper were found together. According to my interviews with 10 the members of the junta -- and I should say that when these 11 documents were seized, they were given to Colonel Majano. 12 Colonel Majano Xeroxed these documents and gave a 13 copy to every member of the governing junta, called them 14 immediately into his office, and they sat down and studied 15 these documents together. 16 I have interviewed, I believe, four members, or maybe 17 five, of the junta. Four or five of the entire junta. Every 18 one has the same impression, which is that when they saw this, 19 they all said this is the document about the assassination of 20 Archbishop Romero. In other words, they identified Operation 21 Pineapple as the assassination of Archbishop Romero. 22 Why is that so? It's because the equipment that was 23 requested is the same. And it is very unusual type of 24 equipment. In a death squad killing, you do not have a 25 sharpshooter. You do not have weapons like this. You do KARL - D 652 1 usually have two cars, so you usually have the killers in a 2 car and the security force for the killers who stay outside, 3 watch, make sure they are okay, et cetera. 4 But this is a very unusual description of an 5 operation. And in that sense, they very quickly and strongly 6 felt that this was the -- these were the documents, the list 7 of things that were going to be needed for the murder of 8 Archbishop Romero, some of the financiers of that murder or 9 the supporters or someone who was involved, and then, finally, 10 a list of some of the payments that were actually made. 11 Q. Do you have any opinion as to whose handwriting is on the 12 bottom as opposed to the top? 13 A. Yes. I am familiar with that handwriting. I think that's 14 Roberto D'Aubuisson's handwriting. 15 Q. How are you familiar with it, Professor Karl? 16 A. Well, I saw it quite a bit, actually, in the 1983 17 campaign, but I have also seen a number of other documents 18 that he has personally written. 19 Q. Were there any other documents in the Greentree documents 20 that were of significance to this matter? 21 A. I should just say one other thing, if I may. That my -- 22 when I say I interviewed the junta, they were quite shocked by 23 this, by the way, when they saw it, because they instantly 24 believed this was Monseñor Romero's assassination. 25 And they, at this point -- at least the members of KARL - D 653 1 the junta and Colonel Majano -- did not fully understand from, 2 in my opinion, the kind of threat that was growing inside the 3 military in El Salvador. And when they saw this, they didn't 4 expect to see this piece of paper. They didn't know who they 5 thought had killed Monseñor Romero originally. 6 The other thing is that the U.S. Embassy declassified 7 documents also repeat -- and I showed this and previously 8 discussed this in Exhibit 164, as well as Ambassador White -- 9 that that is what this is. 10 That was an opinion shared by the U.S. Embassy and 11 also by the members of the governing junta, that this reading 12 that I gave of this document is also theirs. 13 Q. I would like to come back to that in a moment. But if we 14 may, were there any other documents in the Greentree 15 collection that bear on this matter? 16 A. Yes. There is a document that is in tab 4 of the 17 Greentree affidavit. 18 Q. Does it appear in the declassified version of the diary? 19 A. It does not. 20 Q. Well -- 21 A. According to what I have seen of the declassified. If it 22 appears, it has not been declassified with the rest. 23 It is, in my view, if you look at -- 24 Q. Which page in tab 4? 25 A. I think it's the eighth page, but they are not numbered. KARL - D 654 1 It's the eighth page in the way it was Xeroxed by 2 Mr. Greentree. 3 Q. How does it appear at the top? 4 A. It appears -- it is at the top, "Prueba Cuba en 5 Nicaragua." And that means "Evidence that Cuba is in 6 Nicaragua." That's what it says. 7 Do we not have that? 8 Q. No, we don't have that. 9 A. May I translate this document or describe what's in it? 10 Q. Sure. 11 Your Honor, do you have a copy of this page? 12 THE COURT: I have the page that has the words that 13 the witness just spoke at the top of it. It's handwritten. 14 It appears to be a note pad. At the bottom it looks like the 15 word F-R-E-U-T-R -- 16 THE WITNESS: The bottom should say "New York." 17 THE COURT: At the very bottom on the right. I was 18 looking at the left. Yeah, it says "San FR," then I can't 19 read the next letter. 20 THE WITNESS: San Francisco and New York would be the 21 bottom. I think I have a clearer copy. 22 THE COURT: This exhibit hasn't been paginated, but I 23 have that in front of me. 24 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 25 Q. Is there anything significant on this document? KARL - D 655 1 A. I think there is something very significant, and I need to 2 first refer back to Exhibit 125 in order to explain it. 3 MR. Van AELSTYN: Can we have Exhibit 125 up, please. 4 THE WITNESS: Exhibit 125 is a list of evidence that 5 went to the judge. 6 MR. Van AELSTYN: Page 2. 7 THE WITNESS: Actually, it's page 3 at the top, the 8 very first one. It says, "Evidence Number 10." And it 9 describes a document of three pages which is entitled "In 10 Relation to the Accusations Made By a South American Informant 11 Against Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero, Archbishop of San 12 Salvador." 13 And after that, it says, "This informant is ready to 14 give film and written proof within a period not exceeding 15 15 days." 16 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 17 Q. This is a document accusing Oscar Romero? 18 A. Well, let me say a little bit more about it, if I can. 19 And then inside the pages -- this is in my view, the one you 20 don't have on the screen. 21 Q. Back to the Greentree? 22 A. Back to the Greentree in tab 4. This is in Roberto 23 D'Aubuisson's handwriting and is with the documents on hotel 24 stationery as the same size, et cetera. And it translates -- 25 I won't translate the whole document, but it translates, KARL - D 656 1 "Proof that Cuba is in Nicaragua," is the first line. 2 The second line says, "Romero P.C. Pendiente." That 3 means Romero -- 4 "P.C." (in Spanish) or "P.C." (In English) stands for 5 "Communist Party." Partido Comunista. 6 And "pendiente" means "I'm waiting for this." It's 7 "pending" is the best. 8 The document goes on, and I will not translate all of 9 it, but it has another line which says "Support from the 10 Southern Cone." That means South America, the southern part 11 of South America. 12 And according to my interviews and an excellent book 13 on the subject about the role of Argentinians inside 14 El Salvador at this time, it is clear -- and I have 15 interviewed one of the people involved in this operation who 16 is Argentinian -- it is clear that there was an Argentinian 17 support team that was helping Roberto D'Aubuisson in his 18 activities. 19 This is a support team that came from the network 20 that he developed inside the CAL, the Confederation of Latin 21 American Anti-Communists that I identified earlier in my 22 testimony. There were Argentinians helping him. 23 And this refers to, and I draw this conclusion from 24 these two documents as well as my interviews, that there was a 25 document being prepared that would accuse Archbishop Romero of KARL - D 657 1 being a member of the Communist party. That that document has 2 never surfaced, but was being prepared by Argentinians. And 3 it was going to be both a film version and a written version 4 giving proof and denouncing him. 5 Now, this seems to be in process by the dates of 6 these documents and when they occur, after Archbishop Romero 7 has been murdered. So I don't know when they actually started 8 this denunciation process or to try to identify him as a 9 member of the Communist party. But at least following the 10 assassination, at the very least, there was an effort to link 11 him to the Communist party and to make him a member of the 12 Communist party, something which, by the way, is patently 13 false. 14 Q. If we could have up, briefly, Exhibit 122, please. If we 15 could enlarge the lower portion? 16 Professor Karl, this was a cable that was sent from 17 the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador dated May 8. We have 18 discussed it previously, that reported on the raid, listing 19 the officers, et cetera. If you could just briefly -- 20 A. Right. This actually repeats the names that are on Judge 21 Mendez's list. It talks about the raid itself. It says the 22 same information I'm given about 24 people. 23 It lists 12 officers, including Roberto D'Aubuisson 24 and Captain Garay. And the interesting thing about this 25 document to me is the very last part of the comment. So KARL - D 658 1 that's the very last page at the very bottom. 2 And without reading it, it indicates that the United 3 States is extremely worried about the documents that are found 4 on San Luis Finca. 5 It says that this is now a crisis, because Colonel 6 Majano has moved against D'Aubuisson and has arrested him. 7 And it says, in particular, "This was the second attempted 8 coup against him," referring to Majano. "The Salvadoran 9 military are now presented with evidence that they cannot 10 ignore regarding the identity of the plotters." 11 It then goes on to say that there is a split in the 12 military and "The question is whether Junta Member Colonel 13 Abdul Gutierrez," who I previously testified was one of the 14 Molina Group, "and Minister of Defense Colonel Jose Guillermo 15 Garcia," who I also determine was one of the Molina Group, 16 "can continue to paper over this problem or whether some high 17 ranking officers will be forced out by the younger and more 18 liberal officers." 19 So what this cable is indicating to the United States 20 is there is a split in the military. This is a very decisive 21 moment. And the issue is whether or not the hardliners are 22 going to be forced out or the reformers are going to be forced 23 out. 24 In other words -- and they believe, by the way, the 25 comment, the one who made the comment, who wrote this, is KARL - D 659 1 Colonel Majano, and the younger officers will be able to force 2 out the hardliners. 3 Q. Professor Karl, I would like to show you another document 4 that -- 5 Your Honor, has not been admitted into evidence as 6 yet. May I approach the witness? 7 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 8 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 9 Q. I would like to identify this for identification purposes 10 as the next exhibit in order, which I believe is Exhibit 224. 11 A. This is a declassified document that came in the way that 12 I have previously testified the others have. 13 Q. What is the date of the document? 14 A. The document is dated -- 15 Q. On the very first page? 16 A. "May 9th, 1980. Secret cable." And it's cited as "JRG"; 17 that refers to the "Revolutionary Governing Junta, "faces 18 worst crisis yet." 19 Q. And this document was sent from whom to whom? 20 A. It is sent from the Secretary of State, who at the time is 21 Ed Muskie, and it is sent to the Embassy of San Salvador -- 22 Q. So did they -- 23 A. -- to the Ambassador, it was sent to the Ambassador. 24 Q. Is this a response, then, to Exhibit 122, a cable from the 25 Embassy to the Secretary of State dated the previous day, May KARL - D 660 1 8? 2 A. Right, exactly. It is a very important cable in that 3 normal cable traffic doesn't have the Secretary of State in 4 it. When the Secretary of State is answering something, it 5 means that it is very, very important, that this is a crucial 6 event. 7 And what this cable says, and I would turn you to -- 8 you don't have this on -- let me ask you to look at page 2 of 9 the text of the cable. 10 It describes U.S. policy as being able to -- as 11 desiring to bring under control the violent left and right and 12 to eliminate any violence or human rights violations 13 associated with the armed forces, that that is what the U.S. 14 is interested in doing. 15 And to this end, it says -- it describes actions 16 taken against different groups. The last line is important in 17 that second paragraph: 18 "We have considered links between the extreme right 19 and the armed forces particularly dangerous because 20 their persistent coup attempts threaten the very 21 existence of the JRG," that refers to the 22 Revolutionary Governing Junta, "and the continuation 23 of its reform program, as well as tarnishing its 24 image." 25 The third paragraph goes on to say, that, and I'm not KARL - D 661 1 reading it all, that: 2 "The evidence uncovered appeared conclusive as to the 3 guilt of those detained, as well as to others 4 implicated." 5 And then Secretary Muskie says, "We, therefore, 6 believe that prompt and effective action to punish 7 those detained is necessary." 8 Q. Professor Karl -- 9 A. And then the cable has lots more details on it, but I 10 think that's the key content for the purposes that we are 11 talking about right now. 12 Q. And what happened? Were they detained or punished? 13 A. No, they were not. They were neither detained nor 14 punished. All -- and actually, I think, in effect, what you 15 see is that the coup that was being planned in El Salvador 16 effectively is carried out, but in a different way. 17 And when I say that, what I mean is we have a series 18 of documents at San Luis Finca which indicate a coup of 19 hardliners to take over the government is the plan. They are 20 arrested by a reformist military officer. 21 What happens, what you would expect then -- what I 22 would expect, given these kind of documents, is they would be 23 detained, arrested and charged. Instead, they are released, 24 including Mr. D'Aubuisson and Mr. Saravia. They are released. 25 Q. When? KARL - D 662 1 A. They are released several days later. And within two 2 days, Colonel Majano, who is the man who ordered their arrest, 3 is removed from the High Command of the military. He is then 4 threatened several times; his life is threatened. There is a 5 bomb put in his car, there are other threats against his life, 6 and by December 1980, he is out of the country. 7 So rather than have a victory, if I can put it that 8 way, by reformist -- by a reformist military officer and his 9 cohorts taking control of the Salvadoran military, instead, 10 what we actually have is the replacement of reformers with 11 hardline military officers. 12 And we have that, most importantly, through the 13 actions of two other Colonels who are linked -- who are 14 members of the Molina Group, which I explained earlier, 15 included Mr. D'Aubuisson. 16 Q. And those two Colonels are the ones who were referenced in 17 the May 8 cable? 18 A. That's right. Colonel Gutierrez and Colonel Garcia. They 19 are referenced in the May 8th and May 9th. 20 MR. Van AELSTYN: If I could have just one moment? 21 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 22 Is this memo simply a statement of the current 23 position of the Secretary of State? Is it an action memo or 24 is it just to communicate the thinking that is currently 25 applicable? KARL - D 663 1 THE WITNESS: There is actually action requested in 2 the last page of the memo. Because there is a great worry 3 about other military officers who are in positions of High 4 Command that are believed to be hardliners, and the Secretary 5 of State is suggesting that they be eased out. In other 6 words, there be some way to remove them. So there is action 7 at the end. 8 But there is -- it's clear that when this is written, 9 these men are still in jail and Colonel Majano is still in 10 command. So I think that there is no indication in the 11 declassified documents that the Secretary of State or the 12 Embassy expected that Colonel Majano would be forced out 13 instead. 14 So the action is assuming that Colonel Majano is in 15 command, and that not only these officers arrested, but other 16 handliners could be pushed out as well. And in fact that's 17 not what happens. 18 THE COURT: Is this when the war starts, following 19 this? 20 THE WITNESS: The war starts later. At the point of 21 time that this is happening, there is still no single guerilla 22 army. There are five smaller armed factions, but there is no 23 guerilla army in existence. That comes later. 24 So all of this is in a period of what I would call 25 state terror and the disintegration of the old military KARL - D 664 1 authoritarian regime. There is no civil war yet. 2 And this San Luis Finca event is so important because 3 now we have had the murder of Archbishop Romero, which has 4 plunged the country into terror, and we also have this arrest 5 that indicates to everyone there that this includes murderers 6 of Archbishop Romero or people who were involved in some way 7 of the murder of Archbishop Romero, and rather than being 8 detained, they are being released. 9 We have the hardliners replace the reformists. And 10 so this is one of the next most important events to plunge the 11 country into civil war. We are not into civil war yet. 12 THE COURT: Who replaced Majano as the head 13 commander -- 14 THE WITNESS: Colonel Garcia stays as Minister of 15 Defense and Colonel Gutierrez stays in the junta. They are 16 both members of the Molina Group. But most importantly, there 17 is an organization which is called "COPREFA" which is the 18 organization of the High Command of the military. 19 And if you remember, I said it operates not just like 20 a military, but like a government, and that's where they make 21 their decisions. 22 The head of COPREFA is extremely important, and that 23 is what Colonel Majano was. So he was not only in the 24 government, but he is the head of COPREFA. He is replaced as 25 head of COPREFA. And the person who replaces him is Medrano's KARL - D 665 1 nephew. 2 Medrano is the original author of ORDEN, of the 3 paramilitary organizations, et cetera. So he is actually 4 replaced by a very known hardliner, which then takes over all 5 the -- they are basically putting hardliners in all the main 6 institutions of the military. 7 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 8 Q. If I could have footnote 24 from Exhibit 98, this is the 9 Truth Commission Report. And let's draw your attention, 10 Professor Karl, to footnote 24, which states, quote: 11 "On 12 May, Majano lost his influence when Colonel 12 Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez, of the conservative wing, was 13 appointed President of the Revolutionary Government 14 Junta by the armed forces and, as such, became their 15 Commander-in-Chief." 16 A. That's right. So what happens is Majano is forced out of 17 the junta, but he is also forced out of COPREFA. And these 18 are two parallel organizations. One is the official 19 government and the other is how -- is the military structure 20 itself. And it essentially means that his influence is over. 21 From this time on, he has lost all of his influence, and it's 22 a question of time when he leaves the country. 23 This is the definitive moment when the hardliners 24 take over the entire military and security forces of 25 El Salvador. KARL - D 666 1 Q. And D'Aubuisson, at this point, is released? 2 A. D'Aubuisson is released, that's right. 3 Q. So five days after the raid on the San Luis Finca -- 4 A. The story is really over in terms of the reformers. And 5 the hardliners have taken over, including people who are, by 6 evidence gathered here, implicated in the murder of Archbishop 7 Romero. 8 Q. And Captain Saravia was among those arrested at the San 9 Luis Finca? 10 A. He was arrested at San Luis Finca and he was subsequently 11 released with Mr. D'Aubuisson and went to Guatemala right 12 afterwards with Mr. D'Aubuisson. 13 Q. Is there any other evidence of Saravia's linkages to the 14 assassination of Archbishop Romero? 15 A. I want to draw your attention to Exhibit 121. And I will 16 follow it up with Exhibit 125. These are more declassified 17 documents. 18 Exhibit 121 -- 19 Q. What is the date of this document? 20 A. It's November 1980. 21 Q. So after the hardliners have come into power? 22 A. The hardliners have come into power. Majano is out of 23 power. He is still in the country, by the way, but he is out 24 of power. 25 And this is a document in which the political officer KARL - D 667 1 of the U.S. Embassy is reporting his interview with what he 2 describes as a low ranking National Guard officer. And he is 3 saying that this is a source that he's never met before, his 4 reliability cannot be judged. 5 And then the comment afterwards is regarding the 6 assassination of Monseñor Romero. 7 "The source told the political officer that he 8 participated in a meeting during which the 9 assassination of Archbishop Romero was planned. He 10 indicated that Major Roberto D'Aubuisson was in 11 charge of the meeting and that it took place shortly, 12 a day or two, before Romero was assassinated. 13 According to the source, the participants drew lots 14 for the task of killing the Archbishop. The, quote, 15 winner, end quote, was an ex National Guardsman who, 16 said the source, now lives in Cuidad Delgado. The 17 officer said that the cartridge used in the 18 assassination was his own." 19 And then he goes on to describe his relationship 20 with Roberto D'Aubuisson, particularly a meeting in Guatemala. 21 This is a source who is extremely unhappy because he 22 believes that D'Aubuisson is not acting in the full 23 national -- because this is a split, actually, in the group 24 here, and he is upset that D'Aubuisson is working so closely 25 with wealthy Salvadorans. So this is a memo that reports KARL - D 668 1 that. 2 And it is followed up -- 3 Q. Professor Karl, if I may? 4 A. Sure. 5 MR. Van AELSTYN: Your Honor, I have another document 6 that has not been previously marked, if I may approach. 7 THE COURT: Let me ask Professor Karl a question. If 8 we go back to the Saravia list that was part of Exhibit 123, 9 at least, in one form that it was found, and then separate in 10 the U.S. Embassy documents, I thought there that they were 11 going to supply the weapon to the shooter; at least you might 12 infer that from the supply list. 13 THE WITNESS: That's right. 14 THE COURT: So would this be consistent with what 15 this unconfirmed source, at least as to reliability, the 16 National Guard low ranking officer says? By "cartridge," I 17 assume that means that the assassin used his own ammunition. 18 THE WITNESS: May I talk about the next document 19 before I answer that? 20 THE COURT: Yes. 21 THE WITNESS: This next document -- 22 MR. Van AELSTYN: Just a moment, Professor Karl. 23 THE COURT: There is one more question I would like 24 you to think about, and that is how does that square with 25 Garay's testimony that it was the decision, inferentially, of KARL - D 669 1 Saravia, D'Aubuisson and anyone else who was on their level, 2 to bring in the assassin; they chose the shooter. Not -- they 3 didn't do it by lot. 4 THE WITNESS: Right. 5 MR. Van AELSTYN: Your Honor, if I may just describe 6 the document that Professor Karl has. We have provisionally 7 identified it as the next in order, Exhibit 225, and it 8 appears to be another declassified document dated April 23, 9 1981. 10 THE WITNESS: This is a document from the Embassy 11 back to the Department of State, and it is actually a followup 12 conversation with the same source that the November 1980 13 declassified document refers to. It's called "Security Force 14 Officer Comments on Sheraton Murders." 15 Just to situate the document, the Sheraton murders 16 are murders in the Sheraton Hotel of two U.S. citizens. And 17 so the interest of the United States in finding these 18 murderers is extremely high, which is why there is so much 19 being uncovered, because they are pushing very hard to find 20 out who killed these two U.S. citizens who are working in the 21 land reform and are representatives of the U.S. government 22 through USAID. 23 So what is important in this document, this is an 24 April 22nd conversation with a security force officer who 25 gives details about the Sheraton killing. And it also says in KARL - D 670 1 the summary on -- this is number 2, "The officer described, 2 for instance, some of the details of the planning and 3 execution of the Archbishop Romero assassination." 4 If you look at number 5 -- 5 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 6 Q. On the second page of the document? 7 A. On the second page. And the whole document is quite 8 interesting for a lot of reasons, but I'm going to just hone 9 in on a few things. 10 Where it says "Extreme Rightist Doings." "The 11 officer gave" -- this is the source reporting, the 12 Salvadoran officer -- "gave the political officer 13 bits of information on anti-left activities sponsored 14 or condoned by members of his service. He had 15 participated in several of these activities until 16 mid-1980. He said, for example, that he had 17 participated in the dynamiting of the BPR 18 Headquarters, the dynamiting of the Catholic radio, 19 YXAS, and the dynamiting of the Central American 20 University," which we have heard referred to 21 repeatedly. He said, "He engaged in these activities 22 under the activity of Captain Victor Hugo Vega 23 Valencia," who is one of the officers arrested in San 24 Luis Finca. "The officer said he ended his own 25 participation after finding out his friends were KARL - D 671 1 being paid for their activities, while he had felt 2 obligated to do these things out of conviction." 3 And then, again, I'm moving through the document. 4 "Number 6. Among the source's most interesting 5 comments were those he made about the murder of 6 Archbishop Romero. He repeated what he had said to 7 Political Officer in November," and that is what I 8 read earlier, so I won't repeat it. 9 But what is new in this version of the story, if you 10 look on the final page, he repeated the story he said before, 11 but he gives new details. 12 "Participants at the assassination planning session 13 were D'Aubuisson, Soravia," which is misspelled, 14 Amaya Rosa." 15 And then it says, "Comment." That means it's now the 16 officer, the Political Officer in the Embassy commenting. 17 "Captain Alvaro Soravia and Lieutenant Amaya Rosa were 18 arrested with D'Aubuisson in March. The source said 19 that Amaya Rosa at first did not accept his loss to 20 Douglas." And that's referring to the fact that this 21 so-called Douglas is the one who won the right to 22 shoot Archbishop Romero, "but then grudgingly 23 accepted at least the getaway car driver's role in 24 the operation. The officer ended by saying 25 emphatically that the weapon used to kill Romero was KARL - D 672 1 not a .22 caliber, but was instead a 9 millimeter. 2 The source said, as he did in November, that he gave 3 the bullets to the assassin." 4 So this is a sort -- oh, let me read one more thing. 5 "9. The Embassy officer who has this contact believes 6 that his interlocutor reports accurately, but from 7 his own curious and limited perspective. The data 8 given has not been and may never be substantiated. 9 Though much of what the Embassy officer has told may 10 appear incredible to someone outside El Salvador, the 11 events described and the alleged participants would 12 raise few eyebrows here. Unfortunately, for 50 13 years, the Salvadoran security forces have engaged in 14 kidnapping, murder, bombings, torture and assorted 15 mayhem at the service of the wealthy families; only 16 the scale and atrociousness of the crimes this 17 officer describes are out of the ordinary for the 18 security forces." 19 Now, in order to answer the question you raised, sir, 20 the last one first, other cables show that, and my interviews 21 show, that claiming credit for being involved in the 22 assassination of Archbishop Romero was actually a fund-raising 23 tactic. If you could show you were involved in the 24 assassination, you were more likely to get some financing for 25 your activities or your death squad or whatever from sources KARL - D 673 1 of financing. 2 So what we see in the declassifieds are there are 3 some people who claim credit for having the bullet, for 4 wearing the bullet, for giving the bullet to their girlfriend, 5 all kinds of things like that which are simply, in my view, 6 not credible. And there are people claiming involvement. 7 What is credible, in my reading of the declassifieds, 8 is that when the same name is repeatedly involved in a set of 9 meetings. And what is also credible is that there was a 10 meeting to decide to kill the Archbishop. And in that 11 meeting, it was decided that a sharpshooter was necessary. In 12 other words, not any old shooter could kill him. And when you 13 look at the people involved in this, very few of them are 14 actually sharpshooters. 15 So if there is a drawing for lots, the drawing for 16 lots is the right to get the sharpshooter. It is not the 17 right to kill the Archbishop himself, because this is always a 18 plan to hide who is killing the Archbishop. This is, 19 remember, the first major important political murder, and when 20 I say that, of someone of a stature like this in El Salvador. 21 So the idea is to kill him without anybody being able to know 22 who exactly did the killing. 23 But I do think that we see people claiming credit for 24 being involved in the killing and then later on in the 25 declassified documents, we see reports of that as the Embassy KARL - D 674 1 begins to realize that some of these details are -- that 2 people are claiming credit so that they can actually raise 3 money from landowners by saying they were involved in the 4 assassination. 5 I'm not sure if that answered both of your questions. 6 THE COURT: Yes, I think so. Thank you. 7 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 8 Q. Professor Karl, in your opinion, based upon your research 9 concerning the death squad activities, is there any way to 10 sort out the statements that may be braggadocio for 11 fund-raising and some that may have some actual validity? 12 A. Yes. I think in my -- when I read these documents, I look 13 for what I call a "core of consistency." And by that, I mean 14 that in every document there are certain things that are 15 consistent. 16 I also, by the way, never just rely on declassified 17 documents. It's very important to me that I do my own 18 research and investigation. And there are other testimonies 19 available that I cited earlier, Mr. Garay's testimonies; there 20 are some secret testimonies of Mr. Saravia. There are other 21 things that I have had access to which helps me separate out 22 the wheat from the chaff, if I could put it this way. 23 And I think that the core of consistency, in all of 24 the declassifieds, my interviews, these other sources, that I 25 have given, all have a core of consistency about the role of KARL - D 675 1 Roberto D'Aubuisson and the role of Mr. Saravia as his chief 2 aide. 3 THE COURT: When you refer to secret testimony of 4 Saravia, do you mean that in a technical sense, that this was 5 a statement under oath? 6 THE WITNESS: May we hold that question for a bit, 7 your Honor? It's -- there are testimonies of Mr. Saravia, but 8 not under oath in a court of law. 9 THE COURT: All right. It would be hard to call it 10 testimony then. 11 THE WITNESS: Right, excuse me. 12 THE COURT: Statements? 13 THE WITNESS: Statements, thank you. 14 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 15 Q. When last week we were following the chronology, I believe 16 you testified that your understanding was that following the 17 San Luis Finca raid, D'Aubuisson and Saravia went to 18 Guatemala? 19 A. That's right. 20 Q. Bring us up to date through the early 80s. 21 Well, actually, if I may, before you do that, could 22 we please have Exhibit 45 and then 46? 23 Can you identify Exhibits 45 and 46, Professor Karl? 24 A. I can identify the person in the pictures. That's Roberto 25 D'Aubuisson. KARL - D 676 1 Q. And the date here is March 26, 1984, taken from Newsweek 2 magazine. And if we could go back to the previous one. 3 A. The one that says "D'Aubuisson: I'm not an angel." 4 Q. Right, also from Newsweek. Do you know what these 5 photographs are of, other than the individual, the context? 6 A. Yes. These are photographs of Roberto D'Aubuisson on the 7 presidential campaign trail. 8 Q. So in March of 1984, he is running for president of 9 El Salvador? 10 A. That's right. So -- 11 Q. A few years after he had been arrested at the San Luis 12 Finca? 13 A. That's right. 14 Q. How did he get there? 15 A. Well, very briefly, he goes to Guatemala, where he is put 16 under the protection of a man called Mario Sandoval Alarcon, 17 who is the godfather of death squads in Guatemala, which has 18 the same operation of El Salvador going on at the time. 19 When he is there, he works on the design and the 20 organization of the F.A.N., the political party that he 21 found -- political party/paramilitary organization that later 22 becomes the ARENA Party. That is the party that governs 23 El Salvador today. 24 He returns to El Salvador, Mr. D'Aubuisson, with 25 Mr. Saravia. I don't know if they actually came back KARL - D 677 1 together, but they both return to El Salvador from Guatemala. 2 Roberto D'Aubuisson becomes the President of the 3 Legislature first, of the Constituent Assembly. And in that 4 position, he brings Mr. Saravia to work in the security forces 5 of the Legislative Assembly, and they are both working in the 6 security forces of the Legislative Assembly through the '84 7 campaign. 8 Now, what is important about that is at the same time 9 this occurs, a death squad starts operating out of the 10 Legislative Assembly out of the Office of the President. This 11 is the office of Roberto D'Aubuisson that is made up of 12 members of the security guards, the security force of the 13 Legislative Assembly. That is the assembly where Mr. Saravia 14 is working. 15 Afterwards, there is a -- Mr. D'Aubuisson has wanted 16 to be President for some time, and he actually wins an 17 election in El Salvador with the United -- it is an interim 18 presidential election. And he actually wins that election. 19 The United States is so upset that he might be the 20 temporary president of El Salvador until the 1984 elections, 21 that it actually intervenes very strongly, and the new 22 president is appointed named Magana. So the United States 23 actually opposes D'Aubuisson as President. 24 And instead of D'Aubuisson or Duarte, who are the two 25 candidates of the interim presidential period, a third person, KARL - D 678 1 who actually doesn't even run in the elections and is the 2 banker of the military, a civilian named Magana, is actually 3 appointed president. 4 So this is now an effort of D'Aubuisson to become 5 president, but also with the opposition of the United States. 6 And these pictures in Newsweek are portraying that. 7 And he has Mr. Saravia with him in the Constituent 8 Assembly, and there is very ample evidence of a death squad 9 operating out of that Assembly at the time. 10 THE COURT: What was the process by which he became 11 initially the President of the Legislative Assembly? 12 THE WITNESS: There was a deal made, which is a 13 political deal. It had actually nothing to do with the 14 electoral results. 15 The United States, the Reagan Administration, felt 16 that if Mr. D'Aubuisson became the president of the country 17 with his very notorious reputation as a death squad organizer 18 and leader, that it would be impossible to get military aid 19 through the U.S. Congress. 20 At that point, a deal was made that he would take a 21 lesser profile position, which was President of the 22 Legislature, and Mr. Magana, who had not actually even been a 23 candidate in the elections, was appointed president. So it 24 was to give him a power base, but a less visible one, if I can 25 put it that way. KARL - D 679 1 THE COURT: When he returned from Guatemala, then did 2 they have public elections? Did he run for public office? 3 THE WITNESS: No. What he does is he forms the ARENA 4 Party. He becomes a representative of the ARENA Party, and 5 when ARENA wins control of the legislature, which happens in 6 these interim elections, ARENA appoints him a head of the 7 Constituent Assembly. That's the way the political system 8 works there or worked at that time. 9 THE COURT: In this photograph, is he wearing a 10 uniform? 11 THE WITNESS: No, the colors that he used all the 12 time were red, white and blue, and he very often campaigned in 13 that jacket. 14 If you notice, in the picture, ARENA is a party which 15 presents itself with red, white and blue, and you can see on 16 the side of the man behind him, the ARENA Party signature, 17 which is on his sleeve. 18 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 19 Q. This is during a campaign? 20 A. Yes. And that happens earlier. 21 The 1984 elections now is once again an election 22 between Duarte and D'Aubuisson. D'Aubuisson is once again 23 running for president. 24 The United States is again against his candidacy for 25 the same reason as before, because they believe that if he KARL - D 680 1 becomes president, there will be no possibility of providing 2 aid to El Salvador. 3 And so once again, he is running, but the United 4 States is now giving a great deal of money to support the 5 candidacy of Mr. Duarte. 6 THE COURT: Who votes in this election? 7 THE WITNESS: In this election -- well, that was a 8 very controversial question. Because at the point of time we 9 are talking about, violence has risen to the highest it has 10 ever been. And I will give you some statistics later. 11 In this period of time, from 1980 to 1984, 12 El Salvador is at a level of extremely high violence. State 13 terror, primarily committed by the Salvadoran Armed Forces. 14 So voting in the elections under the conditions of 15 state terror, there are no candidates participating at all 16 from what I would call the center left or the left. Even 17 though there is quite a constituency from them, there are no 18 candidates that represent that position. 19 And there is no one participating in the elections 20 and voting from that sector if they have choice. There are 21 people being taken to the voting centers, et cetera. So this 22 is an election held under conditions of really extreme 23 violence. 24 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 25 Q. Professor Karl, very briefly, what is going on with the KARL - D 681 1 investigation of the assassination of Archbishop Romero during 2 this period in the early 80s? 3 A. Well, in the early 80s, then, we have ARENA in control of 4 the legislature, but ARENA is the new party now, that used to 5 be the F.A.N., and is now the party/paramilitary organization 6 of El Salvador. 7 ARENA is controlling the Assembly, but it also has 8 very important control over some of the courts, particularly 9 the Supreme Court and the public attorneys -- or Attorney 10 General, Public Prosecutor's Office, excuse me. 11 So ARENA, appoints, as Public Prosecutor of 12 El Salvador, Jose Francisco Guerrero. We have heard about him 13 before. He was the representative who went to the CAL 14 meetings with Roberto D'Aubuisson, the meetings of the network 15 of extreme rightists that I talked about earlier, but he was 16 also D'Aubuisson's personal lawyer. So the Public Prosecutor 17 is D'Aubuisson's personal lawyer. 18 And what he does, essentially, is make sure that the 19 investigation of Romero's assassination is quashed. And there 20 has been previous testimony to show that judges, in general, 21 are unwilling to take this case. 22 So if anyone was going to take it, it would have to 23 be -- unwilling and unafraid to take this case, if anyone were 24 to take it, it would have to be the Public Prosecutor, but the 25 Public Prosecutor is Roberto D'Aubuisson's personal lawyer. KARL - D 682 1 Q. Did the Public Prosecutor, Jose Francisco Guerrero, submit 2 any evidence to the court, the Fourth Criminal Court that had 3 been investigating the Romero assassination at this time? 4 A. He does. And what is important is that he submits in 5 August 1985 what is called the "Pedro Lobo confession." He 6 submits this to the Fourth Criminal Court of El Salvador. And 7 this is a confession that proves later to be fraudulent. 8 He gets the confession, the Pedro Lobo confession, 9 from Roberto D'Aubuisson. It's a tape that is actually 10 produced by Roberto D'Aubuisson. 11 It is a tape of a man whose name is Roberto Delbert 12 Salazar Collier, and he is also called Pedro Lobo. He is a 13 man who confesses to the murder of Archbishop Romero. 14 The problem is that when Archbishop Romero was 15 murdered, Pedro Lobo was incarcerated as a common criminal 16 inside jail in El Salvador, so he could not possibly have been 17 the killer. 18 When it is revealed that he was incarcerated during 19 this period of time, Pedro Lobo then says that he was offered 20 $50,000 to confess to being an accomplice in the murder of 21 Archbishop Romero. 22 So the Pedro Lobo confession is produced by 23 D'Aubuisson, given to his personal lawyer, who is Jose 24 Francisco Guerrero. The personal lawyer is the Public 25 Prosecutor. And then he puts that in evidence and then it KARL - D 683 1 later proves to be fraudulent. 2 Q. If we could go back for a moment to Exhibit 45, the 3 campaign photograph. I would like to draw your attention, 4 Professor Karl, to page 129 of Exhibit 98, the Truth 5 Commission Report. 6 THE COURT: While you look for that, I have to 7 conduct a proceeding in another case. It won't take me long. 8 Let's take the morning recess now, and we will resume about 9 ten minutes of 11:00. 10 MR. Van AELSTYN: Thank you, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: We will stand in recess until that time. 12 (Recess) 13 THE COURT: Back on the record in Doe versus Saravia. 14 I apologize for the time. We will try to make it up at the 15 noon hour in the other proceeding. 16 We are going to go on now with the testimony of 17 Professor Karl. 18 MR. Van AELSTYN: Thank you, your Honor. 19 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 20 Q. Professor Karl, right before we left, I asked you to look 21 at Exhibit 98, the Truth Commission Report. If I could have 22 Exhibit 45 up again. 23 Did you have an opportunity to look at that during 24 the break, Professor Karl? 25 A. Yes. KARL - D 684 1 Q. Did it refresh your recollection? 2 A. Yes. The testimony I gave about the Pedro Lobo 3 confession, I would just like to add that that tape was 4 produced for Roberto D'Aubuisson's campaign. In other words, 5 the original tape was done to make it look as if the left had 6 killed Archbishop Romero, which is what Pedro Lobo was 7 confessing to. 8 The authenticity of that tape had been discredited 9 during the campaign itself, so that when the Public 10 Prosecutor, Mr. Guerrero, presented that tape, it had already 11 previously been discredited, and it had already been 12 identified as a false confession and publicly identified as 13 such. 14 Q. Did that prosecution in 1985 make any progress against 15 those responsible for the assassination of Monseñor Romero? 16 A. No, it made no progress. Eventually, another 17 investigation is opened up, and we discussed that the other 18 day. 19 That is the investigation that President Duarte 20 appoints of the Special Investigative Commission. That 21 includes the Mr. Lopez who Amado Garay testifies comes to meet 22 with him, and that is the testimony that we talked about that 23 results in the Supreme Court decision that is -- of 24 El Salvador that is sent to the United States that cancels the 25 extradition request from Mr. Saravia. KARL - D 685 1 THE COURT: The year of that? 2 THE WITNESS: That is in 1988. And that was on -- I 3 testified, I believe my last day of testimony, in some detail 4 about that case. 5 So that what we have in the 1980s is blocked 6 investigations, an investigation with false documentation 7 presented by the Public Prosecutor, and false documentation 8 that is already discredited. 9 Then we have President Duarte trying to open up 10 another investigation in 1986. At some period during this new 11 investigation, Mr. Saravia leaves El Salvador and comes to the 12 United States. 13 It is that 1986 investigation that eventually leads 14 to the request for extradition of Mr. Saravia. He is arrested 15 and jailed in Miami. He -- and I, again, testified to this, 16 he is -- his lawyer is provided by D'Aubuisson. He calls 17 D'Aubuisson from jail. 18 I presented the Mariscos Tazumal fax that the 19 administrative decision from the Supreme -- the administrative 20 decision was faxed to the United States from, and we went over 21 Ambassador Walker's cable talking about the obstruction of 22 justice in this case. So -- 23 Q. Professor Karl, at the time of the December 1988 decision 24 of the El Salvador Supreme Court to negate and the 25 investigation of Alvaro Saravia, was Jose Francisco Guerrero KARL - D 686 1 still the Public Prosecutor? 2 A. No. He had been elevated to President of the Supreme 3 Court. 4 Q. The same Supreme Court, then, that issued that 5 decision closing -- 6 A. That's right. So he, at this point, when that decision is 7 made, Roberto D'Aubuisson's personal lawyer is elevated to 8 President of the Supreme Court, which subsequently makes the 9 decision that is sent to the United States and that results, 10 eventually, in Mr. Saravia's release from jail. 11 Q. So in 1988, he has been released from detention, no longer 12 subject to extradition. What is his immigration status at 13 that point in the United States and has that ever come up for 14 review? 15 A. Yes. Apparently, his immigration status is not 16 regularized. And so the next time we have documentary 17 evidence of Mr. Saravia's -- at least I have documentary 18 evidence of Mr. Saravia, is in a series of negotiation 19 meetings that occur in 1990 around his immigration status. 20 MR. Van AELSTYN: Could I have Exhibit 165, please. 21 THE WITNESS: This is a document that I need to go 22 over in some detail. This is a very important document. 23 It is sent in a much more secret way than other 24 declassified documents. If you see on the top, it says, 25 "Never sent as cable." That means this is delivered in a KARL - D 687 1 different way. 2 There are -- the way declassified documents work, 3 some are sent as regular cables and others are sent in other 4 more "back channel" ways, so that they don't appear as part of 5 the regular cable traffic. 6 This is a, from the Embassy of the United States, and 7 it is for Bernie Aronson, who, at that point, is Assistant 8 Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. 9 Q. Professor Karl, if I may just ask one question by way of 10 clarification. It says here from the Legal Officer of the 11 Embassy, San Salvador. But the first sentence here says, "On 12 May 14, legal officer met with Alvaro Saravia in the offices 13 of Miami attorney Neal Sonnet"? 14 A. That's right. 15 Q. So the San Salvador officer is reporting on a meeting in 16 Miami? 17 A. Yes. In my view, it is a very unusual event that officers 18 from the Embassy would be meeting with somebody in Miami 19 rather than in El Salvador. 20 Mr. Saravia is in the United States, and apparently 21 this meeting did not take place in El Salvador, so I think 22 that he probably preferred to have it in the United States, 23 but I don't know that. It did not take place in the offices 24 of Neal Sonnet, who was the attorney that had helped him on 25 the extradition case. He was the attorney that was KARL - D 688 1 purportedly paid by the ARENA Party or by ARENA members of the 2 party, and he was the attorney, very high priced attorney, 3 that seemed -- and if you remember in the cable by Ambassador 4 William Walker, he comments that this attorney is out of the 5 price range of someone like Alvaro Saravia, and discusses the 6 D'Aubuisson aid to Saravia while he is in jail in Miami. 7 So he is now out of jail. He is meeting in the legal 8 offices of the same attorney. And he is offering, if you read 9 this cable, to cooperate with the United States in developing 10 key criminal investigations in El Salvador in return for a 11 regularization of his immigration status, and for that of his 12 family, and also for providing for their security. 13 If you look at number 2 on the memo, he says -- it 14 says. 15 "During this initial interview, Saravia was asked to 16 provide information on the Romero assassination. He 17 was asked to limit discussion only to what he could 18 bear personal witness to. The following is a 19 summation of the relevant points." 20 Part 3 is -- point 3 is the Romero Case. 21 "Saravia confirmed that D'Aubuisson gave the order to 22 murder Archbishop Romero on March 24, 1980. He has 23 no firsthand knowledge, however, on what meetings, if 24 any, took place prior to March 24th to discuss the 25 murder of Romero. KARL - D 689 1 "On the morning of March 24th, 1980, there was a 2 meeting of ten persons, including Roberto 3 D'Aubuisson, Captain Avila and 'Negro' Sagrera at a 4 house in Escalon." 5 And I should say that "Negro" Sagrera is the same as 6 Fernando Sagrera; that's his first name. 7 Q. Where is Escalon? 8 A. Escalon is the wealthy area of San Salvador. 9 "Captain Avila arrived for the meeting with a daily 10 newspaper and pointed out that Romero would be giving 11 a Mass that afternoon at the Church of Divine 12 Providence. He suggested it would be a good 13 opportunity to kill him. 14 "D'Aubuisson agreed and asked if a gunman could be 15 found. One of the ten, only identified as the son of 16 an ex-president of El Salvador, said he knew of a 17 gunman and was ordered by D'Aubuisson to contact him. 18 "D'Aubuisson put Sagrera in charge of the operation, 19 then left for San Miguel to attend previously 20 arranged meetings. 21 "Sagrera, the gunman, and two others met in the 22 parking lot of the Camino Real Hotel a half hour 23 before the murder to finalize the plan. From this 24 meeting the gunman went to the church and murdered 25 Romero. KARL - D 690 1 "The gunman was paid 1,000 colones. Approximately 2 U.S. $200. Saravia does not know if the money came 3 from D'Aubuisson. 4 "The weapon used was an M-16. 5 "Part 4 of the comment of the officer: There are 6 some contradictions between Saravia's version and 7 that given earlier by Garay, the alleged chauffeur. 8 Amado stated that Saravia" -- "Amado stated he took 9 Saravia to D'Aubuisson's house after the murder, 10 where he overheard Saravia report the success of the 11 mission. D'Aubuisson claimed that at the time when 12 Saravia allegedly was reporting to him, he, 13 D'Aubuisson, was outside of San Salvador. 14 D'Aubuisson could be telling the truth and still be 15 guilty of ordering the murder. 16 "5. It is hardly plausible that the murder of Romero 17 was decided on the spur of the moment. Saravia, 18 however, could be telling the truth when he says he 19 was not aware of any prior planning; he was asked to 20 limit discussion to facts he could attest to. It is 21 more probable that the decision to kill Romero was 22 made elsewhere, but the details of when and how were 23 left to D'Aubuisson. Avila's suggestion was merely 24 opportune." 25 Q. Could you address a couple of the discrepancies that have KARL - D 691 1 appeared here? 2 A. Yes. In the first instance, this is a description, like 3 all other confessions, or what I call "death squad 4 confessions," which I mentioned earlier, that there is always 5 a pattern of attempting to distance one's own personal 6 involvement. So the kinds of confessions, the interviews that 7 I have had: "I know, I saw, I drove," but one's own personal 8 involvement is not highlighted in any of these confessions. I 9 only know of one case where somebody actually confessed to 10 what he personally did in these. 11 So what is notable in this is Mr. Saravia is telling 12 a story in which he has knowledge but he doesn't personally 13 appear as the person who sent his driver, for example. 14 So that's one of the discrepancies in the story. 15 That's a common pattern, in my view. 16 Q. And the discrepancy about the alleged conflict in 17 testimony between himself and Amado Garay? 18 A. Well, Amado Garay says that he was working for Saravia, 19 that he left from Saravia's home, that he drove the gunman, 20 that he returned to Saravia's home, so all of that would 21 implicate Mr. Saravia very, very deeply in this story, and he 22 is not telling that story in the same way. 23 Q. No. I'm talking about the conflict that the officer 24 recording this document notes between regarding the report to 25 Roberto D'Aubuisson of the mission's success. KARL - D 692 1 A. Oh, I'm sorry. 2 The Garay's testimony is that -- of that mission's 3 success actually is reported several days later. And so there 4 actually isn't an inconsistency. It's not clear from this 5 report here when that actually took place. So it is not 6 necessarily an inconsistency. 7 Q. Is there anything else in this document that you found 8 noteworthy? 9 A. Yes. I would like to point out a couple of other things. 10 On point 7, it says that: The details are incomplete 11 and would be expanded only after reaching an 12 agreement with Saravia as to his immigration status 13 and ability to safeguard his family." 14 It talks about additional information that he might 15 be able to provide, and I think the relevant part here is we 16 might be able to provide information -- he might be able to 17 provide information on how the Salvadoran court decision in 18 his extradition proceedings was manipulated. 19 It might be that the current President of the Court, 20 Mauricio Gutierrez, this is the man that replaces 21 D'Aubuisson's personal attorney, Guerrero, it might be that 22 the current President of the court, Mauricio Gutierrez, was 23 involved in that decision. 24 Gutierrez is certainly D'Aubuisson's man and was a 25 member of the previous court. KARL - D 693 1 Then I would like to draw your attention to part 9 2 where it says. 3 "Next steps: If we are to exploit Saravia's full 4 potential to clear up missing pieces of the Romero 5 assassination, and possibly other cases, we will have 6 to come to an understanding with him. We are asking 7 him to provide testimony which will implicate, by 8 eyewitness testimony, D'Aubuisson in murder. 9 D'Aubuisson could resort to threats or use of 10 violence against Saravia and his family. Saravia 11 believes that his life will be in danger as soon as 12 D'Aubuisson is aware of his cooperation." 13 And then it repeats his concerns about his 14 immigration status. 15 If I could draw your attention to point 10. 16 "Our first step would be to delay Saravia's June 14th 17 hearing before the immigration judge. This should 18 not be difficult to arrange." And then it says, 19 "Comment: Done. 20 "The additional time will enable us to work with 21 Saravia and develop his information; it will also be 22 proof of our good faith. The next steps should be 23 discussed with immigration, but could include not 24 opposing the asylum request for his family and 25 working out an appropriate security arrangement. If KARL - D 694 1 we agree to legitimize his immigration status, it 2 should be our last act after we are certain that he 3 has cooperated fully with us." 4 And then it goes on to talk about the deal in the 5 making. His immigration status is not regularized, to my 6 knowledge, to this date, so -- 7 Q. Professor Karl, this is contained in a communication from 8 the legal officer of San Salvadoran to Bernie Aronson? 9 A. That's right. 10 Q. The Assistant Secretary of State? 11 A. That's right. 12 Q. What happens after this document is sent, based upon the 13 materials that you have reviewed? 14 A. Okay. Then we can turn to regular cable traffic. So this 15 is the back channels detailed cable. 16 And if you could turn to Exhibit 97. This is a 17 regular cable which repeats some, but not all, of the 18 information in the cable I previously read. 19 Q. This is addressed to the Secretary from Bernard Aronson? 20 A. This is to the Secretary of State. 21 Q. It's been kicked up a level? 22 A. It's been kicked up a level, exactly. And it's called 23 "Discussions with D'Aubuisson Accomplice." 24 I think that what is most important is this is 25 following a much higher level. KARL - D 695 1 It says, "We have been in contact with Alvaro 2 Saravia, formerly an accomplice of ultra rightist 3 Salvadoran politician, Roberto D'Aubuisson." 4 I'm taking this from paragraph 1. And, again, I'm 5 not going to repeat things that have already been read. But 6 let me just say that this cable says to the Secretary of the 7 United States: 8 "Saravia has already told us that he was present when 9 D'Aubuisson ordered the 1980 assassination of 10 Archbishop Romero. While unsurprising, Saravia's 11 story is convincing. We believe that Saravia knows 12 more about the Romero case and may have additional 13 information about D'Aubuisson's involvement in death 14 squads and kidnapping-for-profit." 15 And then if I could just read one more bit of this 16 cable, the next paragraph. 17 "Obviously, we would prefer that his information be 18 used in Salvadoran prosecution, but there is little 19 prospect for this time. D'Aubuisson appears to have 20 significant control on the Salvadoran judiciary." 21 The rest of the statements repeat what I read from 22 the previous cable. 23 THE COURT: What is the date of this communication? 24 MR. Van AELSTYN: I believe it is undated. 25 THE WITNESS: It is undated. KARL - D 696 1 THE COURT: Is there a stamp or anything on it? 2 THE WITNESS: There is a stamp. 3 MR. Van AELSTYN: The stamp -- 4 THE COURT: 9/23/93. 5 THE WITNESS: That's the declassified stamp. That 6 just shows you it was part of the declassified documents. It 7 is a top secret document, and there is no statement of a date. 8 BY MR. Van AELSTYN: 9 Q. Could we have Exhibit 95, please. 10 THE COURT: There is a date right there. 11 MR. Van AELSTYN: Yes, that also was -- 12 THE COURT: Looks like -- 13 MR. Van AELSTYN: May 5, 1990. That is part of the 14 declassification process. So, again, we don't know if that is 15 an accurate date or not. 16 If you go to the next page, please. 17 THE WITNESS: I don't have a copy of this up here 18 with me. 19 Exhibit 95 already notes that there have been several 20 conversations, and that they are asking the FBI to participate 21 in the interrogation of Mr. Saravia. 22 So in this document, as well, Mr. Saravia says that 23 he was D'Aubuisson's personal and private secretary. So he 24 does not identify himself as Chief of Security. He identifies 25 himself in this document as D'Aubuisson's personal and private KARL - D 697 1 secretary. 2 But this is also further documentation that he was an 3 official of the Security Forces of the Constituent Assembly in 4 1983 and 1984. 5 My previous testimony said that that is the same 6 force that a death squad was operating out of in the 7 Constituent Assembly. So they do note that in the document as 8 well. 9 And if I could turn to page -- 10 Q. The next page of Exhibit 95? 11 A. The page prior. 12 Q. Yes. 13 A. Yes, thank you. And if you could -- thank you. 14 One of the concerns is that they would like to find 15 out who is threatening U.S. officials as well. And so the 16 rest of this document is about targeting U.S. officials. 17 There is a plot -- the first one is a plot to 18 assassinate the Ambassador to El Salvador from the United 19 States. This is the Ambassador during the Reagan and Bush 20 period -- the Reagan period. 21 And D'Aubuisson blamed U.S. intervention on his 22 defeat in the '84 elections. He is very angry because the 23 United States funded the candidacy of Duarte, and there are a 24 number of reports that D'Aubuisson is going to kill the U.S. 25 Ambassador. KARL - D 698 1 As a result of these reports, which are taken 2 extremely seriously by the United States, the United States 3 sends General Vernon Walters to speak to D'Aubuisson about 4 the -- about this charge that he is trying to assassinate the 5 United States. 6 There is also charges about drive-by shootings at the 7 U.S. Embassy. 8 And if I could draw your attention also to the 9 declaration of California Representative George Miller. 10 Q. It was submitted in this case? 11 A. Yes, it was submitted in this case. Representative Miller 12 testifies in his declaration, he says that he is warned by 13 U.S. officials that Roberto D'Aubuisson is sending a security 14 man to, quote, and this is his language, "investigate 15 Representative Miller for the positions he is taking inside 16 the U.S. Congress." 17 And they warn Representative Miller that actually he 18 is in danger. They also say that he should not go to 19 El Salvador. He cancels a trip to El Salvador. 20 So now they are asking Mr. Saravia to also try to 21 shed light on these attacks against U.S. Embassy and U.S. 22 officials. 23 Q. To your knowledge, Professor Karl, what became of these 24 negotiations with Mr. Saravia in May, approximately, of 1990? 25 A. Well, I think what is especially important is that KARL - D 699 1 Mr. Saravia is, to my knowledge, his immigration status is 2 never regularized, and that was supposed to be according to 3 these cables, the last act of a series of negotiations. So 4 that does not occur. And that means that Mr. Saravia's 5 immigration status is irregular. 6 Q. Has there been any prosecution of Roberto D'Aubuisson or 7 Mr. Saravia, to your knowledge? 8 A. There has not been any prosecution, but there has been 9 further attempts to discover what happened in the Romero 10 assassination from Mr. Saravia. 11 Q. What were those? 12 A. Those attempts came in the process of some -- some 13 background, if I may. 14 In 1992, the -- both sides in the Salvadoran Civil 15 War signed a peace agreement that was sponsored by the United 16 Nations and negotiated from the Secretary General's office of 17 the United Nations. 18 Q. What was the date of the agreement? 19 A. January 1st, 1992. 20 Q. So approximately six months after these meetings with 21 Mr. Saravia? 22 A. That's right. So there is a peace agreement now that has 23 been signed in El Salvador. Mr. Saravia is in the United 24 States at the time, as far as we know. 25 When the peace agreement is signed, the peace KARL - D 700 1 agreement establishes what is called the "Truth Commission," 2 and that is a commission which is charged with investigating 3 not all crimes in El Salvador, because there are far too many, 4 but a number of murders, assassinations, death squad killings, 5 formal military killings of civilians, et cetera. 6 And it conducts an investigation of these. As part 7 of this investigation, Mr. Saravia is interviewed in New York 8 for the Truth Commission, and he has an attorney with him, 9 although it is no longer the same high-priced attorney that he 10 had in Miami. 11 So he is now operating in a different way. He gives 12 a secret -- he gives a series of statements to the Truth 13 Commission in secret. Those statements are recorded. There 14 are summaries of them and there are transcripts of them, and I 15 have seen most of them. Not all. 16 Q. Okay. Is there anything of particular note that you want 17 to mention about these documents before we move on? 18 A. Well, I think I would just like to say that in those 19 testimonies, they are the fullest statements that I have seen 20 of Mr. Saravia's discussion of the Romero assassination. 21 And in those statements to the Truth Commission, 22 accompanied by his lawyer, given in New York City, Mr. Saravia 23 states that Roberto D'Aubuisson brought arms, including arms 24 for death squad assassinations, and for this particular 25 action, that he introduces them clandestinely into El Salvador KARL - D 701 1 to Guatemala in the United States. 2 He testifies as to how the videos are made to be 3 shown in military barracks. He testifies to the group 4 receiving money and to some of the financiers behind the money 5 that they were raising. 6 Mr. Saravia says that he, Mr. Saravia, knew who 7 provided the red Volkswagen to be driven to the assassination 8 of Archbishop Romero. 9 He says -- Mr. Saravia says that he -- again, 10 Mr. Saravia -- participated in a meeting the day after the 11 assassination, and present in that meeting was this President 12 of the Supreme Court, Francisco Guerrero. So it was a meeting 13 about the assassinatio