U N R E D A C T E D IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION ------------------------------------------------------- ANA PATRICIA CHAVEZ, CECILIA ) SANTOS, JOSE FRANCISCO ) CALDERON, ERLINDA FRANCO, AND ) DANIEL ALVARADO, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) VS. ) NO. 03-2932-Ml/P ) ) NICOLAS CARRANZA, ) ) Defendant. ) ------------------------------------------------------- TRIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON PHIPPS MCCALLA, JUDGE NOVEMBER 7, 2005 VOLUME VI BRENDA PARKER OFFICIAL REPORTER SUITE 942 FEDERAL BUILDING 167 NORTH MAIN STREET MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 38103 896 A P P E A R A N C E S Appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs: BASS BERRY & SIMS PLC 315 DEADERICK STREET, SUITE 2700 NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37238-3001 By: DAVID R. ESQUIVEL, ESQ. CAROLYN PATTY BLUM, ESQ. CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY 291 WEST 12TH STREET NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10014 MATTHEW J. EISENBRANDT, ESQ. CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY 870 MARKET STREET, SUITE 684 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102 Appearing on behalf of the Defendant: FARGARSON & BROOKE 65 UNION AVENUE 9TH FLOOR MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 38103 By: ROBERT M. FARGARSON, ESQ. BRUCE BROOKE, ESQ. 897 W I T N E S S I N D E X WITNESS PAGE LINE TERRY LYNN KARL DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ESQUIVEL: ...................... 906 6 898 E X H I B I T I N D E X EXHIBIT NUMBER PAGE LINE Exhibit Number 20 Photograph 917 21 Exhibit Number 21 Photograph 921 22 Exhibit Number 22 Photograph 923 23 Exhibit Number 23 Photograph 965 14 Exhibit Number 24 Declassified Document 973 1 Exhibit Number 25 Photograph 976 13 Exhibit Number 26 Photograph 978 6 Exhibit Number 26 Photograph 979 13 Exhibit Number 27 Photograph 980 14 Exhibit Number 28 Trust Commision Report 986 1 Exhibit Number 29 Demonstrative 987 3 Exhibit Number 30 Telegram 993 24 Exhibit Number 31 Report 1000 12 Exhibit Number 32 Article 1015 1 Exhibit Number 33 Document 1017 15 Exhibit Number 34 Memorandum 1023 2 Exhibit Number 35 Cable 1026 6 Exhibit Number 36 Cable 1028 1 Exhibit Number 37 Telegram 1053 1 Exhibit Number 38 Telegram 1058 15 Exhibit Number 39 Telegram 1061 16 Exhibit Number 40 Telegram 1067 11 899 Exhibit Number 41 Telegram 1072 5 Exhibit Number 42 Telegram 1075 13 Exhibit Number 43 Video Tape 1077 15 Exhibit Number 44 Article 1083 6 Exhibit Number 45 Notes 1087 1 900 1 MONDAY MORNING AND AFTERNOON 2 NOVEMBER 7, 2005 3 The trial of in this case resumed on this date, 4 Monday, November 7, 2005, at 8:45 o'clock a.m., when and 5 where evidence was introduced and proceedings were had as 6 follows: 7 8 ____________ 9 10 THE COURT: All right. I think we're ready. 11 We did wait a minute and let them have a chance to finish 12 their snacks, which got here a little late. Anything else 13 before we start? 14 MR. FARGARSON: Could we approach the bench? 15 THE COURT: Sure, absolutely. 16 (The following proceedings had at side-bar 17 bench.) 18 MR. FARGARSON: Several things about the next 19 witness who is going to testify. And first of all, we 20 want to object to these pictures on the basis that the 21 gruesomeness of them and the probative value of them, I 22 mean their prejudicial value outweighs the necessity to 23 show those to the jury since they already know and have 24 heard evidence of this and things of that nature. And I'm 25 sure you will hear some more from this witness. That's 901 1 number one. 2 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, those pictures go to 3 the widespread attack. The plaintiff's evidence is 10,000 4 civilians were killed during the course of a year, and 5 those photos demonstrate that fact. 6 THE COURT: I know that they're unpleasant, 7 but, unfortunately, they're not so -- they're bad, but 8 they're not -- we have seen worse. 9 MS. BLUM: Excuse me, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: They're not of a nature that you 11 would not typically allow a jury to see them, that's all 12 I'm saying. And also the plaintiffs have the burden of 13 proof in this area, and I think it might be a problem if I 14 didn't allow them this opportunity to present this type of 15 proof. The widespread knowledge of the -- of activity is 16 somewhat demonstrated by these types of photographs as to 17 which there has already been some testimony. 18 MR. FARGARSON: Okay. Number two -- so we 19 except to the court's ruling. 20 THE COURT: Certainly. 21 MR. FARGARSON: Number two is -- now, this 22 witness is a political science major, teacher, not a 23 military expert, and yet she is purporting to give duties 24 of the military and stating what Carranza should have 25 done. I mean I think she can testify about the history. 902 1 I think she can testify about what she knows about the 2 history of the military, but I don't believe that she has 3 the credentials that Jose Garcia had as a military man to 4 give these conclusionary opinions about what Nicolas 5 Carranza should have done and, secondly, those are issues 6 for the jury to determine, not for her to determine and 7 give evidence on as a historical expert. 8 MR. BROOKE: There is one in the front too. 9 THE COURT: Is there one in the front? 10 MR. BROOKE: Where she wants to talk about the 11 chain of command. 12 MR. ESQUIVEL: She is being offered as an 13 expert in the political history of El Salvador, which 14 includes the role of the military within the government of 15 El Salvador. So the military chain of command is 16 necessary for her to explain how the military fit into the 17 political structure. And as to what Colonel Carranza 18 could have done, as a political scientist, she studies 19 human rights abuses and she studies in particular -- human 20 rights abuses in El Salvador and other countries, and so 21 part of her expertise is what governments can do or should 22 do to prevent or investigate human rights abuses, and 23 that's the nature of her testimony at the -- 24 THE COURT: It is generally outside the area 25 that most people feel comfortable that they have knowledge 903 1 in and does call for some expert presentation. I think 2 her credentials are a matter that the jury will weigh, 3 that they may or may not conclude that they value her 4 opinion, but I think it's the type of statement that can 5 be made. These are the types of statements that can be 6 made. I should allow it. I was pretty clear that without 7 some expert opinions, many people would be left to 8 speculation about these types of issues, they just 9 wouldn't feel comfortable that they had knowledge in this 10 area. I think it is helpful to have it. I think that she 11 is allowed to give the opinion, and then the jury will 12 just have to decide who they accept and who they don't 13 accept or what they don't accept or do accept as valuable 14 evidence in the case. But I think it is appropriate. It 15 seems pretty carefully stated also. It -- she -- as I 16 understand it, her opinion will be that these are things 17 that she could have done, these were options of things 18 available, not so much that he had to do them, although 19 the argument would be that he should have done them. 20 MR. FARGARSON: Right. 21 THE COURT: She will say these are things that 22 you can do? 23 MR. ESQUIVEL: That's correct, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: And I think that it would be 25 helpful to the jury. 904 1 MR. FARGARSON: Well, I still -- respectfully, 2 Your Honor, I think that's much broader than she ought to 3 be allowed to testify. I mean she is getting into the 4 area of what military people should do, not what history 5 is, and I understand she has studied a number of things, 6 but she has never been in the military. She hasn't been a 7 part of the military -- 8 THE COURT: And I think that's an area where 9 she can be cross examined. I do agree with you in that 10 regard, and the jury may decide that that is just -- her 11 credentials are insufficient in that area. I -- but it is 12 really an issue that the jury should be allowed to 13 address, not that I should preclude the jury from hearing 14 that. 15 Anything else? 16 MR. FARGARSON: No. 17 We except to that too. 18 THE COURT: All right. 19 (The following proceedings were had in open 20 court.) 21 THE COURT: All right. We can bring our panel 22 in. 23 (Jury in at 8:47 a.m.) 24 THE COURT: Okay. You may be seated. And 25 thank you for coming in so early this morning. We did 905 1 take up a couple of things at the side bar, but I also did 2 hear that you didn't get your snacks until a little late, 3 so we have been delayed a little bit. I think we're ready 4 for our next witness. Who will our next witness be? 5 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, the plaintiffs call 6 Professor Terry Lynn Karl. 7 THE CLERK: Ma'am, if you will raise your right 8 hand to be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you 9 are about to give the court and jury in this matter to be 10 the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so 11 help you God? 12 THE WITNESS: I do. 13 THE CLERK: You may take the witness stand. 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 906 1 TERRY LYNN KARL, 2 was thereupon called as a witness on behalf of the 3 Plaintiff, and having been first duly sworn, was 4 examined and testified as follows: 5 DIRECT EXAMINATION 6 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 7 Q. Good morning, Professor Karl. 8 A. Good morning. Good morning. 9 Q. Professor Karl, where are you from originally? 10 A. From St. Louis, Missouri. 11 Q. And where did you receive your education? 12 A. At Stanford University in Palo Alto, California. 13 Q. Where did you do your undergraduate work? 14 A. Stanford University. 15 Q. And do you have any graduate level degrees? 16 A. I do. I have a master's degree and a doctorate. 17 Q. And where are those from? 18 A. Stanford University, doctorates in political science. 19 Q. What do you do for a living, Professor Karl? 20 A. I'm a professor at Stanford University at Palo Alto. 21 Q. And how long have you done that? 22 A. I have been at Stanford since 1987. Before that, I was 23 a professor in the government department at Harvard University 24 in Boston, Massachusetts -- Cambridge, excuse me. 25 Q. What position do you hold at Stanford University? DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 907 1 A. I'm the professor of Latin American studies and 2 professor of political science. 3 Q. And what kinds of courses do you teach? 4 A. I teach courses on Latin America. I teach courses on 5 Central America. I teach courses on how military 6 authoritative regimes break down and how new democracies are 7 built. I teach courses on human rights, and I teach courses 8 on what are called mechanisms of accountability, meaning how 9 do you hold people accountable for crimes and human rights 10 abuses after military dictatorships. So in that course, I 11 look at things like trials or what are called Truth 12 Commissions. 13 Q. What is a political scientist, Professor Karl? 14 A. Political scientist studies power, we study who has it, 15 who doesn't have it, why they have it, how they use it, how 16 they lose it, what are the mechanisms of power in a particular 17 country. And when we are country experts, we're Latin 18 American experts, we usually divide ourselves by region, first 19 of all, say, Africa or Latin American, and then, secondly, by 20 country. So if you're an expert in El Salvador, which I am, 21 that means you need to know how the country actually works 22 politically, like who has power, who exercises power, how do 23 they exercise it, who benefits, who loses, who gets hurt, who 24 gains, all those kinds of questions, and we, because of that, 25 because I'm a specialist in Latin America, one of the main DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 908 1 areas that we have to work in is militaries since militaries 2 have exercised power in a number of Latin American countries 3 for a long time. 4 Q. Have you written any books or articles about Latin 5 America? 6 A. Yes, I have. 7 Q. Tell the jury about those, please. 8 A. I have written -- I have written several books. Two of 9 them have won prizes. One has been chosen one of the two best 10 books on Latin America. Another one, I won a prize from the 11 European community for the argument about the relationship 12 between power, democracy and environment. I have written lots 13 of articles. I actually don't know how many. And I actually 14 prefer writing articles. I have written a number of articles 15 on Central America and El Salvador, in particular. 16 Q. Do you have any experience, Professor Karl, as a policy 17 advisor in the area of Latin America? 18 A. I do, and the -- that's largely a result of my work in 19 Latin America, but also my articles, and in particular, two 20 articles in particular about El Salvador that were important 21 involving policy questions. One was an article I wrote that 22 was called After La Palma. La Palma was an effort to find a 23 negotiated settlement in the civil war of El Salvador, and I 24 wrote this article in the early 80s. That article was 25 important because what I said in that article and then later DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 909 1 said in the New York Times was this was a war that actually 2 could not be settled by one side beating the other, that it 3 was a conflict that could only be settled by negotiations 4 since by the time I wrote this article, which is quite a bit 5 of time after the period we're discussing, the FMLN, which was 6 the guerilla opposition, the armed opposition, had become a 7 real army and had been able to actually face off the 8 government army in some way, and that article argued for a 9 negotiated settlement. As a result of that article, I started 10 working with the Congress of the United States. I had 11 actually been working with them earlier, but I started working 12 on how to design a peace agreement, and then I eventually 13 became one of the advisors to the secretary general of the 14 United nations in the UN negotiated piece agreements in El 15 Salvador. The United Nations eventually in the '90s helped to 16 negotiate a peace agreement, and I was the consultant to the 17 chief representative of the secretary general of the United 18 Nations. 19 Q. And what specifically did you do in that role, 20 Professor Karl, in participating in the formation of a peace 21 agreement? 22 A. In that role, in the United Nations, I did a number of 23 things. I had worked in El Salvador for years. I had been 24 back and forth and back and forth inside the country. I had 25 interviewed people across the political spectrum from the left DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 910 1 to the right, so everybody knew me; and as a result of the 2 arguments that I was making in writing about why it had to be 3 settled, I had interviewed very strongly inside the military, 4 a number of military officers, colonels, et cetera. I had 5 interviewed Roberto D'Abuisson who was considered the leader 6 of the right -- extreme right opposition in El Salvador. I 7 had interviewed President Duarte who was a Christian democrat. 8 He's the one whose symbol is a fish that I think you have 9 heard about. He was -- the Christian democrats were a party 10 located somewhat in the center. I had been in the guerilla 11 zones and interviewed inside the guerilla zones, so I think I 12 was one of the few people who had interviewed across the 13 spectrum. And as a result of that, I agreed to chair what 14 were called pretalks. These were secret talks that were held 15 in an undisclosed location that brought together people from 16 the military and from the guerillas to discuss talking about 17 talking, if I can put it that way. They were not peace talks, 18 it was whether or not they were going to have peace talks, and 19 we either call those pretalks or talks about talks. 20 Q. When did those talks occur? 21 A. Those happened actually in 1989. They were -- they 22 were sparked by the murder of six Jesuit priests. Military 23 high -- well, a group of colonels had ordered the murders of 24 six Jesuit priests who were very important in creating a 25 bridge between the right and the left, and that murder was DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 911 1 extremely -- those murders were extremely shocking. They 2 happened in November of 1989, there were 16. Three of those 3 priests had been people that I had worked with for a long 4 period of time, and two days before they were murdered, my 5 university, Stanford had offered three of them visiting 6 professorships at Stanford, and I had actually called Father 7 Nacho Martin Baro and Father Segundo Montes and Father 8 Ellacuria to tell them that I had become desperately afraid 9 that someone was going to kill them. By this point I really 10 understood the terror in El Salvador, and that we had 11 scholarships for them to leave, and they said that they could 12 not leave their own country, that they wanted to stay, that 13 they felt a peace agreement was essential, so they didn't 14 leave; and on November the 16th, they were all murdered. That 15 murder sparked such a huge outcry really all over the world 16 and in the United States and in the United States Congress 17 that it was really the murders that brought about the talks, 18 because it was clear at that point that there was not going to 19 be any more aid in El Salvador and that there was not going to 20 be any more support for a war. 21 Q. And how long did those talks continue? 22 A. Well, the UN official talks were different. The 23 pretalks were very short. Extremely difficult, I might add. 24 It was the first time some of the Salvadorans had actually 25 been in the same room with people they had been fighting for a DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 912 1 long time. And El Salvador is such a small country I should 2 say, that most of these people knew each other somehow, so it 3 wasn't very odd that they were fighting, but they were also 4 saying and how is your mother, is she doing all right, you 5 know, since this is a very tiny country and it is very easy to 6 know people all around, particularly in certain groups in the 7 country. So that started what became the UN peace talks, and 8 those talks actually lasted for about two years. They lasted 9 from '90 to '92 when the peace agreement was signed, and then 10 the results of the peace agreement, the things that had been 11 negotiated were carried out really from '92 all the way 12 through '95, '96, at which point I was also very involved in 13 that. The peace talks required -- so I was a consultant in 14 the peace talks the whole time, during the whole process. 15 Although I was not present inside the peace talks, that was 16 only between the United Nations representative of the 17 secretary general and the people on the side of the armed 18 opposition and on the side of the military, so those talks 19 were between Salvadorans with a UN facilitator. I then -- 20 after the peace talks were signed, I started working in El 21 Salvador in several capacities. I worked to help design a 22 fair electorial system. There had been so much electorial 23 fraud in El Salvador that there was no confidence in the vote. 24 The vote had all always been manipulated in that country, and 25 the argument was that 1994 was going to be the first free and DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 913 1 fair elections, they were actually called the elections of the 2 century, that's the way they were referred to. And that meant 3 that we had to find some way of guaranteeing that those 4 elections would be fair. 5 Q. What role did you have in that process? 6 A. I did a number of things in that part. I helped -- one 7 of the big problems is that there were no electorial rolls, 8 and the rolls that did exist, there were many people who had 9 been killed, there were other people whose names appeared 10 twice, there were a lot of dead people voting, things like 11 that. So we helped create a new electorial register, and that 12 meant that we had to register Salvadorans all over the 13 country. This was very difficult because during the war a lot 14 of the buildings of the government had been damaged or records 15 burned, et cetera. So we really had to create everything from 16 scratch. I helped in that process. I helped in the process 17 of creating a consejo supremo electoral, which is an 18 electorial counsel that would adjudicate problems in the 19 elections if one side challenged the credentials of another 20 side, they would make a fair adjudication. I helped monitor 21 the elections when they were actually held. I was on the 22 Honduran Salvadoran border monitoring the elections. The 23 other role I played for a short period of time was, I think, 24 probably through a mix-up. The United Nations had assigned me 25 the job of beginning the disbanding of the security forces. DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 914 1 One of the results of the peace agreement was that the 2 security forces, and by that, I mean the national police, the 3 treasury police and the national guard were so thoroughly 4 repressive and corrupt, they were such unreformable forces 5 that they had to be completely disbanded. 6 Q. And give the jury a sense of what time you were talking 7 about that you were involved in this process of disband. 8 A. This is after the peace agreement, so I'm talking about 9 the '90s, and I'm really not talking about the period of time 10 that we have been discussing in the trial, but my role then 11 because I had worked in understanding these forces and how 12 they had been built and what they were doing, was to begin the 13 process of disbanding the security forces. There was an 14 agreement between both sides that all security forces would be 15 disbanded and then a new police force would be built. The new 16 police force was going to be comprised of representatives from 17 the military who had clean human rights records. In other 18 words, they had to prove that they had not been in command 19 positions during periods of major human rights abuses or in 20 battalions that had committed these abuses. It was also made 21 up of representatives of the FMLN, which is the guerilla 22 organization, and those representatives also had to show that 23 they were not involved in areas where serious human rights 24 abuses had occurred, and then finally it was comprised of 25 civilians who had never fought or had any relationship with DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 915 1 either side, and so we called it the one-third, one-third, 2 one-third agreement, because it was a new police force made up 3 of all these groups. 4 Q. Now, Professor Karl, let me take you back to the 1980s, 5 did you have personal experience in El Salvador, did you visit 6 El Salvador frequently during that time? 7 A. Yes, I did. I visited El Salvador a number of times 8 during the period that we're talking about. I actually don't 9 know how many times I was there. I was in and out quite a 10 bit. 11 Q. Did you personally witness some of the violence that 12 the jury has heard testimony about last week? 13 A. Yes, I did. My first -- my first trip -- actually, one 14 of the things I remember most, was my very first day in El 15 Salvador where I really didn't understand how terrified 16 everybody was. It looks so normal, I have to tell you. You 17 land there, and it wasn't a war, it was a city just like 18 Memphis, everybody walking down the street, everything looked 19 normal. And as it started to get dark, I was standing at a 20 bus stop, and a black car drove up with windows that were dark 21 glass, drove up to the bus stop; and all of a sudden, 22 everybody ran away, and I was the only person standing at the 23 bus stop. And I remember thinking why are they all running, 24 and I looked inside, you couldn't see inside the car, but they 25 opened the window and said something to me, and I realized DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 916 1 that these were security forces and people were just waiting 2 for a bus, they just disappeared, they didn't want to be 3 there; and that was my first inkling. 4 I then saw -- I went shopping actually. My hotel was 5 right across the street from a shopping center called Metro 6 Centro, and I was trying to buy something for my goddaughter, 7 and I went actually into the Metro Centro, which is the same 8 place that Cecilia Santos, one of the plaintiffs, in this 9 trial mentioned to you. She said she had gone into this place 10 to buy something for a child. It might have even been the 11 same shop that I was trying to shop at, and that that is where 12 she had been taken. I went into that same shopping center, 13 and there was a woman who had been killed lying in the front 14 of the shopping center. It would be like walking into Peabody 15 Place and seeing a body right in the front, it was just right 16 there. And there were all kinds of people around it. That 17 was probably the first thing I saw. I then saw -- I saw a 18 body in the parking lot of my hotel when I was trying to walk 19 over to McDonalds, it was on the way to McDonalds. I saw 20 bodies by the side of the road. I saw bodies in body dumps. 21 Body dumps are places that the security forces used to 22 regularly leave bodies so that you would know that this was a 23 place where they would discard bodies. 24 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, may I have 25 permission to approach the witness, please? DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 917 1 THE COURT: You may. 2 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 3 Q. Professor Karl, I have handed you a picture. Could you 4 tell me, please, what that picture is? 5 A. Yes, it's a picture -- I should say that seeing all 6 these bodies and realizing that one of the issues in the U. S. 7 Congress, which is where I started to work really right away 8 after seeing all this, one of the issues was who was dying and 9 who was killing them. That was one of the things that we 10 really had to find out, and so I began to investigate the 11 process of who was dying and who was killing them. That was 12 what I wanted to know. And this is a picture that shows the 13 collection of bodies actually, so... 14 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, the plaintiffs at 15 this time move this photograph into evidence as 16 Exhibit 18. 17 THE COURT: So received. 18 MR. BROOKE: I believe it is 20. 19 THE CLERK: 20. 20 THE COURT: It is Exhibit 20. 21 (Exhibit Number 20 was marked. Description: 22 Photograph.) 23 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 24 Q. Now, Professor Karl, you had referred to body dumps, 25 and could you please continue with what you were saying about DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 918 1 this picture and what you were saying? 2 A. Yes, sir. This is a picture of a place -- one of the 3 places where bodies were dumped were by the sea, and if you 4 look at this picture, this is actually part of a series of 5 pictures which are actually quite devastating. I'm just 6 showing you the collection of the bodies. What is happening 7 here is that in this area underneath those boxes are bodies, 8 and you can see the man with the mask, that's for the 9 protection of the smell. And what is happening here is that 10 these people are working with the Arch Bishop's office. It 11 was the Arch Bishop's office that really paid attention to who 12 was dying and was the first place to say we have to find these 13 people, we have to identify them, we have to know who they 14 are, and so all of these people are collecting bodies. They 15 are photographing them or writing down records. If you cannot 16 identify their face, for example, which is quite frequent, 17 either because you found the body too late or because the 18 torture had been so severe, what they would do is they would 19 write down descriptions of the belt somebody had, the -- if -- 20 they very seldom had any jewelry, because most of the bodies 21 were robbed of anything that would be valuable. That was 22 common practice. But they did have clothing that might -- 23 that you might be able to identify them. So they would take 24 very careful records of what was found, and in cases like this 25 where you actually couldn't transport the bodies for decent DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 919 1 burial, you can't really see it in this picture, but this is 2 really quite steep and there would have been no way to 3 actually bring these bodies up, there would have been no 4 trucks or anything that the Arch Bishop's office would have 5 been able to use. 6 MR. BROOKE: Your Honor, may we ask the witness 7 to identify the approximate date of the photograph? 8 THE COURT: Absolutely. 9 A. This is not my photograph, I should say, so this is 10 somewhere between 1980 and 1983, but I don't know where. 11 There are a number of photos like these, and this is a 12 representative of something I have seen, but I did not take 13 this photo. 14 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 15 Q. Is this representative of a scene that you personally 16 witnessed while you were in El Salvador? 17 A. Absolutely. So that is actually why I chose this. It 18 is very much like things that I was present at or witnessed, 19 and they will eventually in this case make a fire, that is 20 what they're doing, and after taking all the identifications 21 they can, including photos, they will burn these bodies. 22 Q. Did you also have occasion to see how the 23 identification of bodies went, of people who were trying to 24 identify people who had been killed? 25 A. Yes. DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 920 1 Q. And how did that work? 2 A. Well, the second process is -- there are people going 3 around the country or hearing reports. They're always from 4 the church, by the way. The church is really the place that 5 took the responsibility for this, and for what people called 6 decent burial, and so the church -- and by that I mean the 7 Catholic church. El Salvador at this point is about 8 85 percent Catholic, so it is really a Catholic country at the 9 time we're talking about. And so the first stage would be to 10 find the bodies, and this is one place, but there are just 11 many others, so there will be people going around San 12 Salvador, the capitol city, every morning they would go around 13 and find the bodies from the night before. Every single 14 morning, they would go out. If you saw a body, you would call 15 the Arch Bishop's office and say there's a body on the corner 16 of -- wherever, you know, and these would come from all over 17 the country, these reports. And then they would be 18 centralized in the Arch Bishop's office. And what they would 19 do in the Arch Bishop's office is take the pictures of people 20 that could be identified, or they would take the descriptions 21 of the clothing or the belts or the whatever, the hair, 22 anything they could see, and they would centralize them in the 23 Arch Bishop's office, and they would he essentially form these 24 albums. There were just rows of albums that would have 25 identifying marks, pictures, et cetera. DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 921 1 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, may I have 2 permission to approach the witness, please? 3 THE COURT: You may. 4 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 5 Q. Professor Karl, I handed you a photograph of a woman 6 holding a picture. Could you please describe what this 7 picture depicted and approximately when it was taken? 8 A. This picture would have been taken again between '80 9 and '83. It depicts -- it is an auditorium actually, and it 10 is an auditorium in a place, Socorro Juridico, which means 11 judicial help for you, and it is part of the Arch Bishop's 12 apparatus for identifying bodies and informing their families 13 about what happened to their family members. When somebody 14 is -- 15 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor -- I'm sorry, 16 Professor Karl, to cut you off, but I would like the jury 17 to be able to look at it while you talk about it. 18 THE WITNESS: Okay. 19 MR. ESQUIVEL: At this point, the plaintiffs 20 move into evidence Exhibit 21. 21 THE COURT: So received. 22 (Exhibit Number 21 was marked. Description: 23 Photograph.) 24 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 25 Q. So Professor Karl, could you continue? Is this the DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 922 1 process that you were describing earlier of identifying 2 bodies? 3 A. Yes. So what would happen is if somebody has 4 disappeared or missing, the only place you could go and find 5 out what happened to your son or your father or your mother or 6 your sister or whoever is missing or your neighbor is to come 7 to this office or to come to the church. It was really the 8 only place that actually had the courage and the capacity to 9 help, and so what you see in this picture, there would be 10 auditoriums full of women. This is a larger auditorium, and 11 you would see pictures of people, and they would bring in the 12 picture of their relative. So there was -- the issue was 13 could you match who were they were missing with the collection 14 of bodies and information that I showed you earlier. So these 15 are women who -- this is clearly someone that they're looking 16 for. They're waiting for a chance to begin the identification 17 process. 18 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, may I have 19 permission to approach the witness, please? 20 THE COURT: You may. 21 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 22 Q. Professor Karl, I have handed you another photograph. 23 Would you please describe what this photograph is? 24 A. Yes, this is a picture of what the -- of the albums 25 that I mentioned earlier. When I said that the Arch Bishop's DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 923 1 office would put together these photo albums, they would put 2 together albums that had pictures of anybody who was 3 recognizable, so -- and who had been found dead. I should add 4 that one of the problems of identifying the dead is that 5 sometimes people were captured in a part of San Salvador and 6 they were moved to another part of the country or another part 7 of the city, or they might be captured in one town and moved 8 to another town. That meant that you couldn't always find 9 victims near where they actually lived. They were actually -- 10 and especially if you were trying to hide what happened to 11 them, you might -- they might be killed in one place -- I mean 12 they might be captured in one place or actually killed or 13 dropped in another place, and that means that you might find a 14 body in the eastern part of El Salvador that actually 15 disappeared in the western part, and that's why this was so 16 important because you couldn't just look in your own little 17 town to find victims. These -- in this picture, you see the 18 photo albums that I was talking about. 19 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, at this point, the 20 plaintiffs move this photograph into evidence as 21 Exhibit 22. 22 THE COURT: So received. 23 (Exhibit Number 22 was marked. Description: 24 Photograph.) 25 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 924 1 Q. Professor Karl, would you please describe for the jury 2 the photo album and the process of identifying bodies? 3 A. Yeah. There are rooms with just rows of photo albums, 4 and what happens is families comes in and they look through 5 these books. I don't know how -- I see you can see pretty 6 clearly, these are all faces of people who are dead, and this 7 is the way you try to find whoever it is in your family who is 8 missing. So they will be looking for their mothers or their 9 fathers or their children in these books. When they identify 10 them, if they identify them, if they can find somebody, then 11 we would be able to at least say that there is an 12 identification here. This is very important in the 13 verification and collection of human rights data. In other 14 words, in a situation of state terror, which is what was 15 happening in El Salvador in 1980, the -- it becomes very 16 important to try to figure out, as I said, who has died, how 17 many people are dying, who is killing them, how are they 18 dying. These are all things that we need to know in order to 19 understand these wars and to collect this kind of data. So 20 this is -- this is the moment of identification. Once the 21 family member identifies somebody, we are then able to 22 actually verify them on a roll of names, and so a social 23 scientist like me would consider that a statistic or what we 24 call something we can enter into a data analysis to see 25 patterns. DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 925 1 Q. Professor Karl, what information have you reviewed in 2 order to present the expert testimony that you will be 3 presenting in this case? 4 A. Well, what I feel is my most reliable data is what I 5 have actually gathered and seen myself. I think we all feel 6 that way about our own work. I spent a lot of time in El 7 Salvador verifying the verification process of death. I spent 8 a lot of time in El Salvador trying to understand what I 9 called and wrote about, which was what I call the symbolism of 10 death. People were killed in ways to send messages in El 11 Salvador. And so, for example, it was a very different 12 pattern than I had seen in other countries, in Chili and 13 Argentina, for example. It was different because it was so 14 public, and the nature of the terror which I was trying to 15 understand was that if you wanted to kill the peasant because 16 he supported land reform, you would find the peasant by the 17 road and his mouth would be stuffed with dirt, and that would 18 say this is about land. That would be what I mean by the 19 symbolism of death. 20 If you want -- and if you wanted to terrorize a 21 population, you would kill their teacher or priest, and you 22 would leave them in a very public place so they wouldn't be 23 hidden. In Argentina, you disappear people, and you would 24 never see them again. But in El Salvador, if you wanted to 25 spread terror, you took somebody that everybody respected, you DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 926 1 killed them and put them out in a public place so everybody 2 would know. And so there were messages of death, and I 3 studied those patterns. I used that data. I used the data of 4 my interviews. I was extraordinarily -- I hesitate to use 5 lucky, because I've always wished I had never seen these 6 things, but I was lucky in the sense that the way I got 7 interested in El Salvador was I was living in Caracas, 8 Venezuela, and I met Salvadorans who were in exile at the time 9 from the military regime. This was in the 1970s before the 10 periods that we're talking about in this trial, and I met Jose 11 Napoleon Duarte who eventually became the president of El 12 Salvador. He is the one who originally interested me and 13 introduced me to a range of people who I could interview. I 14 then was able to interview military as well, and that became 15 very important to me. In fact, I was able to talk with just 16 about everybody. I traveled in the 1983-'84 electorial 17 campaign with Roberto D'Abuisson, who was the leader of the 18 extremist right and who was widely known as what is called the 19 intellectual author of the murder of Arch Bishop Romero. When 20 Salvadorans say that phrase, by the way, all Latin Americans, 21 you hear the phrase intellectual author, we don't actually use 22 that language, but it is autora intelectual, and what they 23 mean is the person who thought it up and made it happen, not 24 the person who actually shot the Arch Bishop. So when they 25 say that, that was widely attributed at the time to Roberto DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 927 1 D'Abuisson, and I traveled with him during his campaign to see 2 how he campaigned. I traveled with Duarte as well. I went 3 into the guerilla zones and interviewed people in the guerilla 4 zones. I went out on military mission and interviewed 5 soldiers of the Salvadoran army, so I was really -- that 6 information in particular was very important to me. 7 Q. In addition to your interviews, did you also review 8 documents in El Salvador? 9 A. Yes. I think I read -- I may be the only person who 10 has ever read the entire newspaper sets of every newspaper 11 from start to finish looking for things. I mean I read El 12 Diario, I read Prinsa Grafica, I read Prinsaq Latina. I have 13 also reviewed those on microfilm for this trial. I read -- I 14 read -- 15 Q. And what are those publications you just mentioned? 16 A. Those are the main newspapers in El Salvador during the 17 period of time that we're talking about. They are all 18 conservative newspapers at that time, quite conservative. The 19 only opposition, main opposition newspaper was actually the 20 office was destroyed and the editor of macheted to death, so 21 there was no opposition newspaper at the time. I reviewed the 22 state department transcripts of Radio Venceremos, which was 23 the radio of the guerillas, and the state department would 24 monitor those and put out transcripts, so I read those as 25 well. I read what is called the Estudios Centramericanos, DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 928 1 which was extremely reputable for all of the academics journal 2 that was put out by the Jesuits who were subsequently 3 murdered. I read their work -- they had another journal 4 called Proceso. I read the laws, I read the decrees, I went 5 to press conferences of the military and the other press 6 conferences that would be held. I interviewed virtually every 7 major embassy official over a period of three ambassadors, I 8 believe -- four ambassadors, and that includes the military 9 attaches, the military advisors, the chief -- deputy chief of 10 mission, the ambassadors themselves. I interviewed and I read 11 all of the -- I think one of the most important sources are 12 what we call the declassified documents, which you have 13 seen -- Ambassador White showed you some declassified 14 documents. 15 Q. Professor Karl, are you referring to U. S. government 16 documents now? 17 A. Right. 18 Q. Okay. And what is important about those documents? 19 A. What is very important about those documents is our 20 ability to really see and understand the intelligence inside 21 the United States that was going on at the time. And I think 22 that what is -- when the Truth Commission happened, which is a 23 commission that was set up after the peace agreements to 24 really investigate who did what to who in this story, when 25 that was set up, the United States offered to declassify a DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 929 1 wide range of documents so that the Truth Commission could 2 have access to what we in the United States knew and 3 understood. So those documents became available in the public 4 realm in a way that they don't always -- you usually have to 5 wait about 50 years to see these things, so that's why we have 6 access, it was made available to the United Nations. Those 7 documents are extremely important because they come, they're 8 important for several reasons for someone like me. They show 9 me what the United States understood to be -- what was their 10 understanding at the time. They show me also different forms 11 of declassification. For example, it makes a difference if 12 you get something that is, I sat at a cocktail party and this 13 colonel told me that that colonel was the murderer of Arch 14 Bishop Romero, that would be one kind. That's one kind of 15 declassified document, and it will say so and so murdered Arch 16 Bishop Romero. That to me as a social scientist isn't 17 reliable enough. In other words, that's not by itself a 18 reliable enough statement. So what I look for in the 19 declassifieds is information that I can corroborate from other 20 sources. In other words, it is very important for me that 21 when the declassifieds say something that I know there's other 22 corroborating evidence. I think we all know that intelligence 23 is a tricky business now, and that -- so I look for 24 corroborating evidence in the declassifieds. The other thing 25 I look for, however, is different levels of intelligence. For DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 930 1 example, there's something called finished intelligence. I 2 will be showing you something like that. Finished 3 intelligence means they're absolutely certain about this. It 4 is a different level than this colonel told me that that 5 colonel killed Arch Bishop Romero, or, you know, it is a 6 different level of intelligence. It means that they have lots 7 of corroboration, and it is a higher level of intelligence, so 8 I look for a difference in the documents between what is 9 reliable and I can corroborate and what I think is a story 10 that may or may not be true. 11 Q. Is there anything else that a political scientist does, 12 Professor Karl, to insure the accuracy of her opinions or 13 conclusions? 14 A. Yes. And I say particularly in these stories. For 15 those of us who work in civil wars and state terrorist 16 situations, you can't help but have feelings about what you 17 see. You're not -- you can try to be as removed as possible, 18 but if you see a body, you see a body, and so it becomes 19 particularly important under those conditions that we use all 20 of the tools of our trade to make sure we are being as fair 21 and as accurate as possible, and we develop something called 22 rival arguments. What this means is this is something I use 23 all the time, this is something I teach in methods of social 24 science, I teach all my students how to do this. That means 25 that -- let's say there's a killing and somebody says the DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 931 1 woman at the end did it, right -- excuse me, and I would say 2 maybe you didn't do it, maybe one of the rest of you did it. 3 So I have to have a rival argument, and it is more like -- and 4 then what I did is I say, okay, some people are saying you did 5 it, but I'm going to say I really don't know who did it and it 6 could be you. And so what I then have to do is go look for 7 evidence for both arguments. In other words, I can't just 8 choose the evidence that says that she did it. I have to look 9 for all the evidence and say you might have done it. And 10 that's what we call rival arguments, and then we take evidence 11 and we plug it in until we have a story that we're confident 12 of. 13 Q. Professor Karl, have you applied that rival arguments 14 methodology to the conclusions you have reached in this case? 15 A. Yes, I have, and I have applied it to the conclusions 16 of everything I have written, and sometimes not very happily 17 to the sides that I'm writing about. 18 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, at this point the 19 plaintiffs offer Professor Karl as an expert witness in 20 the political history of El Salvador, including the role 21 of the military within the Salvadoran government. 22 THE COURT: Any voir dire? 23 MR. FARGARSON: Subject to the previous 24 objections that we have made. 25 THE COURT: All right. Well, we will accept DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 932 1 the professor and let her testify about the political 2 history of El Salvador, including the role of the military 3 groups working in conjunction with the military to carry 4 out the civil rights abuses. 5 MR. ESQUIVEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: And the role of the defendant, as I 7 understand, you are going to allow her to testify also. 8 MR. ESQUIVEL: That's correct, Your Honor. 9 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 10 Q. Professor Karl, let's start by summarizing the 11 conclusions you have reached in this case. Have you reached a 12 conclusion about the level of violence that took place in El 13 Salvador in the early 1980s? 14 A. Yes, I have. 15 Q. What is that conclusion? 16 A. El Salvador in the 1980s, and particularly in the 17 period from 1980 to 1983 was characterized by a widespread 18 systematic and deliberate assault on the civilian population. 19 Q. And, Professor Karl, have you reached any 20 conclusions -- 21 A. Excuse me. 22 Q. Yes. 23 A. That's what we call state terror, and by state terror, 24 I mean that it is the institutions of the state, it is the 25 military or the security forces that are committing the DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 933 1 terror, not all of the terror, but a great part of the terror. 2 Q. And, Professor Karl, based on your research and your 3 study and your personal knowledge, have you reached any 4 conclusions about Colonel Carranza's control over members of 5 the Salvadoran military? 6 A. Yes, I have. 7 Q. What are those conclusions? 8 A. As vice-minister of defense which was his first 9 position in 1980 -- 1979 through 1980, and then later as 10 director of the treasury police, Colonel Carranza had 11 effective control over his subordinates in the Salvadoran 12 military, and I should say when I say Salvadoran military, I 13 always say military and security forces, I will make that 14 clear later. 15 Q. What do you mean by effective control? 16 A. I mean that he could give orders, his orders were 17 obeyed. There are no major instances of people disobeying 18 orders, that this was not a chaotic situation, but, in fact, a 19 very well ordered military with a clear chain of command and 20 one that had consistently at every level obeyed that command. 21 Q. Now, Professor Karl, have you also reached a conclusion 22 about what Colonel Carranza knew or should have known about 23 human rights abuses by the military forces in El Salvador? 24 A. Yes, I have. 25 Q. What is your conclusion on that subject? DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 934 1 A. My conclusion is that Colonel Carranza should have 2 known about the abuses committed by his subordinates. Indeed, 3 to me, it is inconceivable that he did not know about those 4 abuses. 5 Q. And Professor Karl, have you reached a conclusion about 6 the steps that Colonel Carranza could have or should have 7 taken in light of this knowledge? 8 A. Yes, I have. 9 Q. And what are your conclusions on that point? 10 A. I believe that he failed in the duty of a commander, 11 which is to take reasonable and necessary steps to prevent 12 human rights abuses or to take reasonable and necessary steps 13 to punish abusers once you know they have happened. 14 Q. And, Professor Karl, finally, as a result of these 15 failures, what conclusion have you reached about the effect of 16 these failures in the Salvadoran military? 17 A. I think that as a result of failing to do these things, 18 Colonel Carranza actually sent a signal, which I call a green 19 light to continue the terror. 20 Q. And what do you mean by that phrase, a green light? 21 A. By not acting in a situation in a year in which 22 somewhere between 9 and 12,000 people were publicly murdered. 23 It actually gave a signal that it was okay to do this, that's 24 what I mean by a green light. 25 Q. Now, Professor Karl, describe for the jury, please, the DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 935 1 political situation that existed in El Salvador in the decades 2 before 1980. 3 A. In the decades before 1980? 4 Q. Yes. 5 A. El Salvador is a -- has been -- not now today, but has 6 been in the period of time we're talking about the longest 7 standing continuous military dictatorship in Latin America, 8 actually provided a graphic that might help with this. 9 Q. Have you prepared a graphic to demonstrate your 10 testimony? 11 A. I have, thank you. 12 Q. Okay. Is that the graphic that you prepared? 13 A. That's right. 14 Q. All right. Go ahead, Professor Karl. 15 A. What is important, I won't take you through every one 16 of these presidents, but what is important in this is that you 17 can see really from 1932 all the way through this slide, there 18 is really a continuous form of military rule. You will 19 occasionally see something if you look at 1948-50, it says 20 military civilian junta. That means there are some civilians 21 that join the government, but it is basically what we would 22 consider a functioning military dictatorship. 23 Q. What does that term junta mean? 24 A. A junta is a group, that's all it means. You will hear 25 it sometimes referred as junta, some people pronounce it that DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 936 1 way junta. In Latin America, it is junta. It really just 2 means a group of people, and it may mean that there are two 3 military men and three civilians or three or more civilians, 4 but when we have a military civilian junta, it is always the 5 military that has the power and the final say. 6 Q. Why does this graphic, why does this military empower 7 begin in 1982? 8 A. In 1932, there is a very large massacre in El Salvador 9 which is referred as la matanz, which means the massacre. We 10 don't actually know how many people were murdered in this 11 massacre, but it is somewhere between 10 and 30,000, we 12 believe, so there is -- it is unclear how many people actually 13 died. There was an uprising in El Salvador against what was 14 then a government that was pretty much run by what you have 15 heard as called the 14 families. That uprising resulted in a 16 massacre. And from that time on, El Salvador has -- the 17 military moved in and consistently gained more and more power 18 in the process and ruled since then. The other thing I would 19 like to point out is that if you look at 1932, you see General 20 Maximiliano Hernandez, his name is important because he is the 21 man who committed the massacre or who ordered the massacre and 22 was in charge at the time. His name is also important because 23 it is the name that the death squad used that killed the 24 husband of Erlinda Franco. In other words, the death squad 25 that killed the six FDR leaders called itself the General DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 937 1 Maximiliano Hernandez dead squad, so they are referring to 2 this period of Salvadoran history, which is a huge massacre 3 and which is really embedded in the conscientiousness of 4 everybody in the story from the right to the left. It is a 5 moment on the side of the extreme right of glory because they 6 manage to install themselves in power. It is also a message 7 to the peasants that this is what is going to happen to you if 8 you rebel. And I should say in the area where the massacre 9 was, it was still the area that had least opposition all the 10 way along. In other words, if you commit a huge massacre like 11 that, you're going to keep a population quiet for a long time, 12 and so in that area, the population was particularly 13 frightened, I would say. 14 Q. Professor Karl, what was the function of the Salvadoran 15 military in this political system? 16 A. Well, the Salvadoran military, I think it is important 17 to understand that it is not like our military, either an 18 organization or in the functions it played. It is a military, 19 but remember also it is the government. So it has just like 20 you see in any government, it has people who disagree on how 21 to govern. I mean it is just -- so you will find just like 22 you find factions in the Republican government today of the 23 United States, they're all republicans, they will all 24 basically follow the president and the party line, but there 25 are going to be some who want to do things one way and some DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 938 1 who want to do things another. In that sense, it is a 2 government and not just a military. I think that's the first 3 point. And as you can see, it is a government for 50 years, 4 so it has a lot of practice in being a government. 5 I think the second thing that is important about the 6 military is that you move between forces. In other words, 7 if -- if you're in the U. S. military, you're going to be in 8 the Navy or the army, and that's where you're going to be, 9 you're not going to start out in the Navy and then move over 10 to the army, that just doesn't happen. You usually work right 11 through one particular service. In El Salvador, that's not 12 the way it is. In El Salvador, you graduate with your class, 13 and so if everybody over there is a graduating class, some of 14 them are going to go into the army, some of them are going to 15 go into the Navy, some of them are going to go into the Air 16 Force, some of them are going to go into the treasury police, 17 some of them are going to go into the national police and some 18 of them are going to go in the national guard, and then if all 19 of a sudden I'm the commander and I say, you know, you're in 20 the national guard, but I want you in the treasury police, 21 you're just going to move over to that service. So your 22 loyalty is not to a service, it is to your graduating class. 23 That's the key point. 24 Q. What effect did that have, Professor Karl, on the 25 Salvadoran military, that structure you're describing? DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 939 1 A. I think it has two very important effects. It means 2 that you have tremendous loyalty to your graduating class and 3 you all move through the structure together. So you know that 4 if you want to -- if I'm the commander and we're all in the 5 same graduating class, I could ask you to do something in the 6 national guard and I could ask you to do something in the 7 treasury police and I won't just control one service, I'll 8 have people in all services, because that's the way it works. 9 I mean that's the first thing it did. The second thing it did 10 is this ability to move between services, it means that you 11 can move your people around, if I put it that way, and you can 12 set up strong lengths of your graduating class to support you, 13 the ruler. But the other thing you can do I think that is 14 important in this fluidity and that was really devastating in 15 the Salvadoran case is let's say you have one group that is 16 committing major human rights abuses like the treasury police, 17 if you take the director of the treasury police out or the 18 chief of security of the treasury police out and you later put 19 them in a military brigade, they're going to carry and spread 20 those same practices. So what is important in El Salvador is 21 the chief abusers of human rights in 1980 were the security 22 forces. By that, I mean the national police, the treasury 23 police and the national guard. Those were the chief abusers 24 of the human rights. But when they -- when you move those 25 abusers of human rights to other areas, they will carry those DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 940 1 same practices with them, and so the practices of abuse starts 2 spreading, particularly throughout the army. 3 Q. How large of a military structure is the Salvadoran 4 military, or was it during this time? 5 A. Well, the Salvadoran military increases in size 6 enormously during the period of the war. So it grows in huge 7 numbers. What is more important than the size of the troops, 8 which quadruple actually during this time, and I actually 9 cannot remember the final number of troops, but -- it grows 10 very, very fast. But what is really key is how it is 11 commanded, and that is very small. 12 Q. Professor Karl, have you created a graphic to 13 demonstrate the size of the officer corps of the Salvadoran 14 military? 15 A. I have. 16 Q. Is this the graphic that you have created? 17 A. Yes, I have. So if you have thousands of soldiers, 18 very young soldiers, by the way, in the fields, the question 19 is who commands them. And what is important here is not only 20 is the Salvadoran officer corps the government and not only 21 does it run the most important institution in the country, 22 which is the military, the most powerful institution, but the 23 number of officers is very small, and if you look at -- I have 24 made a distinction between all officers and field grade 25 officers. Field grade officers are officers that have a DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 941 1 higher level of prestige because they have experience in the 2 field, they're actually command troops. So if you look at the 3 number of field grade officers, the combined number of the 4 army, the Navy and the Air Force is 73. The combined number 5 of field grade officers in the security forces, by that I mean 6 the national guard, the national police and the treasury 7 police is only 33 people. So if you -- if you find that the 8 security forces are the major abusers of human rights in 1980, 9 you are really talking about only 33 officers that you need to 10 deal with. 11 Q. Now, what is the significance of that to your 12 conclusions in this case, Professor Karl? 13 A. Well, what it does is it confirms a finding that we 14 have in all kinds of other stories or situations of state 15 terror in the sense El Salvador is very much like other 16 situations of state terror that I have studied, and that is 17 state terror almost always, and I cannot actually think of an 18 exception, but there always is one, almost always begins with 19 a few people. It is not a lot of people, it is not true that 20 suddenly all chaos breaks out and this ethnic group kills that 21 ethnic group or this class of people kills that class of 22 people, that's not the way state terror happens. We have 23 studied lots and lots and lots of situations of state terror 24 from Saddam Hussein to the Guatemalan situation; and in those 25 cases what we see is it is always a very small number of DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 942 1 people that you need to stop -- to stop the terror from 2 proceeding and from taking on its own life. In this case, in 3 1979, October to 1980, the number is very, very small, and it 4 relies in the security forces. It also means that it is 5 relatively easy to get all those people in one room and say, 6 you know, this has to stop, I order you to stop this, because 7 we're not talking about huge numbers of people. 8 Q. Professor Karl, the numbers -- you have very specific 9 numbers in these graphics, tell the jury what type period the 10 Salvadoran army contained these numbers of officers. 11 A. Okay. These statistics are probably a little bigger 12 than the numbers that were actually in effect when Colonel 13 Carranza was the number two man in the Salvadoran military. 14 That's because these numbers are from November of 1981 and the 15 army was already growing by then. So they might be a little 16 larger, it may be that there were only 30 officers, but they 17 gives you an idea of how many we're talking about. These 18 numbers and statistics were gathered by the U. S. military. 19 Q. Professor Karl, what was the result of this military 20 rule in El Salvador? 21 A. Well, if you have -- and El Salvador, again, is just 22 like other Latin American countries in this sense, if you have 23 50 years of military dictatorship, you usually find that you 24 have some pretty awful economic results, economic and social 25 results. And by that, I mean you end up creating very DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 943 1 dramatically two countries, the Salvador of the military 2 officers of the rich and the Salvador of everybody else, two 3 El Salvadors. When I say everybody else, peasants who 4 Ambassador White told you are so deeply conservative as they 5 are in El Salvador. Peasants had, in El Salvador when this 6 war broke out, had the lowest intake of calories in the 7 Western Hemisphere, they didn't have enough eat. They didn't 8 have an education, they didn't have access to education, they 9 were too poor to send their children to school. They didn't 10 have clothes. Many of them didn't have houses. They were 11 suffering from widespread disease. A fifth of -- children 12 that were studied in 1978, 20 percent in a very small study 13 key in urban areas were suffering from malnutrition. The 14 rural areas would have been much worse. They were hungry, 15 they had to operate -- they had to work seasonal work on 16 coffee plantations, cotton plantations or cattle where cattle 17 were raised, and that work was a system that we called labor 18 repressive. By that, we mean that the military doesn't act as 19 a normal military, but its function is to provide -- is to 20 insure labor to the plantations themselves. So the national 21 guard barracks might actually be on the largest coffee 22 plantations, and you actually have something that is somewhat 23 akin to a pass book system where you actually control labor, 24 you make sure they come in, they have to work a certain 25 number. You -- it actually works a little bit like a company DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 944 1 town as well where people have to buy products from the 2 landlords so they're always in debt to the landlord, et 3 cetera, it is just a perpetual system, it is very close to 4 actual serfdom or to a form of -- we call it labor repression 5 or a form of almost slave labor, it is so, so -- it was so 6 controlled and people were so desperately poor. 7 Q. Did these positions lead to any opposition to the 8 military government? 9 A. Yes, it did. 10 Q. Could you describe, please, the growth of that 11 opposition? 12 A. I want to say one thing first because you can find 13 countries where people are this poor and you don't see an 14 opposition. 15 Q. And why is that? 16 A. That's because people may be this poor, but they may 17 have channels to express their opposition. In other words, in 18 India, for example, there are people who are certainly as poor 19 as what I saw in El Salvador, but they are allowed to 20 organize, they are allowed to form unions, they are allowed to 21 form parties, they are allowed to participate in an electorial 22 process. So you usually find opposition not only where the 23 social conditions exist, but where any attempt to change them 24 is absolutely blocked. That is when you get really strong 25 opposition. DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 945 1 Q. And was -- did that occur in El Salvador? 2 A. Yes, it did. El Salvador eventually had the largest, 3 what we call popular movement. I think here in -- the Latin 4 Americans call them mass movements, and that was the language 5 that I think some of the plaintiffs used, but they had the 6 largest popular movement in the history of El Salvador against 7 military rule. And it was a movement that was fighting for 8 the end of military dictatorship, that was fighting for civil 9 rights, that was fighting for the right to organize, the right 10 to have a union, the right to form political parties, all the 11 things that a military dictatorship wouldn't let them have. 12 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, if I may, I would 13 like to ask Professor Karl to step down and illustrate on 14 the chalkboard the growth of the opposition that she has 15 described. May Professor Karl do that? 16 THE COURT: Certainly. We have to get a 17 microphone on you, so they're going to put one on you, and 18 they will have one for you in just a moment. 19 MR. BROOKE: May I? 20 THE COURT: Sure, absolutely. If you need to 21 come up closer to this podium, fine. It might be easier 22 to see if counsel for the defense would prefer to be over 23 here. 24 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 25 Q. Now, Professor Karl, if you would, please -- DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 946 1 THE COURT: I tell you what, we just got a 2 request for a restroom break. We will do that. We always 3 want to respect that. We will take a 10-minute break. We 4 will come back in 10 minutes. Don't discuss the case 5 among yourselves. Don't let anybody talk with you. 6 THE CLERK: All rise. This Honorable Court 7 stands in recess. 8 (Recess taken at 9:55 a.m. until 10:20 a.m.) 9 THE COURT: Bring the panel in. 10 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: Yes, Your Honor. 11 (Jury in at 10:20 a.m.) 12 THE COURT: You may be seated. Counsel may 13 proceed. 14 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 15 Q. Professor Karl, before the break, we were talking about 16 opposition to the military government, were there opposition 17 political parties in El Salvador? 18 A. Yes, there were. Is this working? 19 Q. Yes. 20 A. Okay. Thank you. I would like to -- this is a 21 complicated history, and I'm going to apologize in advance to 22 all the Salvadorans because I'm going to make it as quick as 23 possible, but I would like to make a little time line here to 24 show you what is happening when. Can you hear me now? Since 25 the interpreters couldn't hear me, I'm going to just repeat DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 947 1 that this is a complicated history, and I'm apologizing to all 2 the Salvadorans in the world for making it -- for simplifying 3 it and saying it so quickly. Question is were there political 4 parties. Okay. I've put some dates on here, 1960, 1972, 5 1977, 1979, 1980, and the question is are there political 6 parties. Important thing in the process of a military 7 dictatorship is the first group that really said -- first 8 important political group that said we want a democracy were 9 the political parties, and they rise about here, 1960. We see 10 political parties. They rise about here. And I'm just going 11 to write parties. And without going through all of them, 12 there's one that you have heard about, which is the Christian 13 democratic party, and that's often referred to, I'll just say 14 Christian democrats right there, that's the one that has the 15 symbol of the fish that Ana Chavez spoke about. She said her 16 mother belonged to the party of the fish. That is the 17 Christian democratic party. 18 Q. Now, Professor Karl, has that also been referred to as 19 the PDC? 20 A. It's always been referred to -- I put it in English, 21 but let's use the Spanish. It has also been referred to as 22 the PDC, and that party also -- let me just put a name there 23 so you will know, their leader is Jose Napoleon Duarte, 24 D-U-A-R-T-E. And Duarte is the man I told you I met in 25 Venezuela who got me interested in El Salvador. He -- the DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 948 1 Christian democrats are eventually the largest and most 2 important party in El Salvador. They are a very, very 3 religious party, they're very closely linked to the church, 4 the Catholic church. They are very strongly anti-communist 5 and anti-Marxist-Leninist because they are very a strong 6 religious party with very strong religious beliefs. And as I 7 said, this is also the fish. So they come up, formed in 1969, 8 and you see, they're not the only party, but they're the only 9 party I'm going to mention right now. There are all kinds of 10 other parties coming here. 11 Q. Now, were there unions that formed during that time? 12 A. Right. The next question is, really, you're getting 13 opposition starting, so a party is formed and the really 14 important unions start to form in the end of the '60s, in the 15 middle of the '60s, and you see unions here, and the one that 16 you probably have heard the most about is ANDES 21 de Juno, 17 ANDES the 21st of June. And that's the teacher's union. This 18 becomes one of the most important unions in the country. It 19 comprises eventually 22,000 teachers, which includes 20 90 percent of all primary and secondary teachers, so it's 21 really the teacher's union. And it also includes other 22 educators from the ministry of education. It includes the 23 professors at the two leading universities. One is the public 24 university, the National University of El Salvador, and the 25 other is the Jesuit University, which is called the UCA. You DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 949 1 head about that before, UCA. So they are a member of the 2 teachers unions. That's about here. Now, as these arise, 3 they get more and more powerful, and it is the analysis of 4 virtually all scholars and also the intelligence documents 5 that in 1972, right here, there is an electorial fraud. 6 Q. What do you mean electorial fraud, what happened in 7 1972? 8 A. Somebody steals the elections, and it is the analysis 9 of really virtually all political scientists that Jose 10 Napoleon Duarte and the coalition that he represented was a 11 coalition of Christian democrats and social democrats. These 12 are two parties that have their roots in Europe, but 13 eventually joined together for the 1972 elections, it would 14 have been the first electorial victory of an opposition in El 15 Salvador. He would have been president, but instead there's 16 an electorial fraud. Literally everything shoots down, the 17 counting stops, et cetera. The military party wins as it has 18 always done. Military party is called -- I'm going to do this 19 in red, the PCN, that's the party of the military. Duarte is 20 kicked out of the country, goes into exile in Venezuela where 21 I meet him. So this stops, the ability of parties and unions 22 to join together for an electorial victory is blocked. 23 Q. Now, Professor Karl, what is a popular movement? 24 A. Well, once you get the sense that maybe parties are not 25 going to be able to win elections, you get what the DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 950 1 Salvadorans called mass movements or popular movements, and by 2 that, I mean that there's a whole series of organizations, and 3 you heard lots of acronyms, I'm not going to explain them all. 4 But you have heard peasants unions, you have heard -- I think 5 FECAS, I think you heard UTC, you heard a lot of them, I'm not 6 going to go through them all. But basically what is important 7 you heard Bloque Popular, Revolutionary BPR. And I should say 8 that everybody is using the word revolutionary. So eventually 9 the military says it had a revolution. The mass movement says 10 they had a revolution. Everybody is saying they had a 11 revolution. It doesn't mean the same as the way we think 12 about it. You will hear both the right and the left talking 13 about a revolution and they mean different things. So you 14 have a mass movement or a popular movement growing here. I 15 won't take you through every single step, but what is 16 important is this becomes the FDR. 17 Q. When does that happen, more or less? 18 A. That happens in April of 1980, and what is key on this 19 line is that this is the largest popular movement in the 20 history of El Salvador. It is a movement for civil rights, 21 for political rights, for the end of military rule and for a 22 land reform, so that land would be distributed more equitably 23 in El Salvador, and this movement with all of its changes 24 becomes the FDR, and the six leaders of the FDR that you heard 25 about who were murdered, including Erlinda Franco's husband, DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 951 1 are murdered in November, 1980. Okay. So these are the 2 people -- it is the leadership of this movement that is killed 3 in 1980. 4 Q. Professor Karl, is there also an armed opposition to 5 the government during any of this time period? 6 A. Yes, there is. And the armed opposition is -- starts 7 right around here, and I'm going to just draw a line because 8 it eventually becomes here -- here, the army of the F -- 9 sorry, it eventually becomes in November of 1980, same time, 10 the FMLN, okay. This is what everybody is referring to as the 11 guerillas. Now, there are five groups that make up this, so 12 I'm not going to -- unless asked, I'm not going to go into all 13 of that, but the important thing is there are five guerilla 14 groups, they are very small here -- 15 Q. When you say very small, give the jury an idea of how 16 many numbers of people are involve. 17 A. The CIA estimates say that about this time, 1979, we 18 are talking about 300 people. Ambassador White said when he 19 got there, which would be about here, it was 500. Now, what 20 is important about these guerilla groups is they grow. All of 21 this is growing. So the party support is growing, the union 22 support is growing, the FDR support is growing and the armed 23 opposition is growing, but it is still very small in this 24 period. 25 Q. Now, Professor Karl, you said that in November of 1980 DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 952 1 the FMLN formed, why did it form at that time? 2 A. It forms as an army here. This is a guerilla -- these 3 are small armed groups which spend all of their time fighting 4 each other. They basically have arguments about what the 5 correct strategy is to defeat the military and have all 6 different arguments about who should do what, they are very 7 nasty about these arguments because they kill each other in 8 the process. They're also in this period of time trying to 9 raise money to support themselves, so there are kidnappings 10 around here, you know, they're having all kinds of internal 11 struggles, they're not growing as a result of that, and 12 they're doing some pretty nasty things. What unites them 13 really in April -- I mean in November is the fact that there 14 is, which I will show you later, so many deaths and murders 15 happening here along with so much pressure on them to become a 16 better armed opposition. What unites them as well is that the 17 possibilities for any peaceful change are getting closed, 18 which I will show you in a minute, but also very important is 19 that they have a meeting in Cuba, and Fidel Castro basically 20 helps them unite. So these small guerilla groups organize and 21 unite in the FMLN. 22 Q. Now, are these guerilla groups communists? Would you 23 consider them to be communist during this period? 24 A. Well, let me show you, the communist party, which is 25 actually the oldest party in El Salvador is here. Let me call DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 953 1 it -- it is PC for partido comunista. It is actually formed 2 way back here in 1932 period that I talked about. It is an 3 extremely conservative party, the communist party. It is four 4 elections, so it is actually participating with kind of a 5 front group in elections all the way through this period. It 6 is not part of the armed opposition until the very end. In 7 fact, it keeps saying peaceful change, peaceful change, 8 peaceful change, it doesn't really join up until about here. 9 So when you say communist, it is a little tricky because the 10 communist party is actually quite conservative. Some of these 11 groups -- and they are all different -- some of these armed 12 groups form from the Christian democrats, and they actually 13 are not Marxist-Leninist, because they are very religious, but 14 they believe that the possibility for peaceful change is 15 closed, that there is no chance. Some form from split-offs 16 from the communist party, some form from split-offs of other 17 guerilla organizations, but basically these are -- some of 18 these are Marxist-Leninist and some are not. 19 Q. And what are the sectors of society that are forming 20 the armed opposition groups? 21 A. Where do they come from? 22 Q. Yes, where do they come from. 23 A. Well, the first -- the armed groups really come from 24 students at some point. It is actually the story in a lot of 25 places where students get more frustrated. They don't have DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 954 1 much mass support here or any kind of base. This is not 2 something that your normal peasant would see somebody going by 3 with a gun and say let's fight the military, they would just 4 look at them and go are you nuts. That's what you would see 5 here, these are really middle class groups, pretty much. 6 Q. Professor Karl, what was the reaction of the military 7 to these developments. 8 A. Well, I think the importance is there's a series of 9 reactions, and they are important to understand because they 10 show you why this grows and why that grows. The first is 11 electorial fraud, it is to say, no, you might win the 12 elections, but we're not going to let you take power, and so 13 you can't have elections. There is also fraud in 1977, by the 14 way, which is when there is another election, so there is a 15 fraud here. Every time there is a fraud, people who believe 16 there's no hope for peaceful change move down into the armed 17 activities, right? Every time there's a fraud, this grows 18 too, challenge the military in peaceful ways, so this is all 19 just growing and growing and growing. 20 I think I need to show you one other thing in terms of 21 the reactions of the military. This is also important, this 22 is all getting us to the period that we're talking about in 23 this trial, which is really October, '79 and all of this 24 period, that's the period we're talking about in the trial. 25 The other thing that's important to understand is that as this DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 955 1 is growing, the military realizes it has a huge problem on its 2 hands, that this is a huge civil rights movement, that they're 3 going to go for democracy, the democracy is being called for 4 all over Latin America, and they got a real problem, and so in 5 this period of time, in the '60s, mid to late '60s they set up 6 a spy apparatus, the military does. 7 Q. What do you mean spy apparatus, what is that? 8 A. They set up a very sophisticated organization that is 9 composed of two parts, intelligence and operations, that will 10 let them know what is going on in the unions, the parties, the 11 popular movements and the guerillas. They're going to spy on 12 everybody and find out who is doing what. When I say a spy 13 apparatus, they do two things. They set up an intelligence 14 apparatus. I'm going to put the acronym here in case anybody 15 ever mentions it, and that is called Ansesal. That's the name 16 of intelligence, Ansesal. The operations or the type of 17 paramilitary or civil defense linked to the military -- 18 THE COURT: I'm going to take just one break 19 and speak to counsel briefly at side bar, and then we're 20 ready to proceed. Let me have Ike come up for just a 21 second. 22 (The following proceedings had at side-bar 23 bench.) 24 THE COURT: I'm only concerned about preserving 25 the record, and since she is up and walking and drawing DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 956 1 things, it is kind of complicated. Now, I'm not going to 2 do this unless everybody agrees, but they can actually put 3 a camera right there that will feed to your monitors, and 4 we're not going to -- it is just so that if you need to 5 look at something, you will be able to have a record of 6 it. Now, we won't do that -- we can't broadcast it, it is 7 not a broadcast thing, it is not for that purpose at all. 8 It is a little hard to follow if you're not watching her. 9 Does it make any sense at all? But it is up to the 10 defense. I don't want to do this unless -- 11 MR. FARGARSON: Well, I wanted to say something 12 anyway. I mean she is -- 13 THE COURT: It is a lecture format and that 14 what's confusing to me. 15 MR. FARGARSON: In other words, she is getting 16 in front of the jury doing all these things, rather than 17 being a witness like she was on a witness stand. She is 18 almost getting in the jury's lap. 19 THE COURT: Well, she has been very respectful, 20 I don't think there's a problem in that regard. My only 21 concern was that now that we have the ability to preserve 22 it, and also we're creating sort of a cabal, a whole bunch 23 of lawyers over on this side, which makes me a little 24 uncomfortable because I like to have you at the table. It 25 is okay, it is not a problem, we can just proceed the way DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 957 1 you are, but it is a little -- it's just a little hard to 2 imagine how somebody is going to deal with all of this, 3 because she is pointing to things on the chart, on a 4 drawing. If she wasn't pointing to things on a drawing, I 5 wouldn't care. 6 MR. ESQUIVEL: Well, she is almost done with 7 this, Your Honor, and maybe we could take that -- capture 8 a shot of the final product. 9 THE COURT: We need to shoot that, otherwise 10 you don't have -- it is a little bit of a disadvantage for 11 the defense. We need to at least get a picture of it. 12 Can we at least do that? We will get a digital photo of 13 that and put that on the screen if you want to. We can do 14 that. That is pretty easy. 15 MR. BROOKE: We object to it being an actual 16 exhibit in the record. 17 THE COURT: Oh, I understand, but the jury is 18 looking at it, do you want to preserve it? 19 MR. BROOKE: We may end up using it in cross. 20 THE COURT: That is exactly what I'm talking 21 about. 22 MR. ESQUIVEL: Then we would want to preserve 23 it. 24 THE COURT: When you start erasing things, it 25 gets complicated. I have expressed -- we're here to DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 958 1 preserve the record in the way that it is best to do it. 2 Ike is here, he knows how to do it. Let's at least agree 3 that -- we have got a digital camera where we can do this 4 one or not. 5 MR. MUSSLEMAN: Let's just use the video 6 camera, and we will take a short -- whenever you say 7 start, I will start it and then we will stop it. 8 THE COURT: So we can see her. 9 MR. MUSSLEMAN: We can freeze the picture. 10 THE COURT: And then if you want a shot of a 11 different one, we will do that. We're just trying to take 12 photographs, it will the easiest way for us to do that; is 13 that okay? 14 MS. BLUM: My only concern is whether we're 15 actually going to be able to see what is on there and 16 whether we might want to have a drawing done afterwards. 17 I mean I guess we can just -- you can tell -- if you're 18 doing a digital, you can tell right away whether it is 19 actually visible. So if there is any problem with that -- 20 MR. MUSSLEMAN: I can -- you want me to go 21 ahead and hook it up? 22 THE COURT: We can put it on your screen and 23 you be able to see what it is. 24 MS. BLUM: Perfect. 25 THE COURT: But I want to make everybody clear DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 959 1 you cannot use this for any broadcast purpose at all. It 2 is just to preserve the record, and also to be fair -- 3 bluntly to be fair to the defense, to preserve your 4 ability to cross-examine, is that okay? I mean if you 5 don't want to do it -- if we don't have an agreement I 6 don't want do it. You're always entitled to get a picture 7 of an exhibit. 8 MR. FARGARSON: I agree with that, there has 9 got to be a picture, the jury is looking at it. 10 THE COURT: Exactly, that's exactly right. 11 MR. FARGARSON: If the jury is not looking at 12 anything, it wouldn't matter, but I mean whatever she was 13 drawing up, there should be -- 14 THE COURT: We won't mark it as an exhibit 15 unless we need to, unless somebody -- 16 MR. FARGARSON: Simply because it is similar to 17 oral testimony. 18 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 19 MR. FARGARSON: It is a visual aid to oral 20 testimony, so it has got -- we have got to have some -- 21 THE COURT: Should we -- should we take a 22 10-minute break so they can do that? And, gentlemen, it 23 is up to you to tell us when you want something recorded. 24 It is not up to me to say we're going to record 25 everything, because we're not here to do that. We're here DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 960 1 to preserve the record, not to -- it's not a -- okay. 2 MS. BLUM: Thank you very much. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. 4 (The following proceedings were had in open 5 court.) 6 THE COURT: The reason we're conferring is that 7 part of our job is to make sure that there is a record for 8 someone to look at if they ever need to later on, and 9 because we have some visuals that are being shown to you, 10 I need to make arrangements to make sure that we can get 11 that. Sometimes it is just on a piece of paper and they 12 just hand it in and mark it, but everybody has gotten so 13 much more technically adapted. Even though this just has 14 got a chalkboard, it has got red, green, blue, it has got 15 numbers, we have to do that, which is fine, but we're 16 going to take a 10-minute break to let Mr. Mussleman and 17 the staff get in a position to make the necessary copies 18 just like we would if something was on that screen, we 19 will make a copy of that. So I apologize, we weren't 20 quite sure what was going to happen, and I did not 21 anticipate it. It is the right thing to do, and sometimes 22 that's what we just have to do. We're going to take a 23 10-minute, and as soon as Mr. Mussleman has everything in 24 order, he will be able to make those recordings. 25 THE CLERK: All rise. This Honorable Court DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 961 1 stands in recess. 2 (Recess taken at 10:45 until 11:00 a.m.) 3 THE COURT: The advantage, too, for defense 4 counsel is you will be able to see some of this at your 5 screen too if it is being done. I hope it works better 6 for everybody, and for the plaintiff's counsel also. 7 Gentlemen, is that okay? 8 MR. FARGARSON: Can you make it a little 9 larger? Okay. 10 THE COURT: Are we ready to go? Is that more 11 seeable? 12 Mr. Ruby, I think we're ready. 13 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: Yes, Your Honor. 14 (Jury in at 11:05 a.m.) 15 THE COURT: All right. You may be seated. And 16 counsel may proceed. 17 MR. ESQUIVEL: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 19 Q. Professor Karl, before our break, you were talking 20 about this spy aparatus, what happened to that spy apparatus 21 over the time period that you have in on your board? 22 A. This spy apparatus, which is composed of an 23 intelligence section and an operation section is called 24 Ansesal, and the paramilitary operations or what is often 25 called the civil defense called orden, O-R-D-E-N. That DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 962 1 becomes the basis for what you later hear really starting in 2 1977 in this period after the electorial fraud and the death 3 squads. In other words, those people you hear in civilian 4 clothes grow out of this apparatus, and I will talk more about 5 this later, but it is important to know that it comes out of 6 this original apparatus. 7 Q. Thank you very much, Professor Karl. 8 A. One thing I just wanted to add is that Colonel Carranza 9 is involved in the establishment of this apparatus, so he -- 10 you will be able to follow his career, but this is part of 11 where he starts in intelligence and operations in the 12 establishment of this apparatus. 13 MR. ESQUIVEL: Thank you, Your Honor. Your 14 Honor, is there anything more that we need to do -- 15 Professor Karl is finished making that chart. I -- 16 THE COURT: I think we have it. We now have a 17 copy, so I think we can turn that off for right now, and 18 we may need to keep somebody. 19 MR. ESQUIVEL: We will preserve that as it is, 20 I don't think we will have a need to erase it. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 22 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 23 Q. Professor Karl, was the military's response to these 24 opposition groups unified or was there some division within 25 the military? DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 963 1 A. Well, starting in 1977 on that picture, there were a 2 group of people who believed that the way to stop the rise of 3 opposition was to hit them very hard, to repress them very 4 hard, and those are what we call the hardliners, that's the 5 expression I will use. There was another group that started 6 to think that the days of military rule were ending, that El 7 Salvador should have a peaceful transition to a democracy and 8 those are the reformists. So inside the military -- remember 9 the military is also a government -- inside the military, you 10 really have two different groups, the reformists and the 11 hardliners, and the difference is really in how to respond to 12 the growth of an opposition. Hit them hard or transition to a 13 democracy. 14 Q. And did something happen in October of 1979 that 15 related to this division in the military? 16 A. Yes, in October of 1979, a group of young officers, it 17 was actually called the young officers coup, sometimes it is 18 called the young officers revolution, sometimes it is called 19 the October revolution, but in October of 1979, a group of 20 young officers literally had a coup inside the military and 21 pushed out the president -- it was a military man -- who was 22 extremely repressive, and started what they called the 23 revolution for democracy and for land reform in El Salvador. 24 That's in October of 1979. 25 Q. And what happened, what political structure resulted DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 964 1 from this coup? 2 A. Well, I've actually prepared -- 3 Q. Would it be helpful for you to see the chain of command 4 chart that has been used? 5 A. Yes, it would. 6 MR. ESQUIVEL: Mr. Gibson, could you put that 7 up? Thank you. 8 A. So this is the military chain of command which you have 9 seen before, and up until October of '79, this -- if I touch 10 it, will it -- yes. This group right here has always been a 11 military person. The president was always a military person. 12 So there was a clear chain of command, the president, the 13 minister of defense, the vice-minister of defense, the head of 14 the general staff, and those four were what is called the high 15 command. So it was, again, the president, the minister, the 16 vice-minister and the head of the general staff, the high 17 command. But in October, 1979, instead of having just one 18 military president, you suddenly have a junta, and it is two 19 military officers and three civilians. So instead of one 20 general commander at the top right here, we suddenly have a 21 junta made up of two military men and three civilians. 22 Q. Who were the military men that served in the junta? 23 A. The military men that served in the junta were Colonel 24 Gutierrez who eventually allies himself with the hardliners, 25 and Colonel Majano who eventually allies himself with the DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 965 1 reformists. Colonel Majano is spelled M-A-J-A-N-O, he's the 2 reformist, and Colonel Gutierrez is G-U-T-I-E-R-R-E-Z, and 3 he's the hardliner. 4 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, may I have 5 permission to approach the witness, please? 6 THE COURT: You may. 7 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 8 Q. I have handed you a photograph, does this photograph 9 depict the people you have been talking about? 10 A. Yes, it does. 11 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, we would move this 12 photo into evidence as Exhibit Number 23. 13 THE COURT: So received. 14 (Exhibit Number 23 was marked. Description: 15 Photograph.) 16 BY MR. ESQUIVEL: 17 Q. Earlier, Professor Karl, you mentioned the high 18 command, can you identify in this photograph who the members 19 of the high command were in October of 1979? 20 A. Yes, I can. The high command started from the man who 21 is closest to all of us is Colonel Castillo, Colonel 22 Carranza -- defendant in this case -- Colonel Majano -- who is 23 the reformist that I talked about -- Colonel Gutierrez who 24 is -- eventually allies him with the hardliners, and Colonel 25 Garcia who is the minister of defense. So in that picture, DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 966 1 you will see the minister of defense, which is this gentleman 2 right here, and you will see Colonel Carranza, which is that 3 gentleman right there. These two people in the middle are now 4 at the top of the chain, but there are two of them, and one is 5 a hardliner and one is a reformist. 6 Q. And in which camp did Colonel Carranza and Colonel 7 Garcia fall? 8 A. Colonel Carranza and Colonel Garcia fell within the 9 hardliners. 10 Q. What was Colonel Carranza appointed the vice-minister 11 of defense in this government? 12 A. Well, I think he was appointed for several reasons. He 13 had a very close relationship with Colonel Garcia, who is this 14 man here, who becomes the minister. They had worked together 15 in ANTEL, which is the telecommunications group. He had also 16 worked with Colonel Gutierrez, this man here, in ANTEL, they 17 had all worked together. 18 Q. Excuse me, if you could explain to the jury what ANTEL 19 is. 20 A. Yes, ANTEL is the telecommunications center, and it is 21 very important, not just because it helps you make your phone 22 calls, but it is also a part of the large spy apparatus that I 23 talked about. It is where conversations were overheard, and I 24 think -- there's an expression that is very important in this 25 story, because not only do you set up orden, which is this DIRECT - TERRY LYNN KARL 967 1 paramilitary civil guard that allows you to find out what's 2 happening, so if we were all in a small village in El 3 Salvador, somewhere in this room would be people who are in 4 the civil guard, and we may not know who they are. 5 Salvadorans refer to them as orejas, the ears that listen to 6 you. So somewhere in this group or somewhere in our group 7 would be somebody who was telling the military what we are all 8 talking about. In the telecommunication system, they would 9 regularly spy on conversations, and those would be fed into 10 the military intelligence apparatus, so