AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION

REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES

 

 

REPORT ON TORTURE

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

The use of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by United States personnel in the interrogation of prisoners captured in the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts has brought shame to the nation and undermined our standing in the world.  While the U.S. government has acknowledged, and is moving to punish, the acts at Abu Ghraib that have been documented on videotape, there are still substantial, fundamental concerns that must be addressed regarding U.S. interrogation policy and the treatment of detainees. 

 

            The U.S. government maintains that its policies comport with the requirements of law, and that the violations at Abu Ghraib represent isolated instances of individual misconduct, but news reports now make clear that those violations are part of a widespread pattern of abusive detention methods.   Executive Branch memoranda were developed to justify interrogation procedures that are in conflict with long-held interpretations and understandings of the reach of treaties and laws governing treatment of detainees.  Furthermore, those legal interpretations do not represent sound policy, and not only risk undercutting the government’s ability to assert any high moral ground in its “war on terrorism”, but also put Americans at risk of receiving treatment by governments and others who need only cite U.S. actions as a pretext for their own inappropriate conduct.

 

            Beyond the legal arguments, the American public has still not been informed of the extent to which prisoners have been abused, tortured or rendered to foreign governments which are known to abuse and torture prisoners.  The investigations under way to identify who is accountable for prisoner abuse are moving slowly, and it is not clear that the scope of the various investigations will encompass all who should be in focus.  There is as yet no clear rendering of whom the U.S government is detaining, where they are, what are the conditions of their detention and interrogation, which agency and personnel are exercising authority over them, who made the decisions regarding U.S. detention policy, and what, precisely, is the U.S policy toward treatment of detainees.

 

            It is incumbent upon the American Bar Association to urge that the U.S. government stop the torture and abuse of detainees, investigate violations of law and prosecute those who committed, authorized or condoned those violations, and assure that detention and interrogation practices adhere faithfully to the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States and related customary international law.

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

In conducting military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in undertaking other actions in relation to the “war on terrorism”, the United States has detained large numbers of persons believed to be involved in activities in furtherance of terrorism or in opposition to U.S. military actions.  There was great interest in obtaining information from these detainees regarding upcoming actions against U.S. forces and planned terrorist attacks.  From the outset, questions were raised regarding the extent to which United States personnel could go to extract information from detainees[1]. High-level legal memoranda dating from early 2002[2] sketched out the legal positions which could be advanced to defend interrogation techniques which had not previously been considered as legal or appropriate for use by U.S. personnel and were beyond standard military doctrine.[3]

 

Allegations of the use of interrogation techniques long considered to be torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment began to surface in connection with interrogations of persons captured during the conflict in Afghanistan.  The first public acknowledgement of these allegations came in December 2002, when the U.S. military announced that it had begun a criminal investigation into the death of a 22 year-old Afghan farmer and part-time taxi driver who had died of “blunt force injuries to lower extremities complicating coronary artery disease” while in U.S. custody at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan.[4] 

 

The American public has now learned that in December, 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld approved a series of harsh questioning techniques for use in Guantanamo, that the techniques beyond those employed previously, including use of dogs to scare prisoners, were authorized in Iraq, and that only after the Abu Ghraib scandal brought U.S. interrogation procedures into public view was there a substantial scaling back of the authorized techniques in Iraq.[5]  In addition, while the Department of Defense (“DOD”) exercises control over thousands of detainees, the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) is conducting a secret detention operation, including an extensive program in Afghanistan.[6]  While the details of this operation are not being disclosed, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has admitted to keeping the identity of a suspect secret, and hiding him from the International Red Cross, at the request of the CIA.[7]

 

Allegations of abusive techniques reportedly being practiced by DOD and CIA personnel at U.S. detention facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan include:  forcing detainees to stand or kneel for hours in black hoods or spray-painted goggles, 24-hour bombardment with lights, “false-flag” operations meant to deceive a captive about his whereabouts, withholding painkillers from wounded detainees, confining detainees in tiny rooms, binding in painful positions, subjecting detainees to loud noises, and sleep deprivation.[8]  In addition, the U.S. is reportedly “rendering” suspects to the custody of foreign intelligence services in countries where the practice of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment during interrogation is well-documented.[9]

 

The abusive treatment of detainees became consistent front-page news in April, 2004, when videotapes circulated showing extensive torture and abusive treatment by United States personnel of detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad.  These disclosures were followed by further charges of severe mistreatment by former detainees in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Guantanamo Naval Base.  Military sources indicate that over 30 prisoners have died in U.S. custody[10] and military officials have acknowledged two prisoner deaths they consider to be homicides and are investigating another 12 deaths.[11] Prison guards charged that intelligence officers told them to “soften up” the Iraqi prisoners, with no explanation as to what that meant.[12] Over 100 cases of misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan have now been reported.[13]

 

As the Department of Defense and the CIA were preparing and implementing their approach to interrogations, a series of memoranda were being prepared by various high-ranking legal officials in the Executive Branch which appear designed to provide a legal basis for going beyond established policies with regard to treatment of detainees.  These memoranda set out a series of arguments for restrictive interpretation of the laws and treaties relevant to the subject, so as to greatly curb their effect.  One example, in the August 1, 2002 memorandum from the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel to Alberto R. Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, (recently rescinded by the Justice Department) concluded that for an act to constitute torture as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2340, “it must inflict pain that is difficult to endure”, “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.”[14]

 

Beyond their strained interpretation of the law, the memoranda attempted to craft an overall insulation from liability by arguing that the President has the authority to ignore any law or treaty that the President believes interferes with the President’s Article II power as Commander-in-Chief.  In one such example, government lawyers argued that, for actions taken with respect to “the President’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign, 18 U.S.C. Section 2340A (the prohibition against torture) must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority.” [15]

 

            These documents,[16] which were released publicly after they were widely leaked, chart the course for an aggressive effort to extract information from detainees using means not previously sanctioned.  Unfortunately, they also appear to have justified a culture in which prisoner abuse became widespread.

 

            The Administration has acknowledged that the conduct that was featured in the Abu Ghraib tapes violated the law, and pledged that those who committed the violations would be brought to justice.  In addition, at least six investigations are under way with regard to the abuse of detainees.[17]  However, there is no indication that these investigations will be concluded anytime soon, nor is it clear that the investigations are being conducted by officers and agencies with the scope and authority to reach all those who should be held responsible.

 

LEGAL STANDARDS

 

The Convention Against Torture

 

The United States’ obligation to prohibit and prevent the torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees in its custody is set forth in the Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment (“CAT”), to which the U.S. is a party.[18]  

 

Under CAT, there are no exceptional circumstances that warrant torture, and extradition or other rendering of a person to a country that would likely subject that person to torture is prohibited. The United Nations Committee Against Torture, created by CAT, monitors implementation of CAT, considers country reports and issues decisions.

 

            When the U.S. ratified CAT in 1994, it did so subject to a reservation providing that the U.S. would prevent “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” insofar as such treatment is prohibited under the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments.[19]  Thus, the U.S. is obligated to prevent not only torture, but also conduct considered cruel, inhuman or degrading under international law if such conduct is also prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

 

In interpreting U.S. obligations, we look to the U.N. Committee Against Torture’s interpretations of CAT as well as U.S. case law decided in the immigration and asylum law context, under the Alien Tort Claims and Torture Victim Protection Acts and concerning the treatment of detainees and prisoners under the Fifth, Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.  Under these interpretations, measures such as severe sleep deprivation, the threat of torture, and forcing someone to sleep on the floor of a cell while handcuffed following interrogation constitutes torture[20] The U.N. Committee found such measures as physical restraints in very painful conditions, being hooded, and using cold air to chill – all measures of which United States interrogators are accused – constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. [21]

 

The United States’ attempt to comply with its obligation under CAT to criminalize torture is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.  Section 2340A criminalizes conduct by a U.S. national or a foreign national present in the U.S. who, acting under color of law, commits or attempts to commit torture outside the United States.  The statute is exclusively criminal and may not be construed as creating any right enforceable in a civil proceeding.   Section 2340A generally applies to acts committed by U.S. nationals overseas (everywhere except “all areas under the jurisdiction of the United States, including any of the places described in sections 5 and 7 of this title and Section 46501(2) of Title 49.”)  When the Section was enacted the reach of the cross-referenced provisions, notably 18 U.S.C. § 7, was uncertain.[22]  However, Section 7 was broadened in the USA PATRIOT Act to clarify jurisdiction over crimes committed against U.S. citizens on U.S. property abroad by extending U.S. criminal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed at its foreign diplomatic, military and other facilities, and by cross-reference excluded those places from the reach of Section 2340A. 

Section 2340A defines torture to be any “act committed by a person acting under color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain…”  The Administration has interpreted this “specific intent” language to virtually eliminate its use against torturers:  [E]ven if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions, if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite specific intent even though the defendant did not act in good faith.”[23]  So long as the purpose is to get information, this interpretation suggests that any means may be used.  This language clearly needs to be restricted to facilitate federal torture prosecutions.

The U.S. did not enact a specific criminal statute outlawing torture within the United States, out of deference to federal-state relations and because it determined that existing federal and state criminal law was sufficient to cover any domestic act that would qualify as torture under CAT.[24]  It is submitted that the inapplicability of state law to U.S. facilities abroad and the lack of other federal criminal law comparable to Section 2340A leaves a serious vacuum in carrying out the obligations of the U.S. under CAT that must be filled.  Unfortunately the U.S. has never enforced 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, and has thereby fallen far short of its obligations under international law and its professed ideals.  It has failed to utilize the statute to prosecute either U.S. agents suspected of committing torture outside the jurisdiction of the U.S. or foreign torturers living within the United States.  [25]

The Uniform Code of Military Justice may be used to prosecute in courts-martial certain acts of ill-treatment carried out, whether in the United States or overseas, by American military personnel and possibly certain civilians, such as CIA agents, accompanying such personnel.  The UCMJ is the most substantively extensive body of federal criminal law relating to interrogation of detainees by U.S. military personnel.  The UCMJ prohibits such persons from subjecting detainees to torture and “cruel or unusual punishment” within or without the United States and regardless of the applicability of the constitutional rights exception of CAT.

 

The Geneva Conventions

 

Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (“Geneva III”) flatly prohibits “any form of coercion” of POWs in interrogation – the most protective standard of treatment found in international law.  Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (“Geneva IV”) protects “civilian” detainees who qualify as “protected persons” from “coercion.”[26]

 

The U.S., Iraq and Afghanistan are all parties to the Geneva Conventions. Article 2 common to all four Conventions provides that the Conventions “apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict” between two or more parties to the Conventions so long as a state of war is recognized by a party to the conflict.  The Conventions also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a signatory, even if the occupation meets with no armed resistance.  See Geneva Conventions, Art. 2.  Signatories to the Conventions are bound by its terms regardless of whether an additional party to the conflict is a signatory.  Id. 

 

The requirements of humane treatment embodied in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I protect all detainees captured in situations of international or internal armed conflict, regardless of “legal” status.[27]  Of course, all detainees - including those captured outside of Afghan territory or in connection with the “War on Terror” - are entitled to the protection provided by human rights law, including CAT, the ICCPR and customary international law.

 

The Administration’s official position is that the Geneva Conventions apply to the War in Afghanistan[28] and the occupation of Iraq,[29] but do not apply to Al Qaeda detainees, and that neither the Taliban nor Al Qaeda detainees are entitled to prisoner of war (“POW”) status thereunder (initially, the Administration’s position was that the Geneva Convention did not apply to the Taliban, but it relented, except with regard to withholding POW status).[30]   The legal underpinning of this approach is found in the internal government documents dating from early 2002 cited above.[31]  The purposes of this analysis were to preserve maximum flexibility with the least restraint by international law and to immunize government officials from prosecution under the War Crimes Act, which renders certain violations of the Geneva Conventions violations of U.S. criminal law.

 

The Administration has stated that it is treating Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees “humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949,” and that the detainees “will not be subjected to physical or mental abuse or cruel treatment.”[32]  However, the Administration has never explained how it determines what interrogation techniques are “appropriate” or “consistent with military necessity,” or how it squares that determination with U.S. obligations under human rights and customary international law. 

 

Furthermore, the Administration’s approach raises serious issues regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions in the War on Terror, notably the minimal protections of Common Article 3 and the actual standards applied in the field.  The internal Administration memoranda argue that Common Article 3 does not apply at all to Al Qaeda’s activities in the Afghanistan conflict because, inasmuch as Al Qaeda operated cross-border and with support from persons in countries outside Afghanistan, that conflict is not an armed conflict of a non-international character within the meaning of Article 3.  In fact, the Geneva Conventions are structured in terms of international armed conflicts (between State parties) and non-international (non-inter-State) conflict.  There is no indication that there is any category of armed conflict that is not covered by the Geneva Conventions.[33]  The Geneva Conventions apply to the totality of a conflict including the regular forces, irregulars (whether or not privileged combatants) and civilians.

 

With respect to interrogation in armed conflict, Common Article 3 requires humane treatment generally and specifically forbids “cruel treatment and torture” or “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.”  Such provisions were violated not only by the conduct photographed at Abu Ghraib, but also by practices reported to have been engaged in at other U.S. facilities in Iraq, and, if reports are accurate, also from the conflict in Afghanistan.

 

The U.S. has acknowledged that its presence in Iraq is an “occupation” within the meaning of Geneva IV.[34]  The U.S., as occupying power, is consequently subject to provisions for the benefit of “protected persons,”[35] including Article 31’s prohibition of “physical or moral coercion to obtain information from them or third parties”.[36]  Should the occupation be considered terminated, in any armed conflict that may continue between remaining U.S. armed forces in Iraq and Iraqi resistance – a non-international (non-state) armed conflict – the minimal protections of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions would apply.

 

It is clear that not only the abuses in Abu Ghraib but also certain practices contemplated by the “Interrogation Rules of Engagement”[37]  – such as extended sleep deprivation and stressful positions – amount to “physical or moral coercion” and are, therefore, violations of Geneva IV.[38]

 

U.S. military authorities maintain that interrogation of certain detainees possessing “high value intelligence” does not have to comply with certain restrictions of Geneva IV because of an exception provided in Article 5 of Geneva IV with respect to persons who threaten the security of a state so – called “security detainees”.[39]  This view is based on a misinterpretation of the plain meaning and purpose of Article 5.

 

Article 5 provides for two categories of temporary exceptions to certain of its standards in the case of detainees who are definitely suspected of being threats to the security of a Party.  The first paragraph of Article 5 provides that “where in the territory of a Party to the conflict,” that Party determines that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of, or engaged in, activities hostile to the security of the State, the Party can suspend that person’s rights and privileges under Geneva IV, where the exercise of such rights are prejudicial to the security of the State.[40]  The plain language of this paragraph limits a Party’s ability to suspend certain protections of Geneva IV to situations where a party to the conflict determines that a protected person is posing a security risk in that party’s territory.  Accordingly, this paragraph plainly has no application to protected persons detained by the U.S. in Iraq, because such detainees are not persons posing a security risk in the territory of the United States.[41] 

 

The second exception[42] applicable to occupation permits the Occupying Power, where absolute military necessity so requires, to temporarily deny “rights of communication” – but no other rights – for a person detained as a spy or saboteur or as a threat to the security of the Occupying Power.  Therefore, during occupation, even detainees who pose a security risk to the Occupying Power have the same protection against coercion as any other detainee.

 

Application of Geneva Conventions and the Anti-Torture Statute to Civilians

 

The War Crimes Act[43] criminalizes as a “war crime” the commission in the U.S. or abroad of a “grave breach” of the Geneva Conventions, violation of Common Article 3, and certain other international offenses, where the perpetrator or the victim is a member of the Armed Forces or a U.S. national.  (With respect to the military, given the other recourse against active service members, the statute applies only to those who may have been discharged before prosecution and therefore were outside the jurisdiction of courts martial or who are being prosecuted jointly with civilians.)

 

The jurisdictional basis for enforcing the War Crimes Act against civilian contractors or others “accompanying” the Armed Forces outside the U.S. is likely to be the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”).[44]  Indeed, the Department of Justice has recently announced that it is asserting jurisdiction under this statute to open a criminal investigation regarding a civilian contractor in Iraq.  A significant issue under MEJA is whether a contractor was “employed” by the Armed Forces (expressly within the Act), was employed by a contractor serving the Armed Forces or was employed by the CIA.  In the latter cases, the reach of MEJA would depend on whether the defendant was “accompanying” the Armed Forces, a factual matter in the circumstances.

 

Other International Legal Standards which Bind the United States

 

International law offers guidance in interpreting CAT.  Some of these international legal standards are, without question, binding on the U.S., such as:  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ICCPR”),[45] the law of jus cogens and customary international law.  The Human Rights Committee established under the ICCPR has found prolonged solitary confinement, threatening a victim with torture, and repeated beatings to violate the Covenant’s prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.[46]  Other sources, such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,[47] also provide guidance.

 

Customary international law has long prohibited the state practice of torture, without reservation, in peace or in wartime.[48]  On December 9, 1975, the United Nations General Assembly adopted by consensus the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Punishment.[49]  The Torture Resolution together with CAT and the ICCPR – ratified by 133 and 151 States, respectively – embody the customary international law obligation to refrain from behavior which constitutes torture.[50]  The prohibition of torture is, moreover, one of the few norms which has attained peremptory norm or jus cogens status, and is recognized as such by United States courts.[51]  Jus cogens is defined as a peremptory norm “accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”[52]  While many international agreements expressly prohibit both torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,[53] it remains an open question as to whether jus cogens status extends to the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.  What is clear, however, is that cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment is prohibited by customary international law.

RECOMMENDATIONS

 

1.               The ABA must condemn the torture and abusive treatment of detainees under U.S. control.  That such a resolution is required at all reflects that this nation’s detention policies have lost their moral compass.  Instead of finding ways to justify this treatment, our government must be standing tall before the world in condemning it, punishing all those responsible, no matter how high up, and taking steps to assure the world that this disgraceful behavior will not happen again.

 

2.               The United States government must ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and related customary international law.  In doing so, it should accept the time-honored interpretations of these instruments.  They were designed to stop torture, not to stimulate an effort to narrow their scope beyond common sense meaning.  The Administration should fully renounce the misguided interpretations found in its internal memoranda and clearly state a policy for treatment of detainees that would restore this nation’s standing among the countries of the world.

 

3.               The United States should recognize its responsibility to treat detainees in accordance with standards it would consider legal if perpetrated against an American prisoner.  The mistreatment of detainees has undermined the U.S.’s best arguments for the humane treatment of American personnel captured by an enemy.

 

4.               The United States must not render detainees to nations which are known to practice prisoner torture and abuse.  Rendering not only violates all basic humanitarian standards, but violates treaty obligations which make clear that a nation cannot avoid its obligations by having other nations conduct unlawful interrogations for us.

 

5.               The U.S. government must honor and implement fully the four Geneva Conventions.  It must acknowledge the applicability of Common Article 3 to all armed conflicts.  There are no “black holes” in the Conventions’ scheme.  Similarly, the Administration must acknowledge the very limited reach of the security exception of Article 5, and understand that the protections in the Convention are substantial, such that no POW’s may be coerced in any way.  The U.S. government should adhere to Geneva III’s requirement that any detainee whose POW status is in “doubt” is entitled to POW status — and, therefore, cannot be subjected to coercive treatment — until a competent tribunal, which must be convened promptly, determines otherwise.[54]

 

6.               18 U.S.C. Section 2340 must be amended in two significant ways.  First, Section 2340(1) should be revised to delete the reference to “specific intent” in the definition of torture, which the Administration has relied upon to assert that a jailer or interrogator would not be liable for causing egregious harm if the perpetrator of the severe torture can show he was not trying to harm, but only to extract information.  That interpretation truly makes a mockery of all the United States purports to stand for regarding human rights.  Second, consistent with its obligation under Article 4 of CAT to ensure that all acts of torture are offenses under its criminal law[55] – and since 18 U.S.C. § 2340 does not, by its terms, apply to acts constituting torture committed in extraterritorial detention centers under U.S. jurisdiction – the U.S. must expand the geographic reach of Section 2340 so that the prescriptions of CAT are applicable to torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment wherever committed.

 

7.               The U.S. government must investigate violations of law with regard to mistreatment of persons under its control and bring appropriate proceedings against those responsible.  Any individual who alleges that he or she has been subjected to torture must be provided with a meaningful opportunity to complain to, and to have his/her case promptly and impartially examined by, competent authorities.  Steps must be taken to ensure that the complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment and intimidation.  These investigations should be conducted by officials of sufficient authority to reach all those who committed, authorized or condoned such violations, whether they be uniformed or civilian personnel and regardless of the agency in which they work. 

 

8.               The depth of the prisoner abuse scandal is so great, and its ramifications so broad and lasting, that an independent investigation is necessary to identify how the practices evolved and the extent of the practices, and recommendations to assure they will not recur.  This investigation must go beyond criminal culpability to get at the root causes, and the policies and culture that could allow such extensive abuse to happen.

 

9.               The United States, as a State Party to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Unusual or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, must fulfill its reporting requirement to the United Nations Committee Against Torture under Article 19 of the Convention, reporting every four years on measures taken to give effect to its undertakings under the Convention.

 

10.            It is important to stress that these actions are necessary to protect American troops who may be detained by other nations who would be disinclined to honor their treaty commitments in light of the U.S. government’s failure to honor its own.  Furthermore, these actions are necessary to re-establish the nation’s credibility in asserting the rights of peoples everywhere.  The world’s most powerful nation must exercise its power on a moral platform.  That platform must be rebuilt, and quickly, in this rapidly changing world.    

 

CONCLUSION

 

There is an inherent tension between the need to obtain potentially life-saving information through interrogation of terrorist suspects and the legal requirements banning torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in a post-September 11^th world.  While we acknowledge the dangers posed to the United States by Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, we conclude that torture cannot be condoned.  Condoning torture under any circumstances erodes one of the most basic principles of international law and human rights and contradicts our values as a democratic state. Permitting the abuse of detainees in U.S. custody not only harms the detainees themselves; it compromises the moral framework of our interrogators and damages our society as a whole.  If U.S. personnel are allowed to engage in brutal interrogation methods which denigrate the dignity and humanity of detainees, we sanction conduct which we as a nation (along with the international community) have clearly determined is wrong and immoral.