UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

JANE DOE and JOHN DOE, . Civil A

Civil Action No. 1:04cv1361

Plaintiffs,

vs.

Alexandria, Virginia

January 28, 2005

YUSUF ABDI ALI, . 10:00 a.m.

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE LEONIE M. BRINKEMA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:

ROBERT R. VIETH, ESQ. Cooley Godward LLP One Freedom Square 11951 Freedom Drive Reston, VA 20190-5656

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

JOSEPH PETER DRENNAN, ESQ.

218 North Lee Street, Third Floor

Alexandria, VA 22314-2631

ALSO PRESENT:

YUSUF ABDI ALI

OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER:

ANNELIESE J. THOMSON, RDR, CRR U.S. District Court, Fifth Floor

401 Courthouse Square Alexandria, VA 22314

(703)299-8595

(Pages 1 - 15)

COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Civil Action 2004-1361, Jane Doe, et al. v.
Yusuf Abdi Ali. Counsel, please note your appearance for the
record.

A VOICE: Your Honor, we didn't hear the case.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

A VOICE: We didn't hear the case name, Your Honor.

THE COURT: It was Jane Doe v. Yusuf Abdi Ali, 04-1361.

A VOICE: Thank you, Your Honor. I'm sorry.

THE COURT: All right, counsel, note your appearance for the record.

MR. VIETH: Good morning, Your Honor. Robert Veith from Cooley Godward for plaintiffs.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. DRENNAN: Good morning, Your Honor. Joseph Peter

Drennan on behalf of the defendant, Yusuf Abdi Ali, who is present
before the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Now, there are two motions pending before the Court. The first is the plaintiffs' motion to proceed anonymously. The second is the defendant's motion to dismiss claims of anonymous plaintiffs.

I'm not going to hear argument on the plaintiffs' motion to proceed anonymously. I have apparently a similar case that Mr. Vieth is also of counsel for the plaintiffs. I think the appropriate -- given the nature of the allegations in this case

and the representations that I have no reason to look behind at this point that the plaintiffs believe that they would be subject to serious security problems in Somalia if their names were publicly revealed, I am going to allow the plaintiffs to proceed anonymously, with the caveat that their names will be revealed to both defense counsel and the defendant under a strict protective order that those names are not to be revealed beyond counsel for the defendant without explicit permission from the Court.

This therefore will in no way restrict the ability of the defendant to mount a defense and to conduct investigation, and I think that's the proper way of balancing the appropriate interests in this case. So that's consistent, as I recall, Mr. Vieth, with what I did in your other case.

MR. VIETH: It is, Your Honor, and thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Drennan, do you understand the parameters?

MR. DRENNAN: I do understand that we're so bound, Your Honor. However, I do feel obliged to mention, of course, there's no need for us, of course, to note exception to the ruling, but respectfully, we do. But beyond that -- and we'll honor that ruling.

However, the Court should know that there have been antecedent proceedings before Judge Poretz involving an inadvertent disclosure of Jane Doe's name in one paragraph of the complaint. That complaint has since been sealed.

THE COURT: Correct.

MR. DRENNAN: However, I just want the record to reflect that that name was known by my client, who was not bound by any order at that time. He has not to my knowledge, you know, indulged in much dissemination of the name. But that name was in a public document up until last Friday.

THE COURT: I'm aware of that, and I can caution you, because this affects the last case on my docket as well, that one of the ongoing problems that counsel have, and fortunately, we're not electronic yet in this district, but with electronic courts, and that's the way of the future, it is a devastating problem when these inadvertent mistakes are made because then it's potentially out on the net, and you can't bring it back in.

But in any pleadings that you-all file with the court, it's the burden -- and our local rule now requires it -- that counsel have the obligation of ensuring that any attachments to pleadings not contain personal identifiers, including, for example, the entire social security number, names of children, various other personal information that's in the local rule. That applies whether a case is proceeding anonymously or not, but particularly in this case, the burden is on counsel to appropriately redact any documents that you're filing publicly.

And because of the Fourth Circuit's view about sealing records in court, don't just think that because there's a piece of sensitive information, the entire document must therefore be

```
sealed. You'll be required to file either as the only copy of the court a redacted copy or a redacted copy for public dissemination and an unredacted copy under seal for record of the court -- of the case. But just be sensitive to that, especially with attachments that you put to your pleadings.
```

MR. DRENNAN: I understand, Your Honor. One brief point further to Your Honor's admonition, the record should also reflect that co-counsel, not Mr. Vieth's firm, but co-counsel for the plaintiffs did indeed post that initial iteration of the complaint on the Internet, and it was on the Internet for three months, until, until a couple of weeks ago.

THE COURT: All right. Well, that's the danger of that.

But I assume that plaintiff has not had any
repercussions from that, Mr. Vieth?

MR. VIETH: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

1.0

2.1

2.3

MR. VIETH: That's correct. And, Your Honor, if I may, one further follow-up, there is a third motion before the Court, and I raise it now, and it's a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint that corrects the problems that we've just discussed. I do believe that's on Your Honor's docket today. There's been no opposition.

THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you what: I think that was before Judge Poretz, but the way to handle it is simply to file a redacted version, unless you're trying to change something else.

1 MR. VIETH: No. 2 THE COURT: Just file the original complaint with whatever the name is blacked out so it can't be seen. 3 4 words, that's how this should be handled rather than a first 5 amended complaint. You're simply filing a redacted version of the original complaint. 6 7 Very well, Your Honor. MR. VIETH: 8 THE COURT: Unless you're trying to change something more substantive than that. 9 MR. VIETH: No, no. We have filed it just to correct an 10 inadvertent disclosure, and Judge Poretz's chambers advised me 11 12 that that was before Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Don't worry about it. I'm ruling on that 14 now. 15 MR. VIETH: Yes, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: The relief you're getting is leave of Court to substitute for the original complaint which is now under seal a 17 18 redacted version of that complaint. 19 MR. VIETH: Very well, Your Honor. 20 THE COURT: All right? 21 MR. VIETH: That's fine. We will do that, and I thank 22 you. 23 THE COURT: Thank you. All right.

Now, the second motion that's before the Court is the

defendant's motion to dismiss the claims of the plaintiffs, and

24

25

the defendant has raised various theories of defense, including arguments about statute of limitations.

2.0

Mr. Drennan, let me ask you this: My understanding of some of the statutes that are involved here is that there is a ten-year statute of limitations and that the ten years runs from the time the person would have entered the United States or at least with one of these statutes, if the person had resided continuously in a foreign nation where a similar cause of action might be able to be raised.

Now, my understanding from the record is that the defendant spent some time in Canada.

MR. DRENNAN: Two years, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you addressed at all the issue as to whether a similar forum would have been available in Canada?

MR. DRENNAN: Well, Your Honor, we did not -- in terms of our equitable tolling argument, just to, to clarify what may be some ambiguities going back and forth in the pleadings here, we agree that with regard to forum non conveniens, we have an affirmative in terms of proving that another forum would have been more convenient.

In terms of equitable tolling, our position is that the -- having raised statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, which we have by filing the motion to dismiss based on such ground and by lodging an answer raising that as an affirmative defense, that it's incumbent upon the defendant (sic)

to come forth and account as to why suit hasn't been filed for such a long period of time.

2.0

2.2

Some of these actions date back -- alleged actions date back over 20 years, i.e., to 1984, and we do concede in terms of the equitable tolling analysis, just to collapse the copious pleading that's gone back and forth, that equitable tolling would apply until the regime fell. The regime fell in 1991, and on that issue, we would note that although not clarified by the plaintiffs, the regime fell right around this time in 1991, January of 1991, and our position in our pleadings and here today is that that is when equitable tolling ceased.

My client per his declaration which was filed with the motion to dismiss accounts for all of his actions both antecedent to -- in terms of his whereabouts, antecedent to the fall of the regime and since the fall of the regime, and he has lived openly, per his declaration -- and this has not been gain said by the other side at all -- he's lived openly since 1991 either in Canada for two years, in the United States for nine years and eight months, and he was in Ethiopia for a period of two years in the mid-'90s.

Although we really didn't develop to the fullest extent that it could have perhaps been developed on the forum non conveniens argument, on the equitable tolling argument, there's no reason why on the, on the issues that are before the Court these plaintiffs could not have brought this action in Canada during

those two years.

Я

1.0

1.5

And this assertion by the plaintiffs that the statute only applies during the period within which the defendant is resident in the United States is premised on essentially two cases: the Marcos decision out of the Ninth Circuit and there's an Estate of Cabello, I believe, decision out of another jurisdiction that seizes upon some material in the Senate report that makes reference to presence in the United States as being the calculus upon which the running of the statute ought to be predicated. However, there's no Fourth Circuit authority on that point.

And we respectfully submit to the Court that the Court could take judicial notice that the courts in Canada are open and that they have a common law system and that they have open access to the courts just as we do, and if one tacks the two years that Mr. Ali was in Canada on the nine years and eight months that he's been in the United States, that carries it over the ten-year threshold, and therefore, this action is stale and untimely and not saved by equitable tolling.

And further, in regard to the issue of equitable tolling, Your Honor, we looked very carefully at the documentary evidence and the declaration of Mr. Ganzglass that was put before the Court to rebut our, our argument with regard to limitations, and Mr. Ganzglass very -- Mr. Ganzglass is a very well-known and respected attorney who has a good deal of knowledge, historic

knowledge about Somalia, but Mr. Ganzglass in his affidavit only admits to having been in Somaliland, the territory defined as Somaliland, once in the 1990s, and he does not give any unequivocal opinion as to this whole notion of how it was that these defendants were so -- or plaintiffs, rather, were so besieged by chaotic conditions there that they could not have conducted their investigation and initiated their action sooner.

In fact, the various reports that have been filed before the Court in this case and in the <u>Samantar</u> case reflect that the notion of Somalia as a contiguous singular entity is something of a misnomer, that since the early 1990s, i.e., shortly after the fall of the Barre regime, Somaliland was created by the Isaaq clan that these plaintiffs are reportedly members of, and there's no indication that they were at any risk to their personal safety and that they were able to -- or unable or precluded from investigating their claims and prosecuting their claims. They lived in a safe region of that country -- or what was a country. It's a failed state now.

And in further regard to that point, Your Honor, it bears mention that Mr. Ganzglass, there's no indication that he ever talked to these plaintiffs. Our system of justice is based on the individual, not the clan, and Mr. Ganzglass makes generic references to members of the Isaaq clan and talks about unsafe conditions in Mogadishu.

I would agree that if these plaintiffs lived in

Mogadishu, they would have a very credible equitable tolling claim because Mogadishu is indeed beset by clan violence. The new interim government that was just formed two months ago in Nairobi, Kenya, after many years of efforts among these clans that have been warring against each other -- indeed, my client participated in those efforts in the mid-1990s -- even after those clans have worked out all of their very deep and bitter conflicts amongst each other, they're still working out arrangements with warring clans and sub-clans in Mogadishu to be able to go back there in order to take up the reins of government and try to establish a government from whence there has not been a government for a decade and a half.

Я

2.0

2.2

And, Your Honor, in, in the -- in further regard to the motion -- or the opposition to the motion to dismiss that's premised on this equitable tolling argument, where is the declaration from these plaintiffs that they personally couldn't bring their lawsuit? Where is -- I don't mean to be persnickety about this, but where is there an indication that Mr. Ganzglass even read and studied the accusations that were made in the lawsuit? His affidavit or his declaration does not state that.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from Mr. Vieth on

the issue of equitable tolling.

MR. VIETH: Your Honor, it is, it is our position that we are here on a motion to dismiss in which the allegations of the complaint must be taken as true. And to be sure, the defendant

did file an affidavit in support of his motion to dismiss. We do not accept as true the statements in that affidavit. We have not had a chance to take any discovery on it. It may turn out to be true as far as his comings and goings are concerned.

1.0

2.3

However, the allegations of the complaint, even putting that aside, recite that the conditions in Somalia, all of Somalia, including Somaliland, were such that it would be unimaginable to file a complaint such as this even before 1997. I believe Your Honor must take that -- accept that as true for purposes of today's motion.

Mr. Drennan has talked a lot about the circumstances in Somalia. We in our moving papers or opposition papers have referred the Court to some reports and the like, but candidly, I don't think the Court is in a position today to make any definitive ruling about any of that. This is, this is essentially argument. Yet Mr. Drennan asks the Court to find as fact what the conditions in Mogadishu are like and how they compare to the conditions in the region of Somaliland. I think we're getting way ahead of ourselves here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I agree with you, this is a motion to dismiss, and the Court must be very deferential to the allegations in the complaint. At the same time, this is a relatively unique kind of complaint for a federal court. It's unique because, A, as I understand it, all of the plaintiffs are still in that area of the world.

MR. VIETH: Correct.

2.4

THE COURT: No. 2, the allegations that are at issue in this case are for conduct that occurred in the 1980s, and so the whole concept behind a statute of limitations is in part to do a balancing of interests. One of the interests, a significant one, is the ability of a defendant to marshall evidence to support a defense, and when charges are that old, for both sides it becomes very difficult to get evidence, and so that's why most causes of action have a statute of limitations.

The one in this case is extremely long, that is, the ten years, and then there are these various tolling provisions.

I think the most judicious approach to this is to allow some discovery on this issue, in other words, not to definitively resolve the statute of limitations issue. I am concerned among other things about whether or not the two-year hiatus in Canada would properly be something that has to be taken into consideration into whether or not equitable tolling applies here.

If it is correct that the defendant lived openly and wasn't hiding, so he could have been found relatively easily, and if, in fact, he was just as amenable to suit in Canada as he is here, I'm not so sure that the equitable tolling would save this case in that it's, what, three months or four months shy of the ten-year limit even giving you all the benefits of the --

MR. VIETH: Assuming that affidavit is true, I would agree that two years in Canada would put us over the limit. It is

```
our position that does not count against the statute of
1
 2
    limitations for this Court because he could not have been sued in
 3
    this Court when he was in Canada under any notion of personal
   jurisdiction.
 4
 5
              I understand Your Honor may be deferring a ruling on all
 6
   of this.
              I just wanted to let the Court know what our position is
    on it.
 7
              THE COURT: All right. And, in fact, what I'm going to
 8
9
   do, Mr. Drennan, is I'm not granting the motion to dismiss at this
10
   point for several reasons, one of which is I do want to find out
11
    if the U.S. Department of State is taking any position whatsoever.
12
              And, Mr. Vieth, have you heard anything back from them?
13
              MR. VIETH:
                          In the other case, I have not, Your Honor,
   nor in this case.
14
15
              THE COURT: All right, all right. Because I think,
16
    obviously, we have to make sure that the executive branch has had
17
    an opportunity to express its position given the nature of the
18
```

issues in this case.

I am comfortable, however, in giving you some definitive ruling in the sense that I do not find as a matter of law that this defendant would qualify for head of state immunity. I don't think he does.

MR. DRENNAN: We haven't made that argument.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: All right. Well, I just want to make sure if you -- we thought it was there by inference, and I want to make

it clear that I would not find that he would be protected in that 1 2 respect. 3 What I'm going to do is on the -- again, the issue about exhaustion, again, is too fact bound at this point in my view to 4 5 be proper. I'm going to deny the motion to dismiss without prejudice to the defendant's ability to raise any of the specific 6 issues in that motion at that time when there is a more fully 7 developed record. I think that's the appropriate way to proceed. 8 9 The statute of limitations issue, however, is of great 10 concern to the Court because of the length of time, and that one 11 can be renoticed at any time when both sides feel that adequate evidence has been developed in that respect. All right? 12 13 Thank you. 14 MR. VIETH: Thank you, Your Honor. 15 (Which were all the proceedings 16 had at this time.) 17 18 CERTIFICATE OF THE REPORTER I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the 19 record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 2.0 21 22 23 Thomson 24

25