U N R E D A C T E D 1103 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE WESTERN DIVISION ------------------------------------------------------- ANA PATRICIA CHAVEZ, CECILIA ) SANTOS, JOSE FRANCISCO ) CALDERON, ERLINDA FRANCO, AND ) DANIEL ALVARADO ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) VS. ) NO. 03-2932-Ml/P ) ) ) NICOLAS CARRANZA, ) ) Defendant. ) ------------------------------------------------------- TRIAL PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON PHIPPS MCCALLA, JUDGE NOVEMBER 8, 2005 VOLUME VII BRENDA PARKER OFFICIAL REPORTER SUITE 942 FEDERAL BUILDING 167 NORTH MAIN STREET MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 38103 1104 A P P E A R A N C E S Appearing on behalf of the Plaintiffs: BASS BERRY & SIMS PLC 315 DEADERICK STREET, SUITE 2700 NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37238-3001 By: DAVID R. ESQUIVEL, ESQ. CAROLYN PATTY BLUM, ESQ. CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY 291 WEST 12TH STREET NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10014 MATTHEW J. EISENBRANDT, ESQ. CENTER FOR JUSTICE & ACCOUNTABILITY 870 MARKET STREET, SUITE 684 SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94102 Appearing on behalf of the Defendant: FARGARSON & BROOKE 65 UNION AVENUE 9TH FLOOR MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 38103 By: ROBERT M. FARGARSON, ESQ. BRUCE BROOKE, ESQ. 1105 W I T N E S S I N D E X WITNESS PAGE LINE TERRY LYNN KARL CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. FARGARSON: ..................... 1108 6 REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. ESQUIVEL: ...................... 1208 4 LEONEL MEJIA DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. FARGARSON: ..................... 1224 8 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MS. BLUM: .......................... 1229 17 ALEJONDRO DABOBERTO MARROQUIN DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BROOKE: ........................ 1233 8 CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. EISENBRANDT: ................... 1239 23 JOSE ANTONIO ARAUJO DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BROOKE: ........................ 1246 8 1106 E X H I B I T I N D E X EXHIBIT NUMBER PAGE LINE Exhibit Number 46 Photograph 1149 13 Exhibit Number 47 Photograph 1189 17 Exhibit Number 48 Photographs 1190 15 Exhibit Number 49 New York Times Article 1198 10 1107 1 TUESDAY MORNING AND AFTERNOON 2 NOVEMBER 8, 2005 3 The trial of in this case resumed on this date, 4 Tuesday, November 8, 2005, at 9:15 o'clock a.m., when and 5 where evidence was introduced and proceedings were had as 6 follows: 7 8 ____________ 9 10 THE COURT: Okay. We're ready to proceed. 11 Have the witness come back around to the witness stand, 12 and we're ready to bring the jury in. 13 (Jury in at 8:00 a.m.) 14 THE COURT: All right. You may be seated and 15 counsel can proceed with cross examination. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1108 1 TERRY LYNN KARL, 2 having been previously called as a witness on behalf of 3 the Plaintiffs, and having been previously duly sworn, was 4 examined and testified as follows: 5 CROSS EXAMINATION 6 BY MR. FARGARSON: 7 Q. Good morning. 8 A. Good morning. 9 Q. If I ask you anything you don't understand, I would 10 appreciate your stopping and letting me ask you another 11 question because I want to understand your answer, and I won't 12 if you don't understand my question, okay? 13 A. Thank you. I will also try to talk a bit slower for 14 the interpreters. 15 Q. Okay. Now, I don't necessarily like to ask ladies 16 their age, but I don't believe we have been given your age 17 yet. 18 A. I'm 57 -- 58. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. In a few days. 21 Q. And when did you graduate from the university? 22 A. I graduated from Stanford in 1977. That's where I 23 got -- when I got my undergraduate degree. 24 Q. And where did you graduate from? 25 A. Stanford University. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1109 1 Q. Where? 2 A. Stanford University. 3 Q. And what type of degree did you get? 4 A. I got a BA, a bachelor with honors. 5 Q. Did you get a master's following that? 6 A. I got a master's in 1976, I believe. 7 Q. So you finished your college just about the time that 8 some of these events you have been testifying about in the 9 1979s and 1980s, 1983 started happening, is that right? 10 A. No, I finished my college in 1970, and these events and 11 my first trips actually occurred at the end of getting my 12 doctorate. 13 Q. And then that first trip would have been when? 14 A. The first trip, I believe, is 198 -- right at the 15 beginning of 1981. 16 Q. The beginning -- 17 A. Yeah. 18 Q. The beginning of 1981? 19 A. That's right. 20 Q. And at the beginning of 1981, where did you go? 21 A. To San Salvador. 22 Q. And was there a particular reason that you went to San 23 Salvador at that particular time? 24 A. Yes, I had finished my doctorate and finished my work 25 which was in Venezuela, and while I was in Caracas, Venezuela, CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1110 1 I met Jose Napoleon Duarte, who at that point was in -- was 2 one of the civilians in the junta. I knew Mr. Duarte and I 3 knew a number of Christian democrats. Venezuela has a 4 Christian democratic party too, and so there was a lot of 5 traffic between the two parties, if I could put it that way. 6 So I already knew some Salvadorans. 7 Q. So you had been to Venezuela previously to the time 8 that you went to San Salvador? 9 A. That's right. 10 Q. Then it is also correct that while in San Salvador, you 11 met with Napoleon Duarte? 12 A. That's right. No, I met Napoleon Duarte in Caracas, 13 not in San Salvador. 14 Q. I'm sorry, I meant Venezuela. You said Caracas, 15 Venezuela. As a result of that, you had some conversations 16 that gave you some interest in San Salvador -- El Salvador? 17 A. Well, the first time I met him, he walked up and he 18 said my name is Jose Napoleon Duarte, and his next sentence 19 was I'm going to be the next president of El Salvador. 20 Q. Okay. 21 A. And I thought that was a very odd way for someone to 22 introduce themselves, and I got introduced in that. That's 23 when I learned about the electorial fraud and the story that 24 he had been elected and then was in exile. 25 Q. Okay. And so then because of that interest in him, CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1111 1 what caused you to go to El Salvador? 2 A. It wasn't so much an interest in him. I had that 3 contact, if I can put it that way or entre, but I took a job 4 at Harvard University, it was my first academic job. And 5 Harvard is very linked up to policy circles in the United 6 States, so that when I got to Harvard, I was considered a 7 Latin America expert, and everybody was calling and asking 8 about Central America, and I decided that as a Latin American 9 expert, I better learn as much as I can about what this is 10 about, and that was part of the impetus as well. 11 Q. What year did you go to Harvard? 12 A. I went to Harvard in 1981. 13 Q. And you say you were considered at that time in 1981 an 14 expert on Latin America? 15 A. Well, when you get a doctorate and your expertise is 16 Latin America, if you are at certain research universities, 17 you're expected to know about the region, not just one 18 country, and so, yes, if you -- if I'm working in the center 19 for Latin American studies and there's a crisis going on in 20 Central America, that's what people expect us to become 21 experts in, and that was quite a bit of a push as well. 22 Q. Okay. So then the answer is yes, in 1981 at Harvard, 23 you were considered an expert in Latin America? 24 A. Yes, exactly. 25 Q. And at that particular time, how many times did you CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1112 1 travel to Latin America? 2 A. I have actually no idea how many times I have been to 3 Latin America. I have a number of trips on my vitae, but I 4 haven't kept nearly the -- we don't put everything on our 5 vitaes, and I just actually have no idea. I have been to 6 Latin America countless times, I have lived in Latin America. 7 Q. I meant in 1981, I'm not talking about what you have 8 done since then. 9 A. 1981? 10 Q. Excuse me just a moment. I'm not talking about how 11 many times you have been there since 1981, I'm talking about 12 how many times you were there before 1981. 13 A. In Latin America? 14 Q. Yes. 15 A. I lived in Latin America, so -- 16 Q. So how many times did you go there? 17 A. Well, I lived there for two and a half years, and then 18 I went back and forth to get my doctorate. In the process of 19 getting your doctorate, you have to constantly be in what we 20 call the field, and I actually don't know how many times. I 21 was there pretty constantly for five years. 22 Q. Where did you live? 23 A. Most of the time, I lived in Caracas. 24 Q. In Venezuela? 25 A. Yes. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1113 1 Q. Where else did you live besides Caracas? 2 A. Let's see, at that time period of time, I went to Costa 3 Rica, Mexico -- gosh, at least Costa Rica, Mexico. I may have 4 gone to Cuba. I have been probably to a number of islands in 5 the Carribean. I was hoping to be a Carribean expert at 6 first, so I spent quite some time in the Carribean. I went to 7 Trinadad, Tobago, to the Dominion Republic, I think. 8 Q. So we have got Caracas in Venezuela, we have got what 9 in Costa Rica? 10 A. San Jose. 11 Q. And then we have got Mexico. What do we have in 12 Mexico? 13 A. Mexico City. 14 Q. Okay. And what was the purpose of the trip to Costa 15 Rica? 16 A. Let's see. This is probably about 1975, and the 17 purpose of the trip, I think, for San Jose, Costa Rica -- 18 Costa Rica and Venezuela were the centers for where exiles 19 went, so during -- and Mexico. During this whole period of 20 time, there were military dictatorships all over Latin 21 America, and if you wanted to interview people from those 22 dictatorships and not go to the -- there, which my advisors at 23 that point were actually operating under our advisor's 24 guidance, so we don't -- our universities don't like to send 25 you into situations that they think are dangerous because they CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1114 1 are responsible, so I went to interview people in exile in 2 Costa Rica from the dirty war in Argentina, from Chili. I 3 also interviewed people in Mexico, to a number of Latin 4 America studies meetings in Mexico. It is usually following 5 some story. 6 Q. Do you remember who you interviewed in Costa Rica that 7 had been involved in the dirty war in Argentina in the 1970s? 8 A. I interviewed in San Jose -- no, I don't, I'm sorry, I 9 don't. 10 Q. Did you interview anybody with the CIA in Costa Rica 11 while you were down there? 12 A. No, I did not. The CIA actually comes to Harvard quite 13 a bit, so you don't actually have to seek them out too much. 14 Q. Isn't San Jose the headquarters of the CIA? 15 A. I'm sorry? 16 Q. Isn't San Jose, Costa Rica the headquarters of the CIA 17 in Central America, or do you know that? 18 A. I don't know that. 19 Q. Then you mentioned Mexico, who did you interview in 20 Mexico? Do you believe those were likewise people that had 21 either been involved in the dirty war in Argentina or in 22 Chili? 23 A. In Mexico, I interviewed Ricardo Lagos who was in 24 exile. He is currently the president of Chili. 25 Q. And he was in Mexico City -- CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1115 1 A. He was visiting Mexico in a meeting. He was in Mexico 2 for a conference, and I was as well. 3 Q. And so did you have any interviews with him? 4 A. I did. 5 Q. And did you write any books or write any papers? 6 A. No, I was working on my Ph.D. thesis, which became a 7 book. 8 Q. All right. 9 A. So this was all in preparation for a book. 10 Q. Did you get any information from him about the 11 political situation in Chili or -- 12 A. Yes, I did. 13 Q. About the war that occurred in Chili? 14 A. Well, there wasn't a war in Chili, there was a military 15 dictatorship, and yes, I did. 16 Q. All right. And then you mentioned Cuba? 17 A. That's right. 18 Q. You may have gone to Cuba, how did you get a visa to go 19 to Cuba in the 1970s? 20 A. I went on the first -- there was one exchange that was 21 a state department exchange, cultural exchange with Cuba 22 between the two countries and I went on that trip. I'm also 23 eligible for an exception because I'm a Latin America expert, 24 I can always travel legally to Cuba. That's part of the 25 academic exception for expertise. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1116 1 Q. I'm sorry, say that again. 2 A. That's part of the academic exception for expertise. 3 I'm always able to go to Cuba. 4 Q. Okay. So it didn't matter that the state department 5 had him on a list of places that you couldn't go too because 6 of your status? 7 A. No, because it's a country that we're expected to know 8 about. 9 Q. All right. And was that when Castro was the military 10 dictator and ruler? 11 A. Then and still. 12 Q. Now, what did you do there? What did you do on that 13 trip to Cuba? 14 A. I had originally thought that I would write a -- my 15 first trip to Cuba, I believe I was looking for the -- I was 16 trying to investigate the prospects of doing my doctoral 17 thesis on Cuba. Nobody had done that. There were no good 18 studies, and I thought I might be able to produce some kind of 19 break through, and I discovered quickly that I wasn't going to 20 have access to the kind of information that would have made a 21 good study and I switched topics. I continued, however, to 22 think -- my dissertation advisor advised me to try to hang my 23 whole career on getting information out of Cuba was a bad 24 move, and I continued to go there to see if I could do some 25 kind of study, and I did write articles on Cuba, but I have CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1117 1 never been able to get the kind of information that I think 2 would be worth my time as a book. 3 Q. The articles that you wrote on Cuba, what were they, 4 what were they about? 5 A. I wrote an article on what was called work incentives 6 in Cuba. The Cubans have a different or had, it's not this 7 way now, but they had a different way that they were claiming 8 they were going to motivate people to work. In other words, 9 we use salaries and bonuses and things like that, and they had 10 a different system and I was curious to see if it would work 11 or not and how it would work. So I went to study how you 12 motivate or don't motivate labor. 13 Q. Okay. And this system that you discovered that they 14 were using, how was it different from either a capitalistic 15 system or a socialistic system, if it was different? 16 A. Yeah, it was different. 17 Q. In particularity? 18 A. First of all, it is a really poor country. So it is 19 very important to realize that not everybody can get 20 everything. And the issue was in this really poor country of 21 scarce resources, if you have five refrigerators and everybody 22 is a worker, which one of you is going to get the 23 refrigerator. Now, under our system, it would be the person 24 who could buy it, right? Under their system, it would be 25 who -- they had this complicated mix of what they called CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1118 1 merit, which meant the hardest worker. So if you're the 2 hardest workers, it would be the front line, and you all would 3 be out. And then among those, they had a system marked on 4 needs, so let's say you had five children and you only have 5 two, then you would get the refrigerator. So I was trying to 6 see how that -- if it worked, if it motivated or discouraged 7 people from working, and just sort of how that functioned, 8 because I had never seen anything like that. 9 Q. Did you draw any conclusions about that system as to 10 whether or not it motivated or -- 11 A. My main conclusion was that they needed a lot more 12 refrigerators, and that it was a complicated story, because it 13 worked in some places and in other places, it led to what we 14 call a kind of patron-client situation where because I'm 15 awarding the refrigerators, you all are going to be really 16 nice to me, and the merit and need breaks down, so it really 17 depended on each factory. I went from factory to factory. 18 Q. When you went to Mexico, you told us about 19 conversations with the gentleman from Chili, what other 20 studies or conversations did you have -- 21 A. I met Jose Insulsa, I think he's currently the foreign 22 minister of Chili and sustained -- it was a very important 23 trip, because a number of the people that I met there -- and 24 actually a number of people I met in Costa Rica, Mexico and 25 Venezuela, they were all living in exile and they are now the CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1119 1 presidents of democrat countries in Latin America. I met 2 Fernando Enrique Cardoso who is the -- who was the president 3 of Brazil until just recently. All of these people were 4 living in exile from military regimes, and as their countries 5 became democratic, they went back, entered the democratic 6 process and have won electorial victories, so it was a very 7 important trip for me in my work today. It has made me able 8 to go into countries and do very much what I did for years in 9 El Salvador. 10 Q. And you mentioned that it was a conference that you 11 went to in Mexico, what -- 12 A. Excuse me. 13 Q. What -- let me finish and then -- 14 A. Yeah. 15 Q. -- you can say whatever you want to. I understood you 16 to say it was a conference of some variety or some sort that 17 you went to in Mexico city, so what was the name of the 18 conference, what was the purpose of the conference? 19 A. I would have to go back and look at my vitae, it was 30 20 years ago, and I have been probably to -- we go to -- I go to 21 dozens of conferences every year, so I don't actually remember 22 why I went to Mexico, which conference. It probably -- or it 23 could have been the Latin American Studies Association, which 24 is our largest professional association, and we meet every 25 year, but I don't actually remember what conference it was. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1120 1 Q. Did you go to more than one? Did you go to Mexico more 2 than one time for any reason? 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. What other reason did you go to Mexico? 5 A. Let's see, I went to Mexico -- I went to Mexico in 1982 6 as a result of El Salvador because there was an initiative -- 7 it might have been '81. There was an initiative by the French 8 government and the Mexican government to try to get a peace 9 settlement in El Salvador. They were very concerned about 10 this huge amount of violence, and it was called the 11 French-Mexican initiative, and I went there to interview the 12 French diplomats and the Mexican diplomats that had put that 13 forward. I went to Mexico again related to Central America 14 for something called the Contadora initiative, which was 15 another initiative to try to bring peace in El Salvador, and 16 there were meetings in Mexico about that. That was between 17 the Venezuelan government, the Mexican government, the Costa 18 Rican government and the Panamanian government, and I then 19 went to Mexico again during what are called the Esquipulas 20 initiatives. Those are initiatives again for peace agreements 21 in Central America by the countries of the region who were 22 pushing hard on both sides for peace, and then eventually I 23 also went to South America tracking the peace agreements, the 24 pressure for peace. There were no peace agreements then, but 25 there was pressure from all Latin American countries to settle CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1121 1 this conflict. So I had a lot of trips in and out of Mexico, 2 Venezuela, Costa Rica and -- once these countries became 3 democratic in the south, I went there frequently too. 4 Q. Now, the 1981 initiative by the French and Mexicans, 5 was that a United Nations initiative or was it the hemispheric 6 states? 7 A. It was an initiative just by the French and the 8 Mexican. 9 Q. Okay. 10 A. And it was an initiative that was sparked by their 11 insistence that the FDR, which is the organization that the 12 six leaders that were murdered belonged to, were a legitimate 13 politically and needed to be given the right to participate in 14 the political process, and so it was pushing on a peace 15 agreement that permitted the FDR and then later the FMLN to 16 participate in elections and to create the conditions so that 17 they could participate in elections. They considered that the 18 key move that the Salvadoran government would have to make for 19 any peace in El Salvador -- in other words, they said if you 20 can't be in elections, you cannot stop this war. 21 Q. And this was in 1981? 22 A. That was, I believe, in 1981. 23 Q. And then the other one -- 24 A. It was called the French-Mexican initiative. 25 Q. And then the other ones that you mentioned, were those CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1122 1 later? 2 A. Yeah, they -- 3 Q. In '81? 4 A. They just keep happening. They are consistent 5 initiatives. After the French-Mexican initiative, the FDR, 6 and later when it merges with the FMLN and becomes what is the 7 FDR-FMLN which is later. The UN adopts a position that they 8 are a legitimate belligerent in a conflict and that they need 9 to be represented in the political process, and that's the 10 basis for all discussions of peace. 11 Q. I thought I also understood you to say that during that 12 time you went to South America, where did you go in south 13 America? 14 A. I don't think I went to South America that early, I 15 went to South America later because the South Americans 16 started getting involved in these peace initiatives. As soon 17 as the military governments fell, which they did in Argentina 18 and Chili and Brazil, as soon as they fell, they formed a 19 community of democratic countries in Latin America, and that 20 what was called the community of democracies, are the ones 21 that became very involved in trying to bring peace to Central 22 America, and they were the ones that insisted that all 23 participants in the conflict had to be able to participate in 24 peaceful channels as a mechanism to resolve the war, so it was 25 their insistence that the FDR-FMLN was a group and they needed CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1123 1 to be able to participate in elections that eventually laid 2 the basis for the peace agreement. That initiative was by the 3 president of Costa Rica, and he won the Nobel Peace prize for 4 that initiative. 5 Q. In order to -- let's see, was that Mr. Res? 6 A. R-E-S. 7 Q. Don't work about my Spanish, I think we probably spell 8 it the same way, I just may say it different from someone who 9 is a linguist. 10 Now, to plug in a time, when did the dictatorship in 11 Argentina fall? 12 A. Most of -- just to plug in a time, as the conflicts are 13 breaking out in Central America, things in the south are 14 happening the other way. In other words, as Central America 15 is entering into war, the military dictatorships in the south 16 are falling, so it is really the early '80s, with the 17 exception of Chili, which is much later that we begin to see 18 changes in the south. 19 Q. Can you put in a date with regard to Argentina since 20 we're basically talking about '79, '81 in El Salvador, can you 21 give us a date in Argentina? 22 A. I think Argentina -- actually, I'm not great on dates 23 unless I bone up, so I don't remember the exact date of the 24 transition into democracy in Argentina, but is after the 25 English called the Falkland war. Once the Argentinean CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1124 1 military is defeated in that war, it is really pushed out of 2 power. 3 Q. And then what about in Brazil, when did the military 4 dictatorship -- 5 A. About the same time. 6 Q. Both of them? 7 A. Uh-huh. 8 Q. Like dominoes? 9 A. Like dominoes. 10 Q. And then what about Chili? 11 A. Chili is later. The Pinochet dictatorship is actually 12 a lot stronger, and it is later. 13 Q. Approximately what time? 14 A. Pinochet has a plebiscite, he's confident that the 15 population supports him. He's a military general. He has a 16 plebiscite, which -- to permit him to stay in power an 17 additional, I believe, eight years, and he actually loses the 18 plebiscite, and then there is tremendous pressure from 19 everybody that he has to leave, and that is about, let's see, 20 the plebiscite is in the '80s, so that's at the end of '80s. 21 Q. About what? 22 A. Near the end of the '80s. 23 Q. '88, '89? 24 A. I think '88. 25 Q. All right. Any -- well, let me back up a minute. I CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1125 1 asked you about South America and then we talked about these 2 dictatorships. I know you had been to Venezuela. 3 A. Yes. 4 Q. What other countries in South America did you go to? 5 A. Well, I have been to -- the countries that I have been 6 to in South America? 7 Q. Yeah. Well, before 1979, 1981, 1983, right in that 8 period, what -- 9 A. In that period of time, I was working on the northern 10 part of Latin America, so that meant I worked in Venezuela, 11 Colombia, the Carribean, Central America and Mexico. That's 12 where I was. I didn't go south, because when I was getting my 13 doctorate, those were military dictatorships. By the time I 14 finished, they were all changing. 15 Q. Okay. So you mentioned Colombia? 16 A. Uh-huh. 17 Q. So where did you go in -- 18 A. I went to Bogata. 19 Q. -- Colombia that would be the neighbor to Venezuela? 20 A. I went to Bogata, yes. 21 Q. And what did you do or why did you go? 22 A. I was in Venezuela. One of the things I was 23 researching was how the budget worked and how money was spent, 24 how it was hidden, I was particularly interested in forms of 25 corruption, and I actually got pretty good at figuring out CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1126 1 these things, and I was invited to Bogata by a university to 2 look at Bogata, Colombia's budget, and it turned out that 3 there's -- in Latin American budgets there's a line called 4 errors and omissions where you put your mistakes, it is 5 supposed to be a very small number. And in the Colombian 6 case, errors and omissions was the largest number on the 7 budget -- or one of the largest numbers on the budget, which 8 meant that that is probably where illegal monies were being 9 entered. So that's what I did there. 10 Q. So you were invited -- 11 A. I was just there once and I looked at a budget, I tried 12 to compare it to the way the Venezuela did their budget. I 13 found it a very perplexing country because its largest export 14 was actually illegal, which is drugs. 15 Q. So do I understand that the reason for going there, you 16 were invited by a university? 17 A. Uh-huh. 18 Q. And in the process of being invited by the university, 19 they assigned you -- 20 A. Well, they didn't assign me, they knew I was looking at 21 budgets, they invited me to come give a talk. I decided to 22 look into the Colombian budgets and see if by comparing it to 23 the Venezuela budget to see if I could see something or learn 24 something, and I did, I did learn something. 25 Q. Was it a conference of university people or -- CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1127 1 A. No, I was invited to give a talk. It was an invitation 2 to me to give a speech. 3 Q. And the speech was to what group? 4 A. It was to a university group, to just academics. 5 Q. Okay. And it happened to be on finance because that 6 was -- 7 A. That was what I was working on. 8 Q. That was an issue? 9 A. That is what I was studying at the time, that is what I 10 was writing about. 11 Q. Any other countries that we've not mentioned that you 12 went to prior to 1979, 1981? 13 A. Let's see, we did the Carribean. No, I think that is 14 about right, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia. 15 Q. Now, you've told us that you met Duarte in Caracas, 16 Venezuela? 17 A. That's right. 18 Q. What were the circumstances of that situation? In 19 other words, how was it that you met him, was it a conference 20 that you went to? 21 A. It was a cocktail party. 22 Q. A cocktail party, okay. And how did it come about that 23 the two of y'all talked, if you did? I guess you did. 24 A. Yeah, we did. The -- as Ambassador White, I think, 25 pointed out that one of the places where you really want to CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1128 1 learn how elites work is socially, that's when people talk to 2 you the most, that's when they sort of tell you how things 3 work. I was doing a study of Venezuela for my doctorate, and 4 I was -- the study was basically trying to understand where 5 the oil money was going. Venezuela is an oil exporting 6 country and they have lots and lots of oil money, and it 7 seemed to be disappearing and I wanted to know where it was 8 going. And the government -- one of the governing parties was 9 Culpay (spelled phonetically), which are the Christian 10 democrats. It is the same -- it is the sister party of 11 Duarte's party. When Duarte won the 1972 elections and then 12 was captured and interrogated and beaten, he might have been 13 killed, but the story is -- certainly, the story I heard from 14 him and from the person he credits with saving him is that the 15 president of Notre Dame University in the United States called 16 a friend in the CIA and said Duarte has been captured, you 17 have got to help get him out, and apparently he was -- there 18 was pressure put on the Salvadoran military to release him as 19 long as he stayed out of the country. Because he was a 20 Christian democrat, he went to Venezuela and he was 21 incorporated into all of their social circles of the parties, 22 et cetera. The cocktail party I went to was a Christian 23 democratic party. Cocktail party for a man who was the 24 presidential candidate and who eventually became president of 25 Venezuela, and I was a student, I was alone in Caracas, and so CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1129 1 I was the only unaccompanied female at that party, and he came 2 in, and he also wasn't with anybody, so I -- he came up to 3 talk to me, and that's when he introduced himself and he said 4 his name was Napoleon and he was going to be the president of 5 El Salvador, and that was quite an opening. And I went over 6 to the man in the cocktail party and I was laughing, because I 7 actually didn't know anything about El Salvador at that point, 8 and I said, there's somebody here who says his name is Jose 9 Napoleon and he's going to be president of El Salvador, and I 10 was laughing about it. He said, Terry, don't you know who he 11 is. And then he told me, and then I sat down and basically 12 interviewed him all night, and that was the beginning. I met 13 him other times in Caracas. He introduced me to Fidel Chavez 14 Mana who became the foreign minister of El Salvador, and he 15 eventually introduced me to the leading Christian democrats in 16 El Salvador, Morales Ehrlich, Ector Dalda (spelled 17 phonetically), I mean just all kinds of people, and that was 18 the way I got to know Christian democrats in El Salvador was 19 really through that process. He also received me -- when he 20 was president at El Salvador, he was president from 1984, 21 he -- on, and he was the chief U. S. ally. I brought 22 congressional delegations to El Salvador, and he always 23 received us. He was the one who gave me permission, he was 24 president, to enter the guerilla zones, because I had 25 Congressmen with me and I wanted to make sure that everybody CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1130 1 would be safe, which meant that we had to have some kind of 2 guarantees that as we were moving through the country nobody 3 would shoot at us, especially when you have Congressmen. So I 4 asked President Duarte if he could arrange safe passage for 5 us, and -- so that happened too. 6 Q. Now, this meeting with Napoleon Duarte in Venezuela was 7 what date? 8 A. Oh, I don't remember. 9 Q. What timeframe? 10 A. It was -- he was still in exile, so my guess is it was 11 around 1977, but I really don't actually remember. 12 Q. Okay. Now, up until this period of time, you had been 13 to a number of places, and you had given talks on finance and 14 you had looked at the worker situation, and I guess somewhat 15 the economy of Cuba, I haven't heard you say anything about 16 writing any papers on the military aspects of the governments 17 of any of the countries in Latin America or even South America 18 during this period of time. 19 A. Everybody in my profession was writing on the military 20 in South America at that time because they were military 21 dictatorships. I -- that was one of the chief areas that we 22 had to learn about. I wanted to do something different 23 simply. I mean I just didn't want to write what everybody 24 else was writing. 25 Q. Okay. Well, I can understand that, but I am correct CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1131 1 then that up until about 1977 or 1978, you had not written 2 analyses -- 3 A. That's right. 4 Q. -- and articles, books or papers about the way the 5 military functioned in any of these countries? 6 A. That's right. Well, actually, no, that is not right. 7 I did write a piece on how the military was moved out of power 8 in Venezuela in 1958. So I had studied the Venezuelan 9 military actually in great detail, and I published a piece on 10 that. 11 Q. Okay. And when did you publish that piece? 12 A. Well, it's part of my dissertation, so I would have 13 written it -- I think I wrote it in about '81, and it wasn't 14 published -- there's always a big delay in publications for us 15 unless we go into journal articles, and I probably was 16 published around -- it's on my CV, but maybe '85, I don't want 17 to be held to these dates, because I'm not -- 18 Q. Okay. What was your dissertation on? 19 A. My dissertation was on Venezuela. 20 Q. Right. I took that to be true since the article was 21 about Venezuela, but what was the title, the subject? 22 A. The title of the dissertation, it was about the 23 transition to democracy in Venezuela and the role that oil 24 played in getting the military out of power and consolidating 25 a new democracy, and it was a study of how oil had first CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1132 1 helped build a democracy and how it was eroding it, that was 2 the argument I made in the dissertation, that the oil money 3 actually helped at the beginning and then had turned into its 4 opposite and was, in fact, eroding democracy. 5 Q. And what was the conclusion of your dissertation about 6 how oil helped democracy? 7 A. Well, the conclusion was that it -- I studied oil 8 export in countries as well, and I studied the impact of the 9 large amount of monies flowing into countries, which is one of 10 the reasons the Salvador story interested me because there 11 were huge amounts of U. S. aid, and aid actually acts a little 12 bit like oil money, and I was interested in that. The 13 conclusion was that oil was the catalyst that helped bring 14 down the military dictatorship in Venezuela. It was then for 15 reasons of timing something that helped consolidate the new 16 democracy, because they had a lot of money to give people who 17 were unhappy, and that always helps if you're trying to 18 consolidate something fragile, and then the way they handed 19 out that money and the kind of mechanisms that were set up, I 20 predicted would end up eroding and possibly destroying 21 Venezuela's democracy. That was my conclusion. 22 Q. Well, was it a welfare type system, some type of 23 socialist -- 24 A. All oil exporting countries are welfare type systems, 25 because they all live -- all of them live off of one product, CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1133 1 and what governments do is they distribute that wealth and 2 their welfare for somebody, they can be welfare for the rich, 3 they can be welfare for the poor, but they're always welfare 4 for somebody. It is a subsidy system. 5 Q. But what I meant is since the oil money, as I 6 understood you to say, would cause some eroding process, was 7 it the free money that was being given that -- 8 A. It's not free money. It is more -- I mean it's a 9 little more complicated than that. It is not about socialism, 10 it is about -- 11 Q. All right. 12 A. -- I mean because all oil exporters are different. 13 Some of them are military dictatorships, some of them like 14 Saudi Arabia are royal authoritarian regimes, some of them 15 are, you know, one socialist. Venezuela was democratic, it 16 was not socialist. There are all different kinds of 17 governments, but what was fascinating to me eventually, and I 18 eventually wrote a book on this, that all different kinds of 19 government that have oil do the same thing, and that was 20 really interesting to me, because you wouldn't expect a Saudi 21 Arabian royal family to do the same thing as the democratic 22 secular government of Venezuela or as the military regime of 23 Algeria, so -- 24 Q. And you say you wrote a book about -- 25 A. I did. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1134 1 Q. -- about your study after your dissertation? 2 A. Yeah, I did. I wrote a different book, which is called 3 the Paradox of Plenty, and it is about why oil regimes -- why 4 it is so difficult to built democracies in oil regimes and why 5 oil is such a difficult commodity to manage for countries that 6 have it. 7 Q. And who published your book, what publishing house? 8 A. University of California Press. 9 Q. And when was it published? 10 A. I should know these things. 11 Q. Do you know approximately, I don't expect you to 12 remember the exact time. I couldn't remember -- 13 A. It was published in 1998. 14 Q. Okay. 15 A. And it received a prize. 16 Q. Okay. Now, after you met Napoleon Duarte, I understand 17 in talking with him that sparked your interest somewhat in El 18 Salvador? 19 A. Yes. 20 Q. And as a result of that, you first came to El Salvador 21 when? 22 A. I think my first visit was right at the beginning of 23 '81. At the beginning of '81, I believe. 24 Q. And then the purpose of your trip in 1981 was what? 25 A. In '81, I came in through Honduras. I -- that's when I CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1135 1 did the interviews on the Rio Sumpul massacre, and that 2 massacre had happened on the Honduran-Salvadoran border. I 3 hadn't mentioned Honduras, but I have also been in Honduras 4 and Nicaragua and other -- I have actually been all over 5 Central America, Guatemala -- actually, I did mention those 6 earlier. There had been a war between El Salvador and 7 Honduras, there was very difficult relations between the two. 8 The -- there had been a massacre that I had talked about on 9 the stand yesterday, which was a combined operation of the 10 army and the security forces and from both sides of the 11 border, the Hondurans shot at Salvadorans and the Salvadoran 12 army shot at Salvadorans, and somewhere between 300 -- at 13 least 300 and 600 people were murdered, civilians were 14 murdered in that process. That's when I interviewed the 15 fishermen who found bodies, and -- so I first went on the 16 Honduran side, and then I went on the Salvadoran side. 17 Q. Now, am I understanding that's the first time you came 18 to -- 19 A. That's right. 20 Q. -- El Salvador? 21 A. That's right. 22 Q. And you came to El Salvador through Honduras? 23 A. That's right. 24 Q. And the reason that you came was what? 25 A. The reason I came was that the Honduran bishops and CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1136 1 priests, I don't remember how many of them, I think it was 2 something like 30, had signed a declaration saying that the 3 Rio Sumpul massacre had occurred, that it was a major 4 massacre, and the Salvadoran government was saying it had not 5 occurred or that it had been a skirmish with guerillas, and 6 there were different stories in that, and I wanted to take a 7 look. 8 THE COURT: We told our jury that they would 9 get their snack at 8:45, and I understand it is there. 10 Also, the folks are here for the 8:45 also, so we are 11 going to take that -- we have sort of reversed things 12 today. We will take a 20-minute break, at which time we 13 will come back and resume cross examination. Twenty 14 minutes. 15 (Recess taken at 8:45 a.m. until 9:35 a.m.) 16 THE COURT: All right. We're ready to bring 17 the panel back in. 18 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: Yes, Your Honor. 19 (Jury in at 9:35 a.m.) 20 THE COURT: We will stay close to that time. 21 You can leave whenever you want to. 22 MR. BROOKE: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: All right. I appreciate that. I 24 needed to take care of another matter, and I appreciate 25 y'all doing that. Mr. Fargarson. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1137 1 BY MR. FARGARSON: 2 Q. Okay. Ms. Karl, I think we were in 1981 and you had 3 been in Honduras and gone to the -- 4 THE COURT: We need to work on that mic a 5 little bit, and Joe is going to help you. 6 BY MR. FARGARSON: 7 Q. Let me try it again. In 1981, you go to Honduras, go 8 to the border of Honduras in El Salvador, is that correct? 9 A. Yes, sir. 10 Q. Now, had you had any conversations with Napoleon Duarte 11 in the meantime from seeing him earlier until the time that 12 you go to Honduras? 13 A. No, sir, he left Venezuela in 1979, I believe, and I 14 was in the United States writing my doctoral thesis. 15 Q. Okay. 16 A. So I had no contact with him. 17 Q. Your purpose in going there was what? 18 A. To the border? 19 Q. Yeah. 20 A. I got to Harvard in 1981, and it was my first teaching 21 job, first academic job, and I was confronted with a series of 22 expectations that I was supposed to know everything about, a 23 range of issues that were in U. S. policy. At Stanford on the 24 West Coast, there's a lot less emphasis on policy, we're 25 farther away from Washington. And every phone call I got from CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1138 1 reporters who would call the Center for Latin American Studies 2 to talk to the expert at that point was about Central America, 3 and I started both teaching on Central America and researching 4 Central America virtually right away, and so I was doing my 5 other work, but also acquiring as much information as I could, 6 and that's really why I started going back and forth. I was 7 asked for advice, I was asked for opinions all the time, and I 8 felt like I had to become extremely knowledgeable, and I felt 9 that the whole time I was on the East Coast, and then some. 10 Q. And so you're at Harvard with a teaching assignment? 11 A. Oh, yes. 12 Q. And as a result of that teaching assignment, you are 13 asked a range of issues, one of which is what, U. S. policy? 14 A. No, I was appointed a professor at Harvard in the 15 government department, and because of the prestige of that 16 university, reporters call you all the time, Congressmen call 17 and say I need a Latin American expert, we're just getting 18 these calls. Even though they may not know who you are, they 19 want an expert, and so I started getting really barraged. 20 Central America was a huge issue at this time, and I started 21 getting barraged with requests that I go look up things, and 22 then I started saying this is too important, I started 23 teaching on Central America, which I did for the next, I 24 believe, ten years. 25 Q. Okay. And when you started teaching on Central CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1139 1 America, what was it that you started teaching about? 2 A. I started teaching about conflicts in Central America, 3 Guatemala, Nicaragua and El Salvador, and I started teaching 4 why Honduras and Costa Rica had never had conflicts, so this 5 was an -- academically, Central America is a -- it is -- it is 6 kind of a perfect test case, because three countries go into 7 war and two don't, and they're similar enough for you -- for 8 one to talk about why war happens and why war does not happen. 9 Q. So you started teaching those courses -- 10 A. Yeah. 11 Q. -- in 1981 or 1980? 12 A. In 1981. 13 Q. Okay. Now, when you started teaching those courses, 14 how did you gain the information that you had or where did you 15 get the information on Nicaragua, where did you get the 16 information on Honduras or El Salvador at that time to start 17 teaching? 18 A. Well, there's actually a large scholarly body of work 19 on Central America, so the first thing I did was use Harvard's 20 library to read sources in both English and Spanish, so I read 21 first the academic works, and those would be -- there are 22 excellent studies on the national guard of Nicaragua, there 23 were excellent studies on the Honduran military, there's a 24 very good study, an old study of the Salvadoran military. 25 There was some good histories, there was collections, CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1140 1 particularly at Hoover Institute, which is at Stanford on 2 guerilla movements in Latin America. They really collect 3 especially this, and there are lots of exchange -- I just read 4 everything I could first in both English and Spanish, and then 5 once I felt like I had a basis to understand certain things, I 6 started going repeatedly to the region, and I continued to do 7 that for 20 years. 8 Q. Okay. So you studied and got information from books? 9 A. Uh-huh. 10 Q. And started teaching and then from time to time you 11 would go into the areas that you were teaching about, is that 12 a fair statement? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. Prior to 1981, had you been to Nicaragua? 15 A. No. 16 Q. What did you learn in reading these books about El 17 Salvador's neighbors Nicaragua? 18 A. Well, Nicaragua at that time was also having a 19 conflict. There had been a military dictatorship there too, 20 but it was a very different kind. It revolved around one 21 dynasty, one family, and it was called the Somozo dynasty, it 22 was very different from the Salvadoran colonels, and that 23 government -- that military dictatorship had collapsed. And 24 while I was at Harvard, the big issue was, was it going to be 25 a democratic government or was it going to be a government by CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1141 1 the Sandinista military force that actually really caused the 2 collapse and the defeat of the Somozo dynasty, so I spent -- 3 that was a very important issue, the United States was trying 4 to decide its policy at the time, which changed substantially 5 in that period, and so I read everything I could about who the 6 opposition was, who the Sandinistas were, what the Somozo 7 dynasty was, one of the Somozo children was a student, so I 8 worked on that issue. 9 Q. Okay. And who did you learn the Sandinistas were? 10 A. Well, the Sandinistas are complicated because they are 11 in some way similar, in some ways similar to the Salvadoran 12 story. There was a huge, a huge coalition against Somozo, 13 huge, and that coalition included people who were religious, 14 people who were Marxist-Leninist, people who were social 15 democrats, people who were Christian democrats, it included 16 armed opposition and it included unarmed opposition. The 17 Sandinistas were originally a coalition that included 18 different factions, and as in most situations, eventually if 19 you do not provide enough space for unarmed oppositions to be 20 involved in politics, it is armed groups that will become the 21 most important, so the Sandinista government was much more 22 strongly represented by what had been the armed opposition. 23 Q. And so what was the Marxist-Leninist group that was 24 involved in the overthrow of the Somozo family? 25 A. Well, the Sandinistas had a Marxist-Leninist -- CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1142 1 Q. And what percentage of the Sandinistas belong to that 2 particular group? 3 A. Actually, I don't know. I spent most of my time in El 4 Salvador and was much less interested in Nicaragua. 5 Q. Okay. 6 A. So I haven't done the kind of study that I have in El 7 Salvador. 8 Q. Did you learn that the United States was concerned 9 about what was happening in Latin America? 10 A. Absolutely. 11 Q. And did you understand and learn that the United States 12 was very interested in the Marxist-Leninist movement into 13 Latin America, particularly Central America? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. And that they had an interest in what was going on in 16 all of those countries down there? 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. But particularly Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and 19 Honduras? 20 A. Right. 21 Q. And there was Marxist-Leninist activities in all of 22 those areas? 23 A. That's right. 24 Q. Now, to -- and in insofar as the arms, the weapons and 25 things of that nature that were being supplied to the CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1143 1 Sandinistas and other interests in the area, did you learn 2 based upon your studies who the major suppliers of those arms 3 were? 4 A. Yes, I did. 5 Q. Did you learn that it was Cuba? 6 A. No, I didn't. 7 Q. All right. Who did you learn that it was? 8 A. Panama and Costa Rica. 9 Q. Okay. What did Cuba have to do about supplying those 10 arms? 11 A. I think Cuba was probably more involved in strategic 12 and tactical discussions. It turned out the Somozo dynasty 13 had lots of enemies, particularly in the region, and a lot of 14 governments were happy to see Somozo go, so I am only 15 speculating here, but I think that the Cubans probably felt 16 they didn't need to supply guns to the Sandinistas, because 17 the Costa Ricans and the Panamanians were doing a fine job on 18 their own. I don't know that. 19 Q. Let me make sure I understand the answer. You're 20 saying the Cubans and the Russians or the Vietnamese did not 21 supply any weapons at all, or are you saying -- 22 A. No, sir, I said that -- your question was who supplied 23 the most arms, and my answer is the Costa Ricans and the 24 Panamanians. 25 Q. Okay, we understand each other then. Thank you. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1144 1 A. All right. 2 Q. Now, back to 1981 and your going to El Salvador through 3 Honduras, did anyone invite you to come to do some study or 4 did you go on your own to gather information in the course of 5 your teaching courses at Harvard? 6 A. I went on my own. 7 Q. Okay. 8 A. I was financed by grants from Harvard. 9 Q. Okay. Now, at this particular time in 1981, what was 10 the composition of the government of El Salvador? 11 A. In 1981, the situation changed in El Salvador from what 12 I explained in my view as state terror to one in which a 13 genuine civil war was occurring, and the country was much more 14 polarized between two sides, and in that context the only 15 party that would form an alliance with the military was a part 16 of the Christian democratic party. In fact, it was Jose 17 Napoleon Duarte. So when he agreed to be in a military 18 civilian junta and when the other representatives of his party 19 had quit, had resigned in protest against repression, there 20 was a pack or a military civilian junta that included part of 21 the Christian democratic party, the Duarte party. The rest of 22 the party -- the party split and the rest went into the 23 opposition and worked with the FDR. So it is an alliance 24 between Duarte's party and the military. 25 Q. Was it a junta? CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1145 1 A. It is a junta. It is military civil junta, yes. 2 Q. Don't be concerned about my Spanish, it is not very 3 well, so if I don't pronounce the words right, hopefully, it 4 will be close enough that you will know what I'm saying. 5 Now, did you know that at the time you went or was that 6 something you found out in the course of going to El Salvador 7 in 1980? 8 A. No, I knew that at the time I went. There are a number 9 of mechanisms and were a number of mechanisms available to me 10 to keep up on Latin America. This is before the world of 11 computers, so we had a series of documents that someone like 12 me, that I would read, the Latin American Weekly Report, the 13 Latin American Regional Report, and then there are those 14 reports, which is the news from Latin America, basically, I 15 would read, and then there was a special regional report on 16 Central America that I would read, and it would be a 17 compilation of news from the region. I knew very -- within, 18 again, it wasn't computer time, so there was always a time 19 delay, but I knew before I went to Central America always more 20 or less what the situation -- what was happening on the 21 ground. I didn't necessarily know how people there saw it, 22 which was why my interviews to me were so important, it gave 23 me a way of being able to see different understandings of what 24 was happening in the region and different ways of expressing 25 that. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1146 1 Q. And on this visit in 1981, how long did you stay? 2 A. I didn't stay very long. I stayed -- I actually don't 3 remember, but it was less than a week. 4 Q. Did you stay in El Salvador or did you stay in 5 Honduras? 6 A. I stayed in El Salvador near the border. 7 Q. All right. What was the name of the town? 8 A. I'm sorry, I would have to look at a map. I could find 9 it for you. 10 Q. Okay. Excuse me just a moment. 11 MR. FARGARSON: Your Honor, may I hand the 12 witness a photograph? 13 THE COURT: Certainly. 14 BY MR. FARGARSON: 15 Q. Ms. Karl, I have handed you a photograph having 16 previously asked you about what the content of the government 17 was during that period of time in 1981, and that's a 18 photograph not in '81, but in 1980. Does that identify the 19 representation of the government at that time you're talking 20 about when you went to El Salvador? 21 A. No, sir, it does not. 22 Q. Okay. 23 A. It partially does. The Jose Napolean Duarte right here 24 was in the government in '81. The most -- Abdul Gutierrez 25 right here was in the government. I don't remember whether CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1147 1 Jose Morales Ehrlich who is on the far end was not, but this 2 man here is Colonel Majano. He is one of the reformists, he's 3 the leader of the reformist section, and he was removed of his 4 command after the incident at San Luis Finca that I talked 5 about yesterday where the conspirators were found in the masks 6 and everything. He was removed from his command, and in 7 November of 1980, a bomb was put in his car, and there was -- 8 and there were other attempts to kill him, and he eventually 9 left the country. So he was not there then. 10 Q. Okay. Who else was there, who else up there was -- 11 A. In the military civilian junta, I actually don't -- as 12 I said, Duarte was in it, Gutierrez was in it, and I don't -- 13 there were lots of civilian shifts, I don't remember in '91 14 whether Jose Ramon Avalos and whether Morales Ehrlich was in 15 the government or not. 16 Q. And what was Napoleon Duarte in that photograph, what 17 was his position? 18 A. He was, I believe, nominally president of the junta. 19 Q. Okay. Then in 1981, what was Napoleon Duarte? 20 A. In 1980, I think -- I believe he was nominally 21 president of the junta until 1982. 22 Q. Okay. Now, the other gentleman on the back row, were 23 those all still in the government in 1981? 24 A. These soldiers in the back? 25 Q. Yeah, any of them -- CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1148 1 A. I don't recognize any of them. Sir, I don't recognize 2 any of them, I don't actually know who they are. 3 Q. And the other -- 4 A. If -- this caption identifies them as Majano's 5 supporters. If they were supporters of the reformists, they 6 were not in any positions of power in 1981. They had already 7 been marginalized in the military. 8 Q. The other two gentleman that you don't have a red 9 mark -- 10 A. Morales Ehrlich, yeah. 11 Q. What about them? 12 A. Well, that's what I said, there was a kind of rotation 13 of Christian democrats through '80 and '81, and I actually do 14 not remember whether Jose Ramon Avalos and whether Jose 15 Antonio Morales Ehrlich are in the junta or not. I know that 16 Duarte was. I had frequent conversations with him about how 17 he had no power and couldn't control the military. He 18 complained of this quite often in private. 19 Q. So how would you carry on these conversations with 20 Napoleon Duarte, would you have personal meetings with him? 21 A. Yes, I saw him in 1982. 22 Q. Phone conversations or personal conversations? 23 A. No, personal conversations. 24 Q. And where would they take place? 25 A. It depended, either at the presidential palace or at a CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1149 1 Christian democratic gathering. It was a very intense time 2 because the party had divided. The Christian democratic party 3 had divided, and there were very strong feelings in the party 4 about whether or not the best way to build democracy was to 5 move into the opposition or to try to make a deal with the 6 military, and Jose Napoleon Duarte was on let's make a deal 7 side. 8 Q. Okay. 9 A. He wanted to be president very much. 10 MR. FARGARSON: Your Honor, I would like to 11 have this marked as the next exhibit. 12 THE COURT: All right. Exhibit 46. 13 (Exhibit Number 46 was marked. Description: 14 Photograph.) 15 A. So that photo, to be clear, does not represent the 16 constitution -- 17 Q. I understand. 18 A. -- it's really a quite different political situation 19 where the reformists have already been marginalized. 20 Q. Now, in 1981 when you were there, what did the 21 government consist of? Tell me the names of the people that 22 were in the government at that time that you went there from 23 Honduras and stayed at the border of El Salvador. 24 A. Well, in my view, the government -- the problem from 25 really -- CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1150 1 Q. Excuse me, just a minute, would you tell me who the 2 people were and then you can say whatever you -- 3 A. Well, Jose Napoleon Duarte was in the government and 4 Abdul Gutierrez, the two people I pointed to in that picture, 5 they were in the government. 6 Q. Who else? 7 A. Gutierrez was the commander in chief of the armed 8 forces. In 1981, the minister of defense was Minister Garcia, 9 Guillermo Garcia who had been working with Colonel Carranza. 10 The head of the treasury police was Francisco Moran. The head 11 of the national guard, I believe, was Vides Casanova. Let's 12 see, the other Christian democratic party members in the 13 junta, I don't recall at the moment. 14 Q. Okay. Now, you mentioned that you carried on these 15 conversations with Napoleon Duarte, over what period of time 16 did those take place? 17 A. I saw him really between 1981 and 1986 or 7. 18 Q. 1981 and -- 19 A. 1987. 1981 through 1987. He was the most important 20 civilian political leader in the government, which is why I 21 usually talked to him. 22 Q. Now, how many times would you have met with him in that 23 six-year period? 24 A. Maybe five or six times. 25 Q. Okay. In that same period of time, did you meet with CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1151 1 other members of a junta or -- 2 A. I met with military leaders then. I thought the real 3 power was in the army, and my -- and the armed forces and the 4 military, and since that's where I wanted to see how power was 5 being exercised, I met with some military colonels. 6 Q. And which ones did you meet with? 7 A. I met with Colonel Ochoa, I met with Colonel 8 Monterrosa. I met with -- 9 Q. What was the first name of Colonel Monterrosa? 10 A. I'm sorry, I never used his first name. He was often 11 called Monte by his friends, but I never knew his first name. 12 Q. I know Monterrosa is not an unusual name in El 13 Salvador. 14 A. No, there was only one Colonel Monterrosa, and he was 15 considered one of the best military officers. He was also the 16 man who conducted the massacre of El Mozote. 17 Q. Who else did you meet with? 18 A. I met with Colonel Ochoa. 19 Q. Right, you mentioned him. 20 A. I met with then Colonel Bustillo was head of the air 21 force. I met with Colonel Lopez Nuila. He was -- he was then 22 head of the police, I believe. I met with -- let's see, I may 23 need to look at a list. 24 Q. That's all right. 25 A. Those were the colonels I met with. I met with a CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1152 1 number of younger officers as well. 2 Q. And your meeting with them was during what period of 3 time? 4 A. Particularly between '81 and '87, those periods of 5 time. 6 Q. Okay. Same time you were -- 7 A. Right, right, I also met with a number of soldiers. 8 Q. Did you ever meet with Mr. Carranza? 9 A. I never did. 10 Q. Did you ever meet with Mr. Guillermo Garcia? 11 A. I never did. I had a meeting with Colonel Garcia, 12 which he had granted to the congressional delegation that I 13 was accompanying, and at the same time that we got that 14 meeting, we were also granted a meeting with one of the 15 leaders of the guerillas in the guerilla zones, and the 16 congressional delegation made the decision that I had to go 17 with the part of the congressional delegation that was going 18 into the guerilla zone, so we split, and part of my delegation 19 went to see Colonel Garcia. He may have then been General 20 Garcia and I accompanied the congressmen and the 21 representatives into the guerilla zones. That's because our 22 interpreter had gotten ill, and there was nobody else who 23 spoke Spanish. So I missed my opportunity to interview him. 24 Q. These meetings with the military men, how would they be 25 arranged and where would they be conducted? Would you just CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1153 1 call them up and they would make appointments? 2 A. It wasn't that easy to see military men. Roberto 3 D'Abuisson helped me set up meetings. He was the person I 4 described who was named in the Truth Commission as the 5 intellectual author, which is a Latin American way of saying 6 the man who designed the murder of Arch Bishop Romero, and he 7 eventually formed a political party called ARENA, and that 8 political party, which is now the governing party of El 9 Salvador today was very close, and Roberto D'Abuisson was very 10 close to military officers, so he helped me see some people. 11 Q. Excuse me a moment. Did I understand in your testimony 12 yesterday that you also met with Roberto D -- 13 A. D'Abuisson, that is who I'm talking about. 14 Q. That's the one you're talking about? 15 A. Yeah, he helped me see some military officers. 16 Q. Okay. So he made -- he was a military officer himself? 17 A. He had been a military officer. He was a student of 18 Colonel Carranza, and he was the military officer who took the 19 files, the secret files that were used to spy on people out of 20 the presidential palace and moved the Ansesal files and moved 21 them into the defense ministry. He then -- 22 Q. Excuse me just a minute. But he met with you? 23 A. Oh, yes. 24 Q. Okay. On more than one occasion? 25 A. Well, I -- he was running for president in 1983 -- CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1154 1 excuse me, for the March, 1984 elections, but he had already 2 decided in 1983, and so he was campaigning, and he took me 3 to -- on some of his campaign trips. 4 Q. But I mean why did he meet with you? Did you call him 5 and ask him if he would meet or did he -- I'm not 6 understanding you exactly what the interest -- 7 A. I tried to talk to everybody, that's my job. So nobody 8 talked to Roberto D'Abuisson, he had been described in the 9 declassified documents as a psychopath, and there is constant 10 descriptions of him as being a quite terrifying person, and 11 nobody had really talked to him. One of the reporters said 12 that he had, and several other reporters told me that they 13 had, and so I thought, well, I could go to the -- his 14 headquarters, which I did, and ask for an interview. He was 15 extremely anti-American, extremely. He was in our -- in 16 academic sense, we call people like this extreme right wing 17 nationalists. He had been referred to in the declassifieds, 18 excuse me, as a fascist, as a psychopath, I mean just by the 19 embassy. I wanted to see what kind of power he had, and I had 20 talked about rival hypotheses, many people were telling me 21 that the right had -- the extreme right had no support inside 22 El Salvador, and I had traveled in the rural areas, and I 23 found peasants to be extremely frightened, but also extremely 24 conservative in their views, and I wanted to see if that was 25 true, and the only way to see whether he had any basis of CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1155 1 support was to travel with him, so I said to him in an 2 interview, everyone says you have no support, and he didn't 3 like Americans, he was very, very actually insulting, and I 4 kept saying they say you have no support, and finally he said, 5 well, if you don't think I have support why don't you come see 6 it, and I said yes. 7 Q. Okay. And so how much time did you spend with him? 8 A. I went out on several campaign trips with him. He was 9 an extraordinarily charismatic speaker and -- 10 Q. So you were with him a number of hours? 11 A. A number of times. Yeah, those trips -- we would take 12 day trips or sometimes -- there was one trip where we couldn't 13 get back to San Salvador, so we ended up taking a two-day 14 trip, and it wasn't just me, he had his men around him, and I 15 would go stay somewhere else. 16 Q. So you were with this psychopath riding around in the 17 car and spending a number of days with him? 18 A. I was indeed, sir. It was terrifying, actually. I 19 mean I was learning an incredible amount. I was just learning 20 something I never would have seen, and he -- I just didn't 21 understand what was happening in El Salvador, and there was no 22 way to understand it unless you understood Roberto D'Abuisson, 23 there was just no way. He would stand up in the campaign with 24 a watermelon and he would take a machete -- he used to wear 25 these muscle shirts, you know, and he would -- he would stand CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1156 1 up, he would hold up a watermelon, he would take a machete, he 2 would cut the watermelon in half and he said these are the 3 Christian democrats, they're green on the outside, which was 4 their color of the party, but they're red in the inside, and 5 so he was saying they're all communists. 6 Q. So you determined that he was a charismatic psychopath? 7 A. I determined that he was a charismatic guy, that he had 8 a very impressive network, that he had significant help from 9 inside the military, because I witnessed him going inside and 10 outside barracks when he was supposed to be outside the 11 military with them just waving him on, which never happened. 12 Q. And he arranged for you to be able to see this -- 13 A. His campaign. 14 Q. Okay. 15 A. Yeah, and I had lots of conversations with him. 16 Q. Now, let me back up to 1979 and 1981, which you have 17 testified about in your direct examination and maybe even a 18 little further back. Tell me about -- what you learned about 19 coups that took place in El Salvador between the party, let's 20 say, 1970 to -- 21 A. '70? 22 Q. Yeah, to 1985, what did you learn? 23 A. Military was a military, but it was also a government, 24 and so as I said in 1972 -- it was a government that had a 25 very interesting system of elections. The whole time, it was CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1157 1 a military dictatorship, there were elections. So Central 2 America actually living under militaries had more elections 3 almost more than any other region in the world. 4 Q. Excuse me for just a moment, if I can. Can I try to 5 get you to back up a moment and tell me about the coups. 6 A. Right, I have to, because, when the elections didn't 7 happen the way they wanted, there would be a coup, that's 8 where I was going. 9 Q. Okay. So that's where you're going, okay. 10 A. That's where I'm going. 11 Q. I want to make sure we're going -- 12 A. No, in 1970 -- you asked during the '70 period, the 13 first thing that I would consider a coup was the electorial 14 fraud of 1972 when President Molina who is a military man 15 basically -- Molina, a military man, became president even 16 though virtually all observers believed that Jose Napoleon 17 Duarte, the Christian democrat won those elections, so that 18 would be the first coup. The second coup is in 1977, or it is 19 both election/coup, let me call it that, is in 1977, and that 20 is a situation in which under a lot of pressure, President 21 Molina, a military president, agrees to a land reform. 22 Remember that opposition I'm talking about is rising, there's 23 lots of demands for an opening up for a land reform, for less 24 repression, and there is the same struggle inside the military 25 between the reformists and the hardliners. The hardliners CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1158 1 win, and General Romero, this is not Arch Bishop Romero, this 2 is another Romero takes power in 1977. It is really a 3 hardline -- the hardline pushing out the Molina faction and 4 taking a hardline position, and that's when death squads start 5 getting very active, that's when all of the Jesuits are given 6 a deadline to leave the country or they will all be murdered. 7 So that's really -- it is a -- it is this odd relationship 8 between elections and coups, if I can put it that way. The 9 next one is 1979, October, when the young reformist officers 10 initially take power with Majano and then lose it very rapidly 11 to the hardliners. 12 Q. And the hardliner was Garcia? 13 A. No, the hardliner -- the very well-known hardliner was 14 Colonel Carranza. 15 Q. Okay. And what was his position at that time? 16 A. He became the vice-minister of defense. Garcia was 17 less -- it was less clear at that time how he was going to 18 fall. Nobody knew exactly what Garcia and Gutierrez were 19 going to do until they appointed Colonel Carranza, and then it 20 became much more clear. 21 Q. In 1979, what is the position that Garcia had? 22 A. After October of 1979, he becomes the minister of 23 defense. 24 Q. All right. And at that time, was there some type of 25 I'll call it a revolt in the military as to what the officers CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1159 1 in the military were going to do, who they would obey, who 2 they wouldn't obey? 3 A. There was a disagreement, but I would not call it a 4 revolt. There's constant disagreement in the government 5 between hardliners and reformers, but the thing that is so 6 exceptional about the Salvadoran military is the fact that the 7 chain of command holds, so that, for example, when Majano is 8 ordered out of the position of commander in chief, he simply 9 follows orders and leaves. You would expect that there would 10 be some kind of revolt or something like that, but, in fact, 11 this military is an extremely disciplined military. It is a 12 military that follows orders. If you say you are being 13 removed, they follow those orders. So if you try to remove 14 somebody, and it is the decision of a superior or the general 15 sentiment of the colonels, they will, in fact, go, but it 16 holds -- it holds its chain very, very clearly. 17 MR. FARGARSON: Excuse me just a moment. 18 THE COURT: Sure. 19 MR. FARGARSON: May I approach the witness, 20 Your Honor? 21 THE COURT: You may. 22 BY MR. FARGARSON: 23 Q. Ms. Karl, I'm going to hand you a document marked PL 24 0796, and take a look at the part that is in yellow? 25 A. Would you tell me where this is from? CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1160 1 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, we will object to 2 the use of this document. There hasn't been any 3 foundation laid for its admissibility. 4 THE COURT: Well, it cannot be displayed at 5 this time until we determine whether or not it can be, 6 one, identified by the witness, and then meets some 7 criteria which will allow its use, so... 8 A. I would have to see the date of this document. I'm not 9 sure where it's from. There is a number of things that have 10 this same name, so I would need to see where it is from. 11 BY MR. FARGARSON: 12 Q. You don't recognize the information that I have placed 13 there? 14 A. Well, this same information -- I don't recognize the 15 specific phraseology. The document is named the Human Rights 16 Situation in El Salvador, and I know so many documents with 17 that name that I would have to see the date or something that 18 is a little stronger to identify it, if that is possible. 19 Q. Well, look at the -- 20 A. I mean I'm happy to identify it if can show me more of 21 the document. 22 Q. Look at the paragraph at the bottom of the page. 23 A. Uh-huh. 24 Q. And it talks about the military commanders and orders. 25 Weren't we just talking about military commanders and orders, CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1161 1 and weren't you just saying that the military kind of always 2 coalesced and lined up according to the chain of command? 3 A. It says -- 4 MR. ESQUIVEL: Your Honor, I object to reading 5 from this document. It is not admissible. 6 THE COURT: It is not -- it cannot be received 7 until it is identified. Objection sustained. 8 MR. FARGARSON: Well, of course, Your Honor, it 9 is not my document, it is a document produced by the 10 plaintiffs. 11 THE COURT: Well, let me take a look at the 12 document, maybe it will say something. 13 (The following proceedings had at side-bar 14 bench.) 15 THE COURT: Well, obviously, it came from 16 something. Maybe we could get the book or article. It is 17 page 152, 153 of some book. 18 MR. FARGARSON: Well, it is the plaintiffs' 19 document. 20 MR. EISENBRANDT: But that doesn't make it 21 admissible. 22 THE COURT: But that doesn't make it one that 23 this witness can identify. And the question is -- I have 24 no idea what it is. 25 MR. FARGARSON: Well, I don't either. I know CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1162 1 it came out of this particular book, though, and it was 2 produced in records. I didn't produce it myself. I guess 3 I can ask her if she ever read that book and if she ever 4 saw that page. 5 THE COURT: I think she can be handed the book, 6 it is just that the two pages out of the book is -- 7 MR. FARGARSON: Have you got the book so I can 8 hand it to her? 9 MR. ESQUIVEL: I don't think I brought our 10 whole document production. I honestly don't know what 11 book this is from. I assume that we produced this entire 12 book. I cannot remember who the author is or what it 13 comes from, to be honest. 14 MR. FARGARSON: Well, you know, this is cross 15 examination, and that article contradicts exactly what -- 16 THE COURT: But it has to be identified. In 17 other words, if this was out of a state department 18 document, if it was out of a learned, you know, an article 19 by a recognized authority in the area, then we would hand 20 them the article. 21 MR. FARGARSON: Right. 22 THE COURT: Ask them do they recognize this as, 23 you know, an authoritative document within the field or a 24 author within the field, and then you might be able to ask 25 it under the learned treatise exception, but I can't do CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1163 1 it -- 2 MS. BLUM: Your Honor, I think this was part of 3 our original document production to defendants. It wasn't 4 part of our exhibit list, and we would, I'm positive, not 5 have given them a two-page document from a longer 6 document. I'm sure we disclosed to them the full 7 document. 8 THE COURT: Right. 9 MR. ESQUIVEL: With some sort of identifying 10 identification. 11 THE COURT: Well, objection has to be 12 sustained, and we need to produce the paper and/or book 13 and -- book, and then it can be determined whether or not 14 it can be used in cross examination. It is not a 15 sufficient amount of material, it is two pages out of what 16 is at least 153 pages, 153 -- there has got to be 154, 17 because the sentence doesn't end there. 18 Well, objection sustained. 19 MR. FARGARSON: Okay. 20 (The following proceedings were had in open 21 court.) 22 BY MR. FARGARSON: 23 Q. Okay. Ms. Karl, did you learn in 1981 that there was a 24 civil war going on in El Salvador or there was a civil unrest 25 or struggle of some sort taking place in the country? CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1164 1 A. By 1981, there was no possibility at all for any 2 peaceful expression of opposition. At least 10,000 civilians 3 had been murdered, and at that point, the opposition, those 4 who felt -- the opposition either stopped doing anything, left 5 the country or joined the guerillas, and anything any peaceful 6 opposition could have done would have had to have been 7 clandestine or underground, there would be no way -- nobody 8 was going to raise their head in a peaceful opposition at this 9 point. And by that time, there was a united guerilla army. 10 There hadn't been before, and it had grown significantly. The 11 repression fueled the guerillas enormously because people 12 started joining them as a result of what had happened to their 13 families, and the guerillas grew bigger, they became much more 14 sophisticated in their fighting, and by the end of 1981, had a 15 real army. So I would say that in 1981, you were in full 16 civil war. 17 Q. All right. I think that's what I asked. 18 A. Uh-huh. 19 Q. And when did the civil war, so to speak, start, in '79 20 or '80? 21 A. No, I think the civil war started at the end of 1980. 22 Q. Okay. 23 A. I think really with the murder of the FDR leaders, that 24 was the end of any possible civil rights protest that was 25 peaceful. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1165 1 Q. Now, also, when you made your chart yesterday and you 2 gave the names of certain groups, you put the name of the 3 FMLN, did you not? 4 A. Uh-huh. 5 Q. And then you said something about later on it became 6 composed of five particular groups, but you didn't need -- 7 A. Earlier it was -- there were five small guerilla 8 factions, quite small, that subsequently united in November of 9 1980 into one armed organization that was called the FMLN. 10 Q. And who were the -- who were the groups that united 11 together, what were the names of the groups? 12 A. One was called the FPL, one was called the ERP, one was 13 called the -- I'm just going to say their acronyms, it gets 14 too complied, the PRTC, one was the RN and the other was the 15 communist party. 16 Q. And when these groups became consolidated and became an 17 army, so to speak. What interest, if any, did the United 18 States have in helping El Salvador or not helping El Salvador 19 in supplying anything to El Salvador, if there was any 20 interest in the United States or concerns in the United 21 States? 22 A. There was a change in policy in 1981 when the Reagan 23 administration came into power, and it took a strong position 24 that it wanted to militarily defeat the FMLN, that was the 25 position of the Reagan administration. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1166 1 Q. Now, why was that, if you know, what would be the 2 reasons why the Reagan administration was interested in not 3 letting the FMLN or these other groups that have joined in 4 have control of the country? 5 A. Well, they identified the FMLN in the view of the 6 Reagan administration as an armed communist movement. That 7 was how it was defined by the Reagan administration initially. 8 As I said, other countries defined it as a legitimate 9 belligerent, so there was a difference of opinion. The Reagan 10 administration at the beginning felt that they were the 11 greatest threat to order in El Salvador, but by 1983, they had 12 changed that view and thought that the military and the 13 extremists and the death squads were the greatest threat, 14 which is why Vice-president Bush came to El Salvador. So 15 there were different -- they came in with one view and they 16 changed their view. 17 Q. What did the United States do in support of El 18 Salvador, according to your knowledge, did they -- 19 A. Military aid to the Salvadoran military. 20 Q. Did they supply military supplies? 21 A. Yes. 22 Q. Did they supply economic -- 23 A. Support, funds. 24 Q. -- support? 25 A. Uh-huh. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1167 1 Q. Do you know what economic support the United States 2 supplied to El Salvador during that period of time? 3 A. It actually wasn't so great. It wasn't so great from 4 '81 through '83 because the issue of giving money to the 5 Salvadoran military security forces was a tremendously 6 controversial issue particularly after the four nuns were 7 murdered. When the aid really sky rocketed was in 1984 after 8 the Bush trip in which he basically said no aid unless the 9 number of human rights abuses go down. The number of human 10 rights abuses did go down in '84, and aid picked up 11 enormously, and it reached the level of a million dollars a 12 day, which in a little tiny country like El Salvador is a huge 13 amount of money, huge. 14 Q. It was actually the most amount of any money supplied 15 to Central American countries, wasn't it? 16 A. That's right. 17 Q. And with regard to military advisors, do you know how 18 many military advisors? 19 A. Well, officially Congress limited -- the original -- 20 the original position of the Reagan administration was that it 21 wanted to actually militarily land troops in El Salvador, and 22 that was defeated in Congress. There was no support for U. S. 23 troops in El Salvador, and there was a limit put on -- 24 formally on U. S. military advisors so as not to get involved 25 in this conflict, not to get U. S. troops involved in this CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1168 1 conflict, and that limit was 56. In fact, the number was 2 higher. 3 Q. So all the advisors that were supposed to be in El 4 Salvador that were military advisors in support of the 5 Salvadoran military were 56? 6 A. That was the official number. 7 Q. All right. So was there an unofficial number then that 8 was actually in El Salvador? 9 A. Well, it was a well-known secret that there were all 10 kinds of people attached to the embassy that were not there as 11 official military advisors, but were, in fact, official 12 military advisors, and so I actually don't know what the 13 number reached. And I should say that that is a well guarded 14 secret. In fact, people who -- we don't actually know how 15 many U. S. military personnel died in El Salvador because some 16 of that information has never been made public. 17 Q. Now, we've talked about the FMLN, and that they became 18 an armed force in El Salvador, what did they do? In other 19 words, what activities did they engage in in El Salvador that 20 you learned and you either saw or heard about or read about? 21 A. Well, they tried to develop -- they were very young, I 22 mean to say, when I went into the guerilla zones, they were 23 referred to as los muchachitos or los muchachos, which means 24 the boys. Their average age couldn't have been -- of the 25 actual guerilla troops, couldn't have been more than 15 or 16, CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1169 1 although the commanders were older. I mean they were really 2 young, and the first thing that the FMLA did was to try to 3 teach people how to shoot and how to be an army, so I did see 4 them train. They also had to hide because the military would 5 kill them. I saw them train. I wanted to know where they got 6 their weapons from and how they equipped themselves. And in 7 my trips -- and I also wanted to know how they recruited, 8 which was an important thing, whether you could recruit or not 9 and how you recruited. And so I spent some time in the 10 guerilla zones trying to answer those questions. 11 Q. And what activities did they engage in in El Salvador, 12 in other words, other than just fighting the military, what 13 else did they do? 14 A. They -- by, I believe, 1981 or 2, they had defined in 15 their view certain parts of the infrastructure as a legitimate 16 war target, which meant that they hit telecommunication 17 centers which they considered as part of the spy unit of the 18 military. They had a spectacular bombing of a bridge. They 19 hit -- they would go into plantation areas where -- there were 20 huge plantations for growing coffee or cotton, they would go 21 into these areas and they would tax, that's their language, 22 quote, tax the owners by saying we will not attack your crops 23 if you -- if you pay your workers more, and they also, I 24 believe, extracted funds from landowners to not attack crops. 25 That was part of the way they raised their money. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1170 1 Q. What about in addition -- 2 A. I should say it is a very effective tactic, because a 3 coffee plant takes five years to produce, so if you pull it 4 out of the ground, you're hurting somebody for five years, it 5 is a very effective thing to do. 6 Q. Well, you talked about some of the atrocities that the 7 military committed, what about atrocities that the FMLN 8 committed on the civilian population, not just the 9 infrastructure, but on the civilian population, what do you 10 know and what did you learn about that? 11 A. I think yesterday, I talked about the ERP, which was 12 one faction, and I view it as the faction that committed most 13 of the human rights abuses on the side of the guerillas. It 14 adopted a policy of killing civilian mayors of ARENA of the 15 party of Robert D'Abuisson. It was -- there was a huge outcry 16 after this policy, and the other guerilla organizations and 17 human rights organizations succeeded in pressuring them to 18 stop. But they killed -- they did adopt as a policy the same 19 policy the Salvadoran military, which they killed the ARENA 20 mayors and the Salvadory military killed the Christian 21 democratic mayors. So it was not safe to be a mayor. 22 Q. Do you know how many mayors were either assassinated or 23 killed by the FMLN? 24 A. I don't know the exact number. In the 22,000 25 complaints that I showed you that are the formal complaints of CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1171 1 the Truth Commission, five percent of those complaints are 2 attributed to the FMLN, so that would be five percent of 3 22,000. 4 Q. Did you learn that the mayors of villages would ask for 5 military aid to protect themselves from -- 6 A. In villages that were controlled by the right, by 7 ARENA, say, they would, in fact, petition the military, and 8 they would particularly do that in areas where there were 9 strong civil defense units or the paramilitaries that I talked 10 about earlier. So, yes, they did, in areas where the 11 Christian democrats were in power, they would not ask for 12 military protection until actually much later because the 13 military had killed so many Christian democrats. So it 14 depended on who you were, whether you were with the military 15 or afraid of the military. 16 MR. FARGARSON: Just a moment. Your Honor, may 17 I approach the witness? 18 THE COURT: Certainly, certainly. 19 BY MR. FARGARSON: 20 Q. Ms. Karl, I've handed you a booklet, I guess I would 21 say, and ask you if you have ever seen that, read it or can 22 identify it as being a book that depicts activities of the 23 FMLN and certain photographs? 24 A. I believe that I saw it on your list of documents, but 25 I have actually never seen this particular document. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1172 1 Q. Well, would you take a look at it and tell if you can, 2 in reviewing it and looking at the material in it, and you can 3 take your time, if that is an accurate document or an 4 inaccurate document, whether it purports to be truthful or 5 purports to be false? 6 MR. ESQUIVEL: Objection, Your Honor, the 7 document is hearsay and inadmissible. 8 THE COURT: Objection sustained. 9 MR. FARGARSON: Okay. 10 A. It has no publication, there is no way to know what it 11 is. 12 THE COURT: I agree. There is a certain way 13 that certain documents can be used, but there's some 14 predicate questions that have to be asked to determine 15 that. For example, you can use an established learned 16 treatise like you use a medical book in a medical case, 17 there might be an author who wrote extensively in this 18 area, and that can be used to ask another question or a 19 question of another expert. I want to explain that to the 20 jury because it is a little confusing, I want you to 21 understand there is a particular way in which these things 22 can be utilized. 23 MR. FARGARSON: Let me just ask a couple of 24 more questions about the author and about the book. 25 THE COURT: Absolutely. CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1173 1 BY MR. FARGARSON: 2 Q. Do you know the author of this book, Bruce B. Jones? 3 A. I do not. 4 Q. Okay. And you have not read the book to know whether 5 it's -- 6 A. I didn't see it until you handed it to me, but it has 7 no publisher or publication or anything that would allow me to 8 identify it. 9 Q. Okay. Let me talk with you few minutes about the Truth 10 Commission report. Let me get the Truth Commission report. 11 Now, you have read the Truth Commission report, haven't you? 12 A. Yes, sir. 13 Q. And you did participate in some hearings regarding the 14 Truth Commission report? 15 A. No, sir. 16 Q. Did I understand that, that you were -- 17 A. No. 18 Q. Oh, I'm sorry. 19 A. No, I did not. 20 Q. What input did you have into the Truth Commission 21 report? 22 A. I helped produce a document on the organization of the 23 death squads. That document is not part of the Truth 24 Commission, and I did not do it for the Truth Commission, I 25 guess I should be clear about this. The Truth Commission CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1174 1 resolved that it was important to know more about the whole 2 death squad apparatus since it was easier to disband formal 3 troops, but how would you know whether you had actually 4 disbanded death squads, and after the Truth Commission, there 5 was a joint commission to compile information on death squads, 6 and I participated in that. So I didn't participate in the 7 Truth Commission at all. 8 Q. Well, are you reasonably familiar with the Truth 9 Commission report and know that Mr. Carranza's name is not 10 mentioned in there except one time? 11 A. I am familiar with it, yes. 12 Q. And that one time that his name is mentioned in there 13 is what, if you remember? 14 A. Actually, I thought he was never mentioned in the Truth 15 Commission, so I am not sure what the one time is. I -- the 16 Truth Commission in the period of time that Mr. Carranza -- 17 Colonel Carranza was in power has actually very little 18 information. There's several cases from 1980, and there's 19 only one case from 1983, so the bulk of the Truth Commission 20 really -- the overwhelming -- the Truth Commission is about 21 250 pages, and I think about 10 percent of that covers the 22 period of time where Colonel Carranza was in power. What it 23 does say, because it was hardest to find information in those 24 early years, it was the most difficult years to research, it 25 does not place responsibility on Colonel Carranza by name, it CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1175 1 places responsibility on the state, which includes the 2 ministry of defense for virtually, I believe, all of the 1980 3 murders. 4 Q. The only reference to his name is on page 253 where it 5 says Colonel Nicolas Carranza, director of the treasury police 6 announced that his forces had captured one member of a squad, 7 though no name was given. And that's the only mention of his 8 name, so you're correct, it isn't in there any other place -- 9 A. Well, except that in the murder of the massacre of San 10 Francisco Guajoyo and the murder of the six FDR leaders and 11 the church women's murders and in the murder of two law 12 students that were taken out of the parking lot of the U. S. 13 Embassy, it clearly says that the state is responsible. And 14 by that, they are naming the top officials of the state, which 15 is the high command, and particularly the defense ministry, so 16 that is how the Truth Commission dealt with responsibility in 17 those early years. It says the state has the responsibility 18 for these murders. 19 Q. But there are names in the Truth Commission of people 20 who did commit human rights violations, who did commit 21 murders? 22 A. They are overwhelmingly of much lower level people, and 23 they are overwhelmingly -- so when it is a high level, it says 24 the state. And by that, they mean, again, the leaders of the 25 state. The names that you see in the Truth Commission are CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1176 1 generally lower level, although not always. And if you look 2 at the people who are actually named in the period of time 3 when Colonel Carranza has actually served, what you do see is 4 an extraordinary pattern, and that is that certain people who 5 were captured at San Luis Finca and who were in the armed 6 forces -- San Luis Finca is the conspiracy in May, 1980, where 7 a number of military officers are found with these documents 8 and the scopes, the night scopes and the masks and they are 9 arrested, and arrested when Colonel Carranza is the 10 vice-minister of defense. Among those people who are arrested 11 are a number of names that subsequently are named in the Truth 12 Commission. If, in fact, the people who have been arrested in 13 San Luis Finca had been investigated and had been prosecuted 14 for the kinds of activities they were doing. They included 15 someone who was named in the murder of Arch Bishop Romero, 16 they included Colonel Carranza's assistant who he brought with 17 him from La Union where he was before he was the 18 vice-minister, a Colonel Elmar Gonzales Araujo who was found 19 in San Luis Finca, who had been brought by Colonel Carranza 20 and who was named as the leader of the Las Hojas massacre in 21 1983. He was also named in a huge scandal in the United 22 States in which Salvadoran -- he was named for receiving a 23 bribe in which Salvadoran military officers were buying 24 inferior bullets from Yugoslavia, repackaging them so they 25 looked like they came from the United States and sending bad CROSS - TERRY LYNN KARL 1177 1 bullets to their own troops. Napoleon Alvarado was named, and 2 he was also in San Luis Finca, and he later is named for 3 covering up massacres. I believe that there are people other 4 named Eduardo Avila, who -- excuse me, I said Colonel Elmar 5 Gonzales was with Colonel Carranza, I meant to say that 6 Eduardo Avila was with Colonel Carranza in La Union, pardon 7 me, and he is the one that moved into logistics in the 8 ministry of defense with Colonel Carranza. He was caught in 9 San Luis Finca. He is the person who was accused by name of 10 trying to kill Colonel Majano, the reformist, and he's the 11 person named for the murder of two U. S. advisors in the 12 Sheraton Hotel and the head of the land reform. So in my 13 view, the people who were named show that had there been 14 action against military officers who were caught inside San 15 Luis Finca with damming evidence that they were involved with 16 death squad activities, these subsequent actions would not 17 have happened. That's why I think that the lack of activity 18 is actually a green light for further abuses. These people, 19 virtually every one, every military officer in the San Luis 20 Finca raid went on to commit very egregious human rights 21 abuses, and one of them was named in the murder of Arch Bishop 22 Romero. 23 Q. Was that the answer to my question as to whether Mr. 24 Carranza's name in there, that answers my question? 25 A. That does, s